M. Comte de Saint Pierre (C. I.) Abbé de Tiron 9 Bis

A PROJECT

For Settling an

Everlasting Peace

IN

EUROPE.

First Proposed by

HENRY IV. of *France*, and approved of by QUEEN *ELIZABETH*, and most of the then PRINCES of *Europe*, and now discussed at large, and made practicable

By the ABBOT St. *PIERRE*, of the *French* ACADEMY.

Et tum ob hanc, tum ob alias causas utile esset, imò quodammodo factu necessarium, Conventus quosdam haberi Christianarum Potestatum, ubi, per eos quorum res non interest, aliorum Controversiæ definiantur; imò & rationes ineantur cogendi partes ut aquis legibus pacem accipiant.

Grotius de jure belli & pacis, Lib. II. c. 23.

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[Price Two Shillings.]

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ADVERTISEMENT
By the Engliſh *Bookſeller.*

ABOUT a Year ago there was Printed in *Holland* a Volume in Twelves, Intituled, *Memoirs for ſettling an Everlaſting Peace in* Europe. It was incredibly bought up, and read in all the Foreign Courts in *Europe*, though it was but a Sketch of the following Work. The Author, encouraged by that Succeſs, and aſſiſted by Men of the beſt Parts, whom he conſulted, has now given it its true Form, by making conſiderable Alterations in it, and enlarging it one half. It was put into my Hands by a Foreign Gentleman, who reſides here in a Publick Character. And ſince a Reader ſeldom peruſes a Work with Pleaſure 'till he knows ſome Particulars relating to the Author of it, I thought it not improper to let him know that

that he is an eminent *French* Abbot, and of the firſt Quality for Birth: He is Brother to the Marquiſs *de St. Pierre*; his Mother was Aunt to the late Mareſchal *de Bellefond*, and to the preſent Mareſchal *de Villars*; he has been about Twenty Years a Member of the *French* Academy, and is now about Fifty Years old. He is ſaid to be extremely Studious, though of a very tender Conſtitution of Body.

The AUTHOR'S

PREFACE,

Giving a General Idea of the

PROJECT.

MY *Deſign is to propoſe Means for ſettling an Everlaſting Peace amongſt all the Chriſtian States. Let not any Body ask me, what Capacity I have acquired, to handle a Subject of ſo very high a Nature. 'Tis a Queſtion I can make no Anſwer to; for tho' for above theſe three and twenty Years I have done all I could to Inſtruct my ſelf thoroughly in Matters of political Government; becauſe 'tis my Opinion, that Such chiefly deſerve the Attention of a good Citizen; yet, perhaps, I have attain'd none of the Qualities neceſſary to make a Man ſerviceable to his Country. But, to judge of the Value of a Work, does the Reader ſtand in need of any thing beſides the Work itſelf?*

About four Years ago, after having finiſh'd an Eſſay uſeful for the interiour Commerce of the Kingdom, being both an Eye-witneſs of the extreme Miſery to which the People were re-

duc'd by the heavy Taxes, and alſo inform'd, by divers particular Relations, of the exceſſive Contributions, the Forragings, the Deſtructions, the Violences, the Cruelties, and the Murthers which the unhappy Inhabitants of the Frontiers of Chriſtian States daily ſuffer; in ſhort, being ſenſibly touch'd with the Evils which War cauſes to the Princes of Europe, *and their Subjects, I took a Reſolution to penetrate into the firſt Sources of this Evil, and to find out by my own Reflections, whether It was ſo inſeparable from the Nature of Sovereignties and Sovereigns, as to be abſolutely without Remedy; I applied my ſelf to examine this Affair, in order to diſcover whether it was not poſſible to find out ſome practicable Means to terminate their future Differences* without War; *and ſo to render the Peace perpetual amongſt them.*

I beſtow'd formerly, at different times, ſome Thoughts upon this Matter, as the moſt uſeful that great Genius's could employ themſelves upon; but thoſe Thoughts were always without any Succeſs: The Difficulties which aroſe one from t'other, and even from the Nature of Mankind itſelf, always diſcouraged me: 'Tis true, I thought of it only in Places, where, tho' my Mornings where wholly ſpent in reading, or in meditating upon Subjects of this Nature, yet my Mind was a little too much taken off, either by Duties or Amuſements; whereas in the Country, being aſſiſted by the Strength which the Mind receives from the calmneſs and leiſure of Solitude, I thought I might, by an obſtinate and continued Meditation, exhauſt a Subject, which 'till then had not perhaps ever been examin'd with ſo much Attention, as in it ſelf it deſerved to be.

I thought it neceſſary to begin, by making ſome Reflections upon the Happineſs it would be, as well to the Sovereigns of Europe, *as to private Men, to live in Peace, united by ſome permanent Society; and upon the Neceſſity they are at preſent in to have continual Wars with each other, about the Poſſeſſion or Diviſion of ſome Advantages; and finally upon the Means which they have hitherto uſed, either to avoid entering upon thoſe Wars, or not to ſink under them, when once they Have entered upon them.*

I found that all thoſe Means conſiſted in making mutual Promiſes, either in Treaties of Commerce, of Truce, of Peace, wherein Limits of Dominion, and other reciprocal Pretentions are regulated; or elſe in Treaties of Guarantie, or of League offenſive and defenſive, to eſtabliſh, to maintain, or to re-eſtabliſh the Equilibrium *of Power between the Principal Houſes; a Syſtem which hitherto ſeems to be the higheſt Degree of Pru-*

Prudence, that the Sovereigns of Europe, *or their Miniſters, ever carried their Policy to.*

I ſoon perceived, that ſo long as they contented themſelves with ſuch Methods, they would never have any ſufficient Security *for the Execution of Treaties, nor ſufficient Means for terminating equitably, and above all* without War, *their future Differences; and that unleſs they could find out ſome better Ways, the Chriſtian Princes muſt never expect any thing but an almoſt continual War, which can never be interrupted but by ſome Treaties of Peace, or rather by Truces, which are the neceſſary Productions of Equality of Forces, and of the Wearineſs and Exhauſtion of the Combatants, and which in the End muſt be the total Ruin of the Vanquiſhed.* * *'Tis theſe Reflections that are the Subject of the firſt Diſcourſe. I have reduced them all into two Heads, or two Propoſitions, which I propoſe to my ſelf to demonſtrate.*

1ſt. The preſent Conſtitution of *Europe* can never produce any thing elſe but almoſt continual Wars, becauſe it can never procure any *ſufficient Security* for the Execution of Treaties.

2dly. The *Equilibrium* of Power between the Houſe of *France*, and the Houſe of *Auſtria*, cannot procure any *ſufficient Security* either againſt Foreign Wars, or againſt Civil Wars, and conſequently cannot procure any *ſufficient Security* either for the Preſervation of Territory, or for the Preſervation of Commerce.

The firſt Step neceſſary to the obtaining a Cure for a Diſeaſe great, or inveterate, and for which alone nothing but ineffectual Medicines have hitherto been uſed, is to endeavour, on the one Side, to find out the different Cauſes of the Diſeaſe; and, on the other, the Diſproportion of thoſe Medicines with the Diſeaſe it ſelf.

I afterwards conſider'd, whether Sovereigns might not find ſome ſufficient Security *for the Execution of mutual Promiſes, by eſtabliſhing a perpetual Arbitration; and I find, that if the eighteen Principal Sovereignties of* Europe, *in order to maintain the preſent Government, to avoid War, and to pro-*

* Subject of the firſt Diſcourſe.

cure the Advantages of an uninterrupted Commerce between Nation and Nation, would make a Treaty of Union, and a perpetual Congreſs, much after the Model, either of the ſeven Sovereignties of Holland, *the thirteen Sovereignties of the* Swiſſes, *or the Sovereignties of* Germany, *and form an* European Union, *from what is beſt in thoſe Unions, and eſpecially in the* Germanic Union, *which conſiſts of above two hundred Sovereignties: I found, I ſay, that the weakeſt would have a* ſufficient Security, *that the great Power of the ſtrongeſt could not hurt them; that every one would exactly keep their reciprocal Promiſes; that Commerce would never be interrupted, and that all future Differences would be terminated* without War, *by means of Umpires, a Bleſſing which can never be obtain'd any other Way.*

Theſe are the eighteen Principal Chriſtian Sovereignties, which ſhould each of them have a Voice in the general Diet of Europe: 1. France, 2. Spain, 3. England, 4. Holland, 5. Portugal, 6. Switzerland, *and the Aſſociates,* 7. Florence, *and the Aſſociates,* 8. Genoa, *and Aſſociates,* 9. *The Eccleſiaſtick State,* 10. Venice, 11. Savoy, 12. Lorrain, 13. Denmark, 14. Courland *and* Dantzick, *&c.* 15. *The Emperor and Empire,* 16. Poland, 17. Sweden, 18. Muſcovy. *I ſet down the Empire only as one Sovereignty, becauſe it is but one Body:* Holland *too is mention'd but for one Sovereignty, becauſe that Republick, tho' it conſiſts of ſeven Sovereign Republicks, is but one Body; the ſame of* Switzerland.

In examining the Government of the Sovereigns of Germany, *I did not find that there would be more Difficulty in forming the* European Body *now, than formerly there was in forming the* Germanick Body, *in executing* in great *that which has been already executed* in little; *on the contrary, I found that there would be fewer Obſtacles, and more Facility, in forming the* European Body; *and what greatly perſwaded me that this Project was no Chimera, was the Information I received from one of my Friends, ſoon after I had ſhewn him the firſt Sketch of this Work: He told me that* Henry IV. *had form'd a Project, which, in the main, was much the ſame; and ſo I found in the Memoirs of the Duke of* Sully, *his Prime Miniſter; and in Monſieur* de Perefixe's *Hiſtory of his Reign: Nay more, I found that this Project had been even agreed to by a great many Princes, in the Beginning of the laſt Century: This gave me Occaſion from thence to draw ſome Inferences, to*

prove

prove that the Thing was far from being impracticable: * *And this is the Subject of the Second Diſcourſe.*

1*ſt*. The ſame Motives and the ſame Means that formerly ſufficed to form *a permanent Society* of all the Sovereignties of *Germany*, are within the Reach and Power of the preſent Sovereigns, and may ſuffice to form *a permanent Society* of all the Chriſtian Sovereignties of *Europe*.

2*dly*. The Approbation which moſt of the Sovereigns of *Europe* gave to the Project for *an European Society*, which *Henry the Great* propoſed to them, proves that it may be hoped ſuch a Project will be approved of by their Succeſſors.

Theſe Models of permanent Societies, the Approbation that was given, an hundred Years ago, to the Project of Henry *the Great, are ſufficient to produce two very great Prepoſſeſſions in favour of the Poſſibility of this: I know the Weight of Prepoſſeſſions, and that they make more Impreſſions upon the Generality of Minds, than true Arguments, fetch'd from the very Bottom of the Subject, and from neceſſary Conſequences of the firſt Principles; but I plainly foreſee they will never be ſufficient entirely to determine Spirits of the firſt Order; that They will be continually finding out Differences and Inequalities between the* European Society, *which I propoſe, and the Societies I quote as Models; that* Henry IV, *might after all be deceived in thinking That* poſſible, *which was in reality* impoſſible. *Thus I find my ſelf obliged to demonſtrate every Thing ſtrictly, and am reſolved to uſe my utmoſt Endeavours, to trace back thoſe very* Motives, *which induced the Ancient Sovereigns of* Germany, *and thoſe of the laſt Century, to deſire an unalterable Peace; and ſhall try to find out Methods, better than theirs, to form a more important Eſtabliſhment.*

As for ſufficient Motives, *I believe that if any one could propoſe a Treaty which might render the Union ſolid and unalterable, and ſo give every one a* ſufficient Security *for the Perpetuity of the Peace, the Princes would find therein much fewer Inconveniencies, and thoſe much leſs great, a greater Number of Advantages, and thoſe much more great, than in the preſent Syſtem of War; that a great many Sovereigns,*

* Subject of the ſecond Diſcourſe.

eſpecially the leaſt powerful, would begin by Signing it, and afterwards would preſent it to others to Sign; and that even the moſt powerful, if they examined it thoroughly, would ſoon find they could never embrace any Reſolution, nor ſign any Treaty, near ſo Advantagious as this would be.

As for practicable and ſufficient Means, *which conſiſt in the Articles of a Treaty of Union, made to be to every one a* ſufficient Security *for the Perpetuity of the Peace, I have ſpared no Pains to invent them, and I believe I have done it.*

Now, as on the one ſide, thoſe who have read the firſt Sketches of the fourth Diſcourſe agree, that a Treaty which ſhould be compoſed of ſuch Articles, would form that ſufficient Security, *ſo ſought after by Politicians; and as, on the other ſide, the ſigning of thoſe Articles depends ſolely* upon the Will *of the Sovereigns, and all thoſe Princes would be ſo much the more inclined to be* willing *to Sign them, and to procure the Execution of them, the more evidently they ſhall have ſeen the Greatneſs of the Advantages they may reap from them: We may conclude, that on their ſide there will be no Impoſſibility found in the Execution of the Project; and that the more they ſhall be convinc'd of this Security, and theſe Advantages, the more eaſily they will be brought to execute it. The whole Project then is contain'd in this ſingle Argument.*

* If the *European Society*, which is propos'd, can procure for all the Chriſtian Princes a *ſufficient Security* for the Perpetuity of the Peace, both without and within their Dominions, there is none of them that will not find it more advantageous to ſign the Treaty for the Eſtabliſhment of that Society, than not to ſign it.

‡ Now the *European Society*, which is propos'd, *can* procure, for all the Chriſtian Princes, a *ſufficient Security* for the Perpetuity of the Peace both within and without their Dominions.

† Therefore there will be none of them but what will find it much more advantageous to ſign the Treaty for the Eſtabliſhment of that Society, than not to ſign it.

The Major, or the firſt Propoſition, contains the Motives, *and the Proof of it may be found in the third Diſcourſe after the Preliminary Diſcourſes, which I thought neceſſary, in order to diſpoſe the*

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* Subject of the third Diſcourſe. ‡ Subject of the fourth Diſcourſe. † Purpoſe of the Work.

the Mind of the Reader to conceive the Force of the Demonſtration. The Minor, or the ſecond Propoſition, contains the Means; the Proof of it may be found in the fourth Diſcourſe. As for the laſt Propoſition, or the Concluſion, that is the End that I propos'd to my ſelf in this Work.

As this Project may begin to be known in the Courts of Europe, *either in the middle, or towards the end of a War, or in the Conferences, or after the Concluſion of a Peace, or even in the midſt of a profound Peace,* ‡ *it was neceſſary to ſhew compendiouſly in the fifth Diſcourſe, that upon any of thoſe Occaſions it would produce both a great Facility in concluding the Peace, and a great deſire to render it perpetual, if it was concluded.*

Having obſerv'd that ſeveral were of Opinion, that even though the Sovereigns of Europe *ſhould one by one have ſign'd the Treaty of Union, yet there would, in all appearance, remain ſome Difficulties, almoſt inſurmountable, in the Formation of the Congreſs, and in* the Means *how to begin and maintain ſuch an Eſtabliſhment:* * *I was oblig'd, in order to remove this Doubt, to propoſe, in the Sixth Diſcourſe, ſeveral Articles, to which the Sovereigns* may agree: *Not that I thought there could be none propos'd more uſeful, for the rendring the Eſtabliſhment more ſolid in it ſelf, and more convenient for each Member. All I pretend to prove is, that thoſe feign'd Difficulties, which Men may form to themſelves, with reſpect to the Execution of the Eſtabliſhment, are very far from being inſurmountable, ſince even the Articles that I propoſe are* ſufficient *for that Execution, and that nothing hinders the Sovereigns from agreeing to them.*

Such is the Analyſis, ſuch the Order I have follow'd in this Work; this is the Fruit I have gather'd from my Meditations for above four Years; this is the Uſe I have made of the judicious Criticiſms of my Friends; and now, if ever any Body propos'd a Subject worthy to be attentively examin'd by the moſt excellent Wits, and eſpecially by the wiſeſt Miniſters and the beſt Princes, it may be ſaid, that this is it; ſince it treats of no leſs than of the Means how to procure to all the Sovereigns and Nations of Europe, *the greateſt Felicity that a new Eſtabliſhment can poſſibly ever procure them.*

It is eaſie to comprehend, that the more Methods this Project ſhall carry in it, for rendring the Peace of Europe *unal-*

‡ Subject of the fifth Diſcourſe. * Subject of the ſixth Diſcourſe.

terable, the more it may contribute to facilitate the Concluſion of that which is now treating at Utrecht: *For the Allies of the Houſe of* Auſtria *deſire Peace as much as we do; but they do not care for it, without* ſufficient Security *for its Duration. And indeed, if we were to examin the Intereſt of thoſe Allies in the preſent War, we ſhould find, that it all turns upon two principal Heads: The Firſt is a* ſufficient Security *for the Preſervation of their Dominions againſt the great Power of the Houſe of* France, *which may, in time, find ſpecious Pretences and favourable Opportunities to make Conqueſts upon them, and to introduce into their Country a Religion and Government for which they have a very great Averſion. The other Head is, a* ſufficient Security *for Liberty of Commerce; whether that of* America, *or that of the* Mediterranean; *in thoſe two Commerces conſiſts above half the Revenue of* England *and* Holland.

But what ſufficient Securities *can be found for the Weakeſt againſt the Strongeſt? There are but two Syſtems for this; the firſt is, if it can be done,* ſufficiently *to weaken the Strongeſt; which is either impoſſible, or ruinous; though it is that which the Allies follow in the preſent War, to arrive at their Chimerical* Equilibrium. *The ſecond is,* ſufficiently *to fortifie the Weaker, and to give him a Force ſufficiently ſuperior, without depriving the Stronger of any of his Force; which is what I propoſe to do by a Treaty of Society, that might give to the Weaker a new Augmentation of very ſtrong Allies, and who would be ſo much the ſtronger, as they would be much more cloſely united; not to deprive the Stronger of any thing he poſſeſſes, but to take from him the Power of ever diſturbing the others, either in their Poſſeſſions at home, or in their Commerce abroad.*

In my ſecond Draught I took in all the Kingdoms of the World; but my Friends obſerv'd to me, that even though in following Ages moſt of the Sovereigns of Aſia *and* Africa *might deſire to be receiv'd into the Union, yet this Proſpect would ſeem ſo remote, and ſo full of Difficulties, that it would caſt an Air of Impoſſibility upon the whole Project, which would diſguſt all the Readers, and make ſome believe, that tho' it were even reſtrain'd only to the Chriſtian part of* Europe, *the Execution of it would be ſtill impoſſible; therefore I ſubſcribed to their Opinion, and that the more willingly, conſidering, that the Union of* Europe *would ſuffice to preſerve* Europe *always in Peace; and that it would be powerful enough to maintain its Frontiers and Commerce, in ſpight of thoſe who ſhould en-*

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deavour to diſturb it. The General Council It might eſtabliſh in the Indies, *would ſoon become the Arbiter of the Sovereigns of that Country, and, by its Authority, hinder them from taking up Arms; the Credit of the Union would be much the greater amongſt them, as they would be aſſur'd, that it only deſired Securities for its Commerce; that that Commerce cannot but be very advantageous to them; that it does not aim at any Conqueſts; and that it will never look upon any as Enemies, but thoſe who were Enemies to Peace.*

If the Reader is willing to form a ſound Judgment of the Work, it is, in my Opinion, neceſſary that he ſhould make a ſtop at the end of every Diſcourſe, and ask himſelf what Effect the Proofs I bring have upon him. If he thinks them ſufficient, he may go on; but if he does not think them ſo, That may proceed, either from his ſtill meeting with Difficulties, or from his not having read ſome Paſſages with Attention enough; and nothing is more common, even with the moſt thoughtful Readers, than ſometimes to want Attention. In the firſt Caſe he need only make a Note of his Doubts, and obſerve, whether they be not ſufficiently clear'd up in the following part of the Work. In the ſecond Caſe, the only Remedy is, to read over again the Paſſages he did not well underſtand; otherwiſe he would act like a Judge, that ſhould report and make a Judgment after a ſuperficial Reading, and without having given ſufficient Attention to the principal Evidences of the Cauſe. I have endeavour'd to make a Concatenation between the Thoughts, that the Mind might the more eaſily comprehend them. Now thoſe who are no attentive enough to perceive this Concatenation, can never be ſenſible of the Force of particular Arguments, and much leſs of the Force of a Demonſtration, which reſults from the Aſſemblage of thoſe Arguments.

I own the Title gives a Prejudice to the Work; but as I am perſuaded, that it is not impoſſible to find out Means ſufficient and practicable to ſettle an Everlaſting Peace among Chriſtians; and even believe, that the Means which I have thought of are of that Nature; I imagin'd, that if I my ſelf firſt ſeem'd to be uncertain, as to the Solidity of thoſe Means, and doubtful of the Poſſibility of executing them, the Readers, tho' never ſo well diſpos'd in favour of the Syſtem, might really doubt of it too, and that their real Doubtfulneſs might, perhaps, go further than my affected Doubtfulneſs. It is not with things, in which the Deſign is to perſuade Men to Action, as it is with things of pure Speculation; the Pilot who himſelf ſeems uncertain of the Succeſs of his Voyage, is not likely to perſuade the

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Paſſenger to imbark; the Undertaker who himſelf ſeems to doubt of the Solidity of an important Work which he propoſed to undertake, is not at all likely to perſuade others to join in the Enterprize. Therefore I choſe rather to venture being thought ridiculous in aſſuming an affirmative Stile, and promiſing in the Title all that I hope to make good in the Body of the Work, than to run the riſque, by a falſe Air of Modeſty and Uncertainty, of doing the leaſt wrong to the Publick, by making Men of Senſe look upon this Project as whimſical and impoſſible to be put in execution, when I, my ſelf, form'd it, in full Expectation to ſee it one Day executed.

A PROJECT

For Settling an

Everlaſting PEACE

IN

EUROPE.

Firſt DISCOURSE.

The Means hitherto uſed for the maintaining of Peace, are utterly ineffectual.

THE Hiſtories of former Ages, the Experience we have of what has hitherto paſs'd before our own Eyes, convince us but too much, that Wars are eaſily kindled, that they cauſe an infinite number of Misfortunes, and that it is very hard to extinguiſh them; but every Body does not know, that the Means hitherto us'd to prevent them, are in themſelves very ineffectual; and that as they are at preſent, they bear no Proportion to the Effect that is hop'd for from them; and 'tis that Diſproportion, or the Cauſe of ſuch Inefficacy, that I propoſe to evince in this Diſcourſe.

Theſe Means may be reduc'd to Two: The one regards Treaties between Sovereigns, and what may be expected from them: The other regards the *Equilibrium* between the two moſt Powerful Houſes in *Europe*. Therefore I ſhall reduce my Diſcourſe to two Heads, which ſhall be compriſed under two Propoſitions. The

The FIRST PROPOSITION to be demonſtrated.

The preſent Conſtitution of Europe *can never produce any thing elſe but almoſt continual Wars, becauſe it can never procure any* ſufficient Security *for the Execution of Treaties.*

MAnkind may live in Peace: So long as they have nothing of any ſort to be diſputed or divided between them, they mutually obtain, and procure to each other, ſeveral Conveniences, ſeveral conſiderable Advantages, by means of the Commerce they have with one another; and this unites them: But when they have any thing to be diſputed or divided between them; each of them, about the Poſſeſſion of the Whole, or the greater or leſſer Share in the Diviſion, generally departs from Equity, which alone is able to ſerve them for a Rule in the Deciſion, and for a Preſervative againſt Diſ-union: It almoſt always happens, that in Proportion as their Deſires are violent, they each of them inlarge their Pretenſions, and their Mind is then employ'd only in repreſenting them to themſelves as juſt. Thus, of neceſſity, Intereſt muſt ſometimes unite them, and Intereſt muſt ſometimes divide them.

Were they ſo wiſe as they ought to be, they would ſoon find, that the Intereſt which tends to keep them united, is much greater than the Intereſt which tends to divide them. Some indeed, in conſideration of the Advantages of Commerce, which they are willing to preſerve, do voluntarily give up ſome of their Pretenſions: But the major part, hurried away by the Violence of their Deſires, do not well conſider what they ſhall loſe by the Ceſſation of Commerce; and in the midſt of the Diſorder which Paſſion occaſions in their Soul, 'tis in vain to repreſent to them what would be their greateſt Advantage, what in it ſelf moſt equitable; they then look upon Profit as Loſs, and Equity her ſelf as Injuſtice.

The Deſire of Satisfaction for a Wrong ſuppoſed to be received; of revenging himſelf by Reprizals; of taking or retaking that which he imagines to be his Right; the Jealouſie of Power, or Reputation; the Pleaſure in mortifying, in humbling a Neighbour, who, he thinks, has given him cauſe to be diſcontented: All theſe are ſo many Sources of Quarrels, which cannot but ariſe in the Heart of Man; neither can they fail inceſſantly to produce Differences, either with Reaſon, or with Pretence; or without Reaſon and without Pre-

Pretence. Thus Mankind, who ſeem to be created only to enjoy the Bleſſings which Society procures, are often obliged, for the Poſſeſſion and Dividing of thoſe ſame Bleſſings, to re-enter into a State of Diviſion. It even is not ſufficient for avoiding of Conteſts, that one of the Pretenders be equitable; for tho' he of himſelf ſhould ſubmit to Reaſon, yet if t'other does not do the ſame, they can never agree; ſo that, in order to make good their Pretenſions, they are both oblig'd to have recourſe to other Means than reciprocal and voluntary Conceſſions.

But what way is there to put an End to their Differences, and Bounds to their Pretenſions? We know all the Ways; there are but two ſorts, according to the two ſorts of the Pretenders; either Force or Law: For either the two Pretenders make a part, and are Members of ſome *permanent Society*, or they do not make a part of it: If they do not make a part of it, their Differences cannot be terminated by Laws, nor, conſequently, by the Judges or Interpreters of Laws; as they have the Misfortune to be deſtitute of the Advantages of a perpetual Commerce and of a *permanent Society*, ſo alſo have they the Misfortune to be deſtitute of the Advantage of Laws, which diſtribute to every one what lawfully belongs to him. Thus, to obtain what each of 'em looks upon as his Right, they are unhappily oblig'd to ſurprize one another by Deceit, or to deſtroy each other by Force, that is, by War.

Such is the Condition of the Heads of Families among *Savages*, who live without Law: Such the State of the petty Kings of *Africa*, of the miſerable *Caciques*, or petty Sovereigns of *America:* Nay, ſuch is the preſent Condition of our *European* Sovereigns; as they have as yet no *permanent Society* among them, they have no Law whereby to decide their Differences *without War:* For even tho' by the Conventions of their Treaties, they were able to foreſee and decide all the Accidents that might poſſibly give birth to their Differences; yet, can thoſe Conventions ever be looked upon as inviolable Laws, ſo long as it remains in the Power of one or other of the Pretenders to violate them, under Pretences which thoſe who are unwilling to ſubmit to them never are without; and will not each of them have the Power to violate them, according to his Caprice, ſo long as neither the one nor the other is under a neceſſity of obſerving them? And what can reduce them to that happy Neceſſity, but the ſuperior Force of *a Society permanent and ſufficiently powerful*, if they made a part of it? But as yet they have

have not form'd a Society *permanent and ſufficiently powerful.* Some indeed have form'd Societies by Treaties of Leagues and Alliances; but as thoſe Treaties have nothing in them that's binding, any longer than during the Pleaſure of the Allies, they are not *permanent Societies.* Some others have even begun to form *permanent Societies*, ſuch as the thirteen *Switz Cantons*, the ſeven Sovereignties of the *Netherlands*; but as they have not taken Aſſociates enough into their Society, it is not *ſufficiently powerful.*

Thus the ſole Means that Sovereigns have to obtain their Pretenſions, is War; for as for Umpires, what good will their Sentence do, when the Perſon condemn'd cannot be conſtrain'd to execute it, and when they are ſtill neceſſitated to return to the Means of Force, or War, to oblige him thereto? And as that Means has ſeveral Inconveniencies, which we ſhall make known in the Sequel, we will here only obſerve upon ſome few, which fall in with the Subject of this Diſcourſe.

The Firſt Inconvenience.

THIS Method of terminating a Difference by War, does not really terminate it, ſo long as the two Pretenders, or their Succeſſors, ſubſiſt; ſince the ill Succeſs of a War never yet perſuaded him who had the worſt of it, that he undertook it wrongfully: Thus he does not really give up his Pretenſions; on the contrary, he only multiplies them, on account of the Loſſes and Charges he has been at in the War; and of the Portion of Territory which he was forced to yield up in the Treaty that put a ſtop to it: We may eaſily imagine, that in order to revive his former Pretenſions, and make new Demands, he only waits till he become more ſtrong, or his Enemy more weak, either by Minorities, or by Domeſtick Diſſenſions, or by ſome long and waſteful foreign War: Thus it is plain, that among Perſons who are not Members of ſome *Society ſufficiently powerful and permanent*, eſtabliſh'd upon good Laws, Pretenſions can never be really terminated, but by the Deſtruction of one or other of the Pretenders.

And indeed, ever ſince there have been Sovereigns in the World, War has never diſcontinued, Pretenſions have never ceaſed, Differences have never been perfectly terminated, but by the Fall and Ruin of Sovereign Houſes, and by the Overthrow of their Dominions. We need but open the Hiſtories of Nations, and we ſhall meet with none but what have been many times overthrown; we ſhall ſee nothing

thing but Families of illuſtrious Sovereigns fall'n to nothing; and that becauſe hitherto there have been no ſure Means for putting an end to their Differences *without War*.

The Pretenders, who are of *a Society permanent and ſufficiently powerful*, will not be ſo oblig'd to deſtroy each other to obtain their Pretenſions. If each of them has an hundred thouſand Livres *per Annum*, and if that which is in diſpute between them is worth a thouſand Livres *per Annum*, neither they, nor their Deſcendants, are oblig'd to have a perpetual and immortal War: Thus, one of them may loſe his Pretenſion, without running a riſque to loſe the reſt of his Eſtate; and neither need to fear from the other, for himſelf or his People, either Burnings, Wounds, Murther, nor any other Violence. How do they get this Advantage? By being both Members of *a Society permanent and ſufficiently powerful*. Now we know that no Society can ſubſiſt but by Laws, which may cure the Diviſion of its Members, and keep them united notwithſtanding any ſlight Cauſes of Diviſion. Theſe Laws are the true Bonds of Society; theſe Bonds are ſtrong and laſting, in proportion as the Laws are convenient for the Aſſociates, equitable, clear, calculated for a great diverſity of Accidents, and alſo in proportion as they are well obſerv'd, and eſpecially, well authorized and maintained by the Strength of the whole Society, againſt thoſe who, in the Heat of their Paſſion, without reflecting upon the Bleſſings of Society, ſhould be ſo mad as to endeavour to deſtroy it, as much as lies in their Power, by reſiſting the Judges, the living Interpreters of thoſe Laws.

The Pretenders, who do not belong to ſuch a Society, may each of them ſay, the Fiſhing in this Sea, in this River, is wholly mine, *becauſe it is my Pleaſure that it ſhould be ſo*. As there is no Law amongſt them, all their Rule, all their Law, conſiſts in their Will and Pleaſure; and the only Means they have to decide their Difference, is that which may coſt them a hundred times as much as the Thing in diſpute is worth.

Two Pretenders that are in a Society do not talk thus: Each of them may pretend to the Fiſhing of a River; but there is another Rule than their Will, and that is, the Law: Each of them quotes ſome Article of the Law to juſtifie his Pretenſions; and, in order to terminate their Difference, they are both under the happy Neceſſity of appealing to the Judgment of thoſe whom the Society has eſtabliſh'd Interpreters of the Law. Now ſuch Judgment abſolutely and for ever terminates their Differences, and by wholly annihilating

hilating their Pretenſions, puts them out of the unhappy Neceſſity of ruining their Neighbours to preſerve themſelves; all the Pretenders are preſerved, They, their Families, and their Eſtates; whereas the *Means of War* can never annihilate the reciprocal Pretenſions of thoſe Men who Live without Law, I mean, of Sovereigns, but by annihilating the Fortune and Family of one of the Pretenders. This is the firſt Inconvenience; this is the Effect of the want of Society among Sovereigns, and of a *Society permanent and ſufficiently powerful.*

II. *Inconvenience.*

BETWEEN the Children, and between all the Deſcendants and Succeſſors of Sovereigns, who have once been in War, Pretenſions are never perfectly annihilated: Hence it happens, that in the midſt even of Peace, they are always, and with Reaſon, in diſtruſt, and oblig'd to be at very great Expences to ſtand upon their Guard, one againſt another; and that there never is any ſolid and permanent Ties between them for Commerce.

On the contrary, nothing is more common in a permanent Society, than to ſee a ſtrict Friendſhip and mutual Intercourſe between the Children of thoſe who have had a Law-Suit with one another; and this is becauſe thoſe Suits are really terminated, and all their Pretenſions are entirely annihilated: Thus each of them, in full Confidence, enjoys all the Advantages of Commerce.

III. *Inconvenience.*

THE Sovereigns of *Europe* have no *ſufficient Security* for the Preſervation of their Dominions; for be they never ſo powerful, Diviſion may happen in their Family, in their State; the Princes may fall into Minority, or into Imbecility: Beſides this, if they are weak they may be invaded and conquered by Neighbours that are more powerful; thus they have no ſufficient Security that they and their Poſterity ſhall quietly and long poſſeſs what they do now poſſeſs: There is as yet no *permanent Society* eſtabliſhed, that might be *powerful* enough to protect them in Times of Weakneſs againſt the Efforts of the Ambitious, who are in their Time of Strength: On the contrary, if in a Society, a Lord leaves Children in Minority, the Law provides for the Safety of their Perſons, the Preſervation of their Eſtates; and the Strength of the Society defends them againſt all manner of Violence, or Uſurpation.

Beſides,

Beſides, They whoſe Differences have been terminated by Judgment, are ſure of quietly poſſeſſing that which belongs to them; and this is becauſe the ſame Law which regulates and divides what belongs to one, what belongs to the other, what each of them ought ſeparately to poſſeſs, does, by its Authority, defend them from all Invaſion and Diſpoſſeſſion, and this Authority proceeds from the *all-powerful, or ſufficiently powerful* Force of the Society, a Power againſt which it would be in vain for a Member to rebel; and he would be ſo much the more deterred from reſiſting, as the Puniſhment of ſuch Reſiſtance is great and inevitable. Now the Security every one has for himſelf and Poſterity, quietly to poſſeſs what he does poſſeſs, and alſo what he may farther acquire, is one of the greateſt Advantages a Man can enjoy, and he cannot enjoy it but in a Society, nor any longer than that Society ſhall endure.

IV. *Inconvenience.*

SOVEREIGNS may give one another their Words; engage themſelves by mutual Promiſes, and ſign reciprocal Treaties; but there is no *ſufficient Security* that one of the Contractants will not change his Mind; or that one of their Succeſſors will not ſet up ſome old or new Pretenſion, for a Colour not to execute that which he has promiſed; and if one of them change his Mind, what *ſufficient Security* is there that he ſhall be conſtrained to do Juſtice by a ſuperior Force? For when there is no Security for the voluntary Execution of a Promiſe, there muſt at leaſt be ſome *ſufficient Security*, that that Promiſe ſhall be executed by means of Force, notwithſtanding the Change of Mind in him who made that Engagement. Now where can that *ſufficient Security* be found, except it be in a *Force permanent and ſufficiently ſuperior*? For if the Refuſer thinks himſelf able to ſurmount it, he will re-commence the War, inſtead of maintaining the Peace; but in the preſent Conſtitution of *Europe*, can there be found a *permanent Force ſufficiently ſuperior*, whereby to put every Sovereign quite out of Hopes of ſucceeding by taking up Arms?

If there is any Obſcurity in the Treaty, who is there to explain it? If any Equivocation, who is there to remove it with a *ſufficient Authority*? For when one of the Parties is deſirous to avoid acquitting himſelf of an Engagement, let Equity appear never ſo viſibly, either by the Articles of the Treaty, or Judgment of Arbitrators, all this is uſeleſs without two Conditions eſſential to Arbitration: The firſt is, that the Arbitrators be more powerful than him who ſhould

refuſe to execute either the Articles of the Treaty, or their Judgment, and that their Superiority of Forces be great enough to put him out of all Hopes of ſurmounting it, and all Temptations of reſiſting it: The ſecond is, That the Arbitrators be *ſufficiently Intereſted* to purſue ſuch Execution. Now this is what is utterly impoſſible among Sovereigns in the preſent Conſtitution of *Europe*, where there is as yet no general and perpetual Congreſs of their Deputies, *no permanent Society* form'd, no Convention for the Eſtabliſhment of Laws proper either to put ſure and immutable Bounds to Dominions, or to decide and prevent the Cauſes of Diviſion which may happen among them, or to render Commerce univerſal, free, equal, certain, perpetual, amongſt all Nations; or laſtly, to render this Society of Arbitrators ſufficiently powerful, and perfectly unmovable.

On the contrary, the Nobles of one and the ſame State have the Advantage of a Commerce free, equal, certain, perpetual, and univerſal in the Extent of the ſame State with their Equals, whether with the more Rich, whether with the leſs Rich: And as Commerce cannot always be carried on by actual Exchangements, that may be ſupplied by promiſſary Exchangements. A Promiſe in that Caſe eſpecially if it be Written, or in a Treaty, is equivalent to an actual Exchange and Payment: Becauſe the Society, of which thoſe Lords are Members, authoriſes thoſe Promiſes, is itſelf a Security for them, and is always ready to lend its Force againſt him, who, having changed his Mind, would avoid keeping his Promiſe: He is obliged to ſtand to his Word, becauſe there is a Law, a ſuperior Force, which would conſtrain him to do it, whether he will or no, and which would even infallibly puniſh him for his bootleſs Reſiſtance.

What can reſtrain, what can curb a Man hurried away by the Movement of an unlawful Paſſion? But one thing, and that is, a contrary Movement cauſed by a ſtronger Paſſion, either Deſire or Fear; but as it is ſeldom poſſible to raiſe in him ſuddenly a greater Deſire than that which actuates him, the Law is obliged to raiſe in him the Fear of an Evil more grievous and terrible, than the Good he aims at can appear deſirable: For what is it that determines the Subject to comply with a Sentence, by which he is condemn'd, and which he thinks very unjuſt, but his knowing that if he ſhould reſiſt the Power of the Judges, it would be but in vain, and that he would likewiſe run the Riſque of forfeiting the reſt of his Eſtate, and that of his Family, if he ſhould oppoſe his Force to that of the Society? Thus

Thus Fear ſilences the ſharpeſt and moſt impetuous Paſſions, and leads that Member of the Society, whether he will or no, to Peace, that is, to his own Intereſt.

He would perhaps be ſo imprudent as to wiſh that the Society had neither Will nor Power to inforce the Execution of that Sentence; without conſidering that if it were ſo, it would for the ſame Reaſon want Will and Power to inforce the Execution of ſeveral Sentences of much greater Importance, which himſelf or his Predeceſſors have obtain'd, or which his Poſterity ſhall obtain againſt thoſe who ſhall ſue them without juſt Cauſe: He would be glad not to be obliged to execute a Clauſe in a Contract; without conſidering, that for the ſame Reaſon the Society neither could nor would oblige his Debtors to execute the Promiſes they have made him by the like Contracts; thus his Tenants might let alone paying him his Rent, and from being very rich, he would in a Moment become poor and miſerable. He does not perceive in his Paſſion, that the very Law, which he deſires to have the Liberty of infringing and annulling, is the only Source of his Riches, and even the Safe-guard of his Life: Thus the Society, by its great Force, may ſtrike the Aſſociate with a Fear great enough to put a ſtop to the Tranſport of a great Paſſion; thus a ſalutary Fear forces him to obſerve a Law, which in the main is infinitely Advantageous to him.

V. *Inconvenience.*

SUCH is the Conſtitution of *Europe*, that the Sovereigns are not ſure of Juſtice in Affairs, even of ſmall Importance, without reſolving to be at the immenſe Charge of Armaments by Sea and Land; 'tis becauſe they have no *Society permanent and ſufficiently powerful*: They have agreed upon no Laws that might ſerve either to fix the Bounds of the Territories of each State, or to render the Commerce between their People convenient, ſafe, equal, univerſal, and perpetual: They have pitch'd upon no Arbitrators or Interpreters of the Laws of their Society, and ſo long as they ſhall remain without Society, they can find no Remedy for their Misfortunes.

Two Lords that are at Law with each other, do not take up Arms, neither they, nor their Kindred, nor their Friends, nor their Domeſticks, nor their Vaſſals: They truſt neither their Lives nor Fortunes to the Chance of a Battle: To obtain Juſtice they're not oblig'd to be at the Charge of an Armament, which would coſt them twenty times the value of the Thing contended for: They are not obliged to ſup-

Port that ruinous Expence for ſeveral Years; but how come they by this great Advantage? By being Members of a *permanent Society.*

VI. *Inconvenience.*

IN every Society, thoſe who have no Law Suit of their own, are not ſo unhappy as to be conſtrain'd to join in the Law Suits of their Neighbours; but among Sovereigns it is not ſo; every Sovereign is obliged to fear, leſt any of his Neighbours ſhould grow too powerful by his Conqueſts; thus when a War breaks out between two Princes, it of neceſſity kindles, by little and little, among ſeveral others, and the Reaſon is the juſt Fear of the Aggrandizement of a Neighbour, who might grow unjuſt and turn an Enemy. Now ſo long as the particular Societies of *Europe* do not form a general Society, ſo long as the particular States do not compoſe a perpetual Aſſembly of the General States of *Europe*, ſo long as all thoſe Members remain ſeparate, and do not make the *Europæan Body*, there is no *ſufficient Preſervative* againſt thoſe Misfortunes. There is abſolutely need of a Society which may prevent all important Differences, and terminate all petty ones, *without War*; a Union, whoſe principal Baſis ſhould be to hinder all Aggrandizement of Territory, by keeping every one within his actual Limits; for as for the other ſorts of Aggrandizement, which may happen from good Policy, the Perfection of Laws, uſeful Eſtabliſhments, the Progreſs of Arts and Sciences, or the Augmentation of Commerce; far from being forbidden, they ſhould on the contrary be propoſed to the ableſt Princes, as one of the principal Recompences of their Abilities.

The Sovereigns are about making a Peace: the wiſeſt will take all poſſible Guarantees and Securities to make it laſting; but what Guarantees, what *ſufficient Securities* can they take for that Duration? If they let *Europe* continue in the Conſtitution and Form it is now in, is it not in the Power of any Prince that is diſſatisfied with the Peace, to recommence the War in two Years time? Can his Neighbours, on their ſide, avoid arming, and taking part in this War? Who can hinder him from arming? For, in ſhort, what is it can engage this Sovereign to take up Arms? Is it not the ſole Hope of bettering his Condition? What is it that can diſſuade him from taking them up? Is it not the well grounded Fear of making his Condition incomparably worſe? But what can cauſe that Fear? a Force *ſufficiently Superior* to his own. But where can that Force be found, till all the Forces of *Europe* be united into one Body?

VII. *In-*

VII. *Inconvenience.*

THOUGH two Lords are at Law, yet their Vaſſals continue their Commerce with one another; but a War between Sovereigns wholly interrupts all Commerce between their Subjects. Thoſe who have examined what *France* gets by her Foreign Commerce agree, that it amounts at leaſt to a third part of the value of all the Revenues of the Kingdom in Land, now theſe Revenues amount to above four hundred and fifty Millions, inclusive of the Clergy; now if *France* were deprived of all Foreign Commerce, ſhe would every Year loſe above a hundred and fifty Millions.

The Foreign Commerce of the *Engliſh* amounts to twice as much as the Revenue of *England* in Land; ſo that if they have an hundred and ten Millions in Land, their Foreign Commerce brings them in above two hundred and twenty Millions. As for the *Dutch*, their Commerce is worth to them yet more in proportion, and amounts to four times as much as their Revenue in Land; for if this latter amounts to fifty Millions, their Foreign Commerce brings them in above two hundred Millions. Now is it not plain, that ſo long as there is no *permanent Society* amongſt the Chriſtian States, the Commerce between their Subjects will be often interrupted? And what prodigious Loſſes do thoſe frequent Interruptions cauſe, both to Sovereigns and their Subjects?

Reflection upon theſe Inconveniencies.

ANY body wou'd think, were he on one ſide to conſider all the Misfortunes that Princes ſuffer for want of forming a Society among themſelves; and on the other ſide, all the Advantages which Aſſociates reap from the permanent Society they are Members of; any one wou'd think, I ſay, that I would conclude, that the Condition of a rich and powerful Subject would, all things conſider'd, be preferable to that of his Sovereign; but it is not difficult to comprehend, that when I related the Misfortunes of the one, and the Advantages of the other; all I endeavoured to prove was, that were it not for Society every Subject wou'd live like a Savage, without any Security either for his Eſtate, or for the Preſervation of his Family, or even for his Life, and that he would be daily in danger of being ſurpriſed and murthered by him with whom he had any thing to diſpute or divide; and that having no Law for the Security of any Lands, any Moveables, or any other Goods, he would be daily obliged to Combat againſt Neceſſity, in perpetual Uneaſineſs for his own Subſiſtance and that of his Family, as

are the Heads of Families among Savages. I intended to prove but one thing, namely, that it is infinitely more advantageous for every Man to be in a *permanent Society* with his Equals, and with thoſe that were almoſt his Equals, than not to be in one; and from hence I have concluded, that the Chriſtian Sovereigns will always want one infinite Happineſs, till they make a *permanent Society* among themſelves, to give the weakeſt ſufficient Security againſt the ſtrongeſt, to prevent the chief Cauſes of Diviſion among them, to have at hand an infallible Means to obtain Juſtice *without War*, in what little Differences may remain, and to have ſufficient Security for the Continuation of Commerce among all the Chriſtian Nations.

This is the Purpoſe of the Compariſon I made between the Bleſſings that are produced by a *permanent Society* in general; and the Evils that are cauſed by a *non Society*; it is therefore eaſie to comprehend, that all this Compariſon is made only to demonſtrate that by a new Society among Equals, the Sovereigns of *Europe* might make their Condition much better than it is at preſent, on the one ſide by preſerving and increaſing all the Advantages of Sovereigns, and on the other by acquiring all the new Advantages which they will reap from the new Quality of Member of *a permanent Society*; immenſe Advantages, which they can never enjoy, but by the Formation of that Society.

Reflection upon the little Solidity of Treaties of League and Guarantee among thoſe who have no Society permanent and ſufficiently powerful.

I have ſhewn, that there will never be any *ſufficient Security* for the Execution of Treaties of Peace and Commerce in *Europe*, ſo long as the Refuſer cannot be conſtrain'd by a ſufficient Force to execute them, and that that ſufficient Force can never be found till ſome *permanent Society* be eſtabliſh'd among *all* the Chriſtian States.

The Politicians, in favour eſpecially of the leſs powerful Princes, have invented Treaties of League Offenſive and Defenſive, in order to ſecure themſelves from the Attacks of the more powerful. Theſe ſame Politicians, to make the Treaties of Peace more ſolid againſt the unquiet Humour of Ambitious Princes, have alſo been uſed, in favour of Peaceful Princes, to bring into thoſe Treaties of Peace ſeveral Sovereigns as Guarantees for the Execution of their reciprocal Promiſes. It is certain, that nothing would be more fit for the purpoſe thoſe Politicians propoſe to themſelves, if thoſe Leagues, and thoſe Promiſes of Guarantees, were not,

not, from the Nature of thoſe who make them, very ſubject to have no Effect; but the Misfortune is, that nothing is more common than to ſee ſome of the Allies of the Guarantees either ceaſe to be *willing* to execute the Treaty when they are able to do it, or to ceaſe to be *able* to do it when they are willing.

Men change their Minds, becauſe the Intereſt, whether real or ſeeming, which made them ſign the Treaty, is itſelf changed. I call That a real Intereſt, which the wiſer ſort generally follow to augment their Riches, their Reputation, their Power, to confirm and aggrandize either their Family or Eſtate. I call That a ſeeming Intereſt which is ſlight, and which proceeds either from ſome tranſient Paſſion, or from ſome frivolous and ill-grounded Hope: Diſorderly Ambition is of itſelf ſufficient to fill the Imagination with the vaineſt Hopes and falſeſt Views; then the ſlighteſt Subjects of Complaint, the moſt remote Pretenſions, are ſufficient Colours for not keeping their Words. Beſides, the Contractants are not Immortal, one of them dies. He is ſucceeded by one who has quite different Views, and who does not always think himſelf obliged to ſtand to the Engagements of his Predeceſſor. 'Tis thus that Allies divide; this is what makes Princes ceaſe to be *willing* to execute what they have promis'd, tho' they be *able*. Hiſtory is full of ſuch Examples.

As ſome Princes ceaſe to be *willing* to execute their Promiſes, tho' they are *able*, ſo it often happens that they ceaſe to be *able* to do it when they are *willing*. They find themſelves engag'd in Civil Wars, which exhauſt them, and they are obliged to enter into an unforeſeen and ruinous War. Theſe are very common Sources of the Ceſſation of *Ability*.

I think the Reader is now in a Condition to judge, that *ſo long as the Conſtitution of* Europe *remains as it is at preſent, it is impoſſible to prevent Differences between Sovereigns, it is impoſſible to terminate them* without War, *it is impoſſible to find a* ſufficient Security *for the Execution of reciprocal Promiſes, whether thoſe which are already made by paſs'd Treaties, or thoſe which ſhall be made by future Treaties; and that it is conſequently abſolutely impoſſible, that Treaties ſhould ever procure a* ſufficient Security *for the Duration of the Peace*; and this is the firſt Propoſition that I propoſed to demonſtrate in this Diſcourſe.

SECOND PROPOSITION
to be Demonſtrated.

The Equilibrium of Power between the Houſe of France *and the Houſe of* Auſtria, *can never procure any* ſufficient Security, *either for the Preſervation of their Dominions, or for the Continuation of Commerce.*

I MIGHT content my ſelf with ſhewing the Truth of this Propoſition by direct Proofs; nay, it ſhould ſeem that I even *ought* to defer, to the end of the Work, comparing the Syſtem of the *Equilibrium*, with the Syſtem of the *permanent Society* of *Europe*; and 'tis true, that we ſeldom conceive the whole Force of a Compariſon, till we are firſt well acquainted with the things compar'd: But I thought the Reader might give me Credit for a few Hours, make an end of reading the Work, and then, if he think fit, return to this Compariſon, and read it over again: And beſides, as I am to demonſtrate to him the Weakneſs and Uſeleſneſs of the Syſtem of the *Equilibrium*, I thought this Oppoſition of the two Syſtems, tho' but imperfect, would nevertheleſs have its Effect, and make the direct Proofs appear in a better Light.

I find five very conſiderable Advantages in the Syſtem of the *European* Society.

1. *Firſt, 'Tis a ſure Preſervative againſt the Misfortune of having a Foreign War; whereas the* Equilibrium *is far from being ſuch a Preſervative.*

2. *'Tis a ſure Preſervative againſt the Misfortune of having Civil Wars in the States which ſhall enter into the Union; whereas the* Equilibrium *is no Defence at all againſt them.*

3. *In this Union there is found a* perfect *Security for the Preſervation of each State; whereas the* Equilibrium *produces but a very* imperfect *Security.*

4. *There is found therein a perfect Security for the Continuation of Commerce; whereas the* Equilibrium *muſt needs cauſe the Interruption of it.*

5. *It is more difficult and expenſive to eſtabliſh the* Equilibrium, *and to maintain it for a few Years, than to eſtabliſh the* permanent Society, *and to maintain it for ever.*

FIRST ADVANTAGE;
With reſpect to Foreign Wars.

THE *Equilibrium* is, in its Nature, a Poſture, wherein all that is in the Scale is very eaſily put or kept in Motion; the

the leaſt Cauſe, either interior or exterior, is ſufficient to give it a new Motion, or to make it continue in that which it has already: Thus the *Equilibrium* of two Houſes may, indeed, yield ſome Ceſſation of Motion, ſome Truces; but far from being able to produce a ſolid Repoſe, an unalterable Peace, it furniſhes any Sovereign that is ambitious, impatient, and unquiet, with an eaſie opportunity of recommencing the War, and even with maintaining it longer when re-commenced; ſince, on one ſide, that Sovereign may be encourag'd to that Enterprize by flattering Hopes, and can never be put out of them by any very great Fear, becauſe it is ſuppos'd, that being in an *Equilibrium* of Power, there are as many Reaſons to Hope, as Cauſes to Fear; and on t'other ſide, does not every body know, that what makes the Combat laſt, is the *Equilibrium* which remains between the Forces of the Combatants?

If Evidence of Argument be not ſufficient, let us conſult Experience; let us ſee what has happen'd for theſe two hundred Years laſt paſt in the Syſtem of the *Equilibrium*; let us read the Hiſtory of *Europe*: What has this wretched Syſtem produc'd, but almoſt continual Wars? How ſhort a time did the *Truce* of *Vervins* laſt? I cannot call by any other Name a Peace that cannot endure long. On the contrary, how long has the War laſted ſince that Truce? Such is the Effect of this ſo deſired *Equilibrium*. Now, does not Time paſt inſtruct us, that from ſuch Cauſes, we are, for the future, to expect only ſuch Effects? And who is there that does not perceive, that in the Syſtem of the *Equilibrium* there is no Security but Arms in Hand? And thus no body can ever enjoy his Liberty, but at the Expence of his Repoſe.

On the contrary, in the *European* Union there will be no longer two Sides in the *Equilibrium* of Forces; and as among the Sovereigns, when united, there will be but one End, namely, always to preſerve the Bleſſing of Peace; ſo there will be but one Side; and all the Forces will be united and directed to one End: So that no Prince can ever afterwards be deſirous to trouble that Repoſe, ſince he would be put to the Ban of *Europe*, and could not but be diſpoſſeſs'd for ever, the very firſt Campaign.

Since the Union of the *Germans*, there have been no Wars among Them; or, at leaſt, none that have laſted long, or that have had any Conſequences, unleſs it were when ſome of its Members made particular Unions with Foreign Sovereigns: And what is the Reaſon of this? 'Tis becauſe even the

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moſt raſh, the moſt turbulent among of them, have been kept in by the fear of the Ban of the Empire, and none of them could expect alone to withſtand them all, even but one Campaign, without being entirely diſpoſſeſs'd; neither did any of them ever make an Alliance with a Foreign Sovereign, but in hopes that that Alliance would ſhield him from the Ban, and by the firſt Treaty of Peace that ſhould be made, he ſhould not only preſerve his Sovereignty entire, but alſo obtain Juſtice in the Pretenſions that made him take up Arms. What reſults from this Conſideration? A plain Demonſtration, that if thoſe Members of the *Germanick* Body had no powerful Neighbours that were out of that Body, there would never have been any Wars among them; that is, if that Union, inſtead of being confin'd to *Germany*, had taken in all the Sovereigns of *Europe*, there would never have been any War, either in *Germany*, or in any other part of *Europe*.

SECOND ADVANTAGE;
With reſpect to Civil Wars.

IT is certain, that all which the leſs powerful Princes of *Europe* hope for from the Effect of the *Equilibrium*, is the Preſervation of their Dominions againſt the Ambition of the one, or of the other of the two great Powers; and they do not expect that the Syſtem of the *Equilibrium* ſhould defend 'em from Seditions, from Revolts, and from Civil Wars. On the contrary, we ſee that one of the moſt important Effects of the *European* Union, will be infallibly to preſerve, as well the leſs powerful States, as the moſt powerful, from all Sedition, from all Revolt, and eſpecially from all Civil War; and this, becauſe when every Body knows, that when any Party, except that of the Sovereign, ſhall take up Arms, it will be declar'd an Enemy to the Union, and be certainly overcome, and rigorouſly puniſhed, by the ſufficiently powerful Forces of the united Sovereigns; Sedition and Revolt can have no Heads worthy of Confidence, and thus they will either never begin, or at leaſt will diſſipate of themſelves.

The *Equilibrium* then is no Defence againſt Civil War, which, in the Opinion of the Wiſe, is, of all Evils in a State, the moſt terrible and fatal; and indeed, let us conſult Experience it ſelf, let us read in the Hiſtory of *Europe* what has happen'd for theſe two hundred Years laſt paſt, and we ſhall find a great number of Civil Wars in *Germany*, *France*, *Flanders*, *England*. Did they not all take their Birth in the midſt of the Syſtem of the *Equilibrium*? And would they

ever

ever have *been* at all, if the *European Union*, which I propoſe, had been then formed?

THIRD ADVANTAGE.

Each State has more Security for its Preſervation in the Syſtem of the Union.

THE *Equilibrium*, tho' it were eſtabliſh'd, has nothing in it very ſolid; and thus it would be but an uncertain Guarantee for the Preſervation of States.

1. We juſt now ſaw, that the *Equilibrium* is no Defence againſt Wars, either Civil or Foreign; *Europe* then will be ſtill liable to the Events of War: Now who is there that does not know, that all that depends upon the Chance of War is very uncertain? And conſequently, the States are ſtill expos'd to the moſt unhappy Revolutions.

2. After the Eſtabliſhment of that *Equilibrium*, which will have been purchaſed with the Lives of an infinite number of Men, and of immenſe Sums by the *Engliſh*, the *Dutch*, the *Portugueze*, and the other Allies of the Houſe of *Auſtria*, what Impoſſibility is there, but that one Houſe may become, in leſs than fifty Years, half as weak again as the other, by Minorities, by Regencies, by Civil Wars, by ill Laws, whilſt the other ſhall be ſtrengthned by the contrary Methods? May not that which has already happen'd, happen again? Let any body call to mind the formidable Power of the Houſe of *Auſtria*, under *Charles* V. and eſpecially of the Branch of *Spain*, at the beginning of the Reign of *Philip* II. his Son? Every body knows, that that ſole Branch was at that time more powerful than the Houſe of *France*: And which of us is ignorant, that fifty or ſixty Years after his Death, that ſame Branch, weaken'd by an ill Government, had not a fourth part of the Strength of the Houſe of *France*, which fortify'd it ſelf by a very different Government?

If, in a hundred Years, the Houſe of *France* ſhould fall into the ſame weakneſs, thro' Minorities and inteſtine Diviſions, muſt not the *Engliſh* and *Dutch* then take up Arms to make Conqueſts upon the Houſe of *Auſtria*, in favour of the Houſe of *France*? Nothing, then, is more inconſtant and difficult to maintain than that *Equilibrium*.

3. At this time, that the Emperor is the only Remnant of his Family, and has no Children by the Empreſs, who is as young as himſelf, 'tis uncertain if that Family will not be quite extinct in thirty, nay in twenty Years; and in that Caſe, will not the whole Edifice of the *Equilibrium* fall to Ruin? That Edifice, which has been ſo chargeable to the Allies,

Allies, and for which they ſtill propoſe to be at ſo much Expence; is not this another Source of Uncertainty?

4. The *Equilibrium* of the two Houſes cannot be preſerved but by the *Equilibrium* of their Allies: Now who is ſure that one Houſe may never have more powerful Allies than the other? There is therefore in this nothing but Uncertainty, and conſequently, the *Security* is very little, and far from being *ſufficient*.

5. If one Houſe grow more ſtrong, and the other more weak, and if their Neighbours are then at War, who ſhall hinder the ſtronger from oppreſſing the weaker?

6. We ſuppoſe, that a leſs powerful Prince can never be prevail'd upon, by preſent and ſpecious Advantages; that he can never ſuffer himſelf to be ruled by Jealouſie, or by Revenge, to make a League with the ſtronger againſt his own Intereſt. We ſuppoſe, that Paſſion can't make him commit groſs Faults in his Conduct: 'Tis true, this is not common, but yet they are ſometimes guilty of ſuch Overſights. Now then, Overſights may be deciſive to break the *Equilibrium*; and this is another Source of Uncertainty.

7. There is another perpetual Source of *In-Equilibrium* between equal Sovereigns, and that is, the Inequality of the Genius's of the Sovereigns; 'tis properly in the greateſt Places that we ſee, with the moſt Evidence, the Truth of the Proverb, *According to the Value of the Man is the Value of his Land.* To demonſtrate this great Difference, I need only oppoſe one King of *Spain* to another King of *Spain*: King *Charles* I. that is, the Emperor *Charles* V. to King *Charles* II. the Great Grandfather to the Great Grandſon. 'Tis true, *Charles* V. had *Holland* more than *Charles* II. had; but what was *Holland* in the time of *Charles* V. in compariſon of *Portugal*, and its Places in the *Indies* and the *Philippine* Iſlands, which *Charles* II. had more than *Charles* V. Even *America*, in the time of *Charles* II. was much more extenſive, and produc'd a great deal more Gold. Would *Charles* II. ever have been able to have ſurmounted the Difficulties which *Charles* V. had to ſet the Imperial Crown upon his Head; yet with equal Dominions, what a prodigious Inequality was there between the Power of the one and the Power of the other! Now, tho' the Allies ſhou'd form an Equality, an *Equilibrium* between two Sovereignties, how can they ever make an Equality between the Genius's of the Sovereigns who may come to govern theſe equal States? And yet without That, which it is impoſſible to do, is it not impoſſible for them ever to have any ſufficient Security

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for preſerving that *Equilibrium* even but for half a Century? How long, then, ſeduc'd by vain Appearances, will they miſtake for a Reality, a Chimera, which has already coſt them ſo much Blood and Treaſure, and which is ſtill like to coſt them ſo much more?

Even tho' by the Security they may expect from the Syſtem of the *Equilibrium*, they had remov'd all the Uncertainties upon which its Effect is founded; yet they would ſtill find, that it not only is no Defence againſt War, either Civil or Foreign; but that even, with reſpect to the preſerving States intire, it has nothing ſolid enough to be a *ſufficient Security* to thoſe who have the leaſt Eye to Futurity.

On the contrary, the Syſtem of the General Union of *Europe* has none of all theſe Faults; its Solidity does not depend upon the Hazards of War, ſince in that there can be no War. There is no need of fearing the weakning of a Family, or of any other Power, ſince that would not weaken the Union; and ſince, beſides, one Member commonly ſtrengthens himſelf out of that which another Member loſes, Let the Houſe of *Auſtria* end never ſo ſoon, its Dominions would not end; and in what manner ſoever they are govern'd afterwards, their Forces remain, they ſubſiſt for the Security of the Union.

FOURTH ADVANTAGE;
With reſpect to Continuation of Commerce.

WE juſt now ſaw, that the *Equilibrium* is ſo far from being a Preſervative againſt Wars, that, if it is perfect, it only increaſes the number and duration of them; and if it is imperfect, the leſs powerful Princes, who follow that Syſtem, have the leſs Security from it for the Preſervation of their Dominions intire: And beſides, Wars, either Civil or Foreign, cannot be either the leſs frequent, or the leſs durable, on that account. Thus that Syſtem is no Remedy to the Interruption of Commerce either at home or abroad.

On the contrary, in the Syſtem of the Union, wherein there can be no War of any ſort, or at leaſt of very little duration; Commerce, whether Domeſtick or Foreign, can hardly ever be interrupted.

FIFTH ADVANTAGE.
The Syſtem of the Equilibrium *is more* Expenſive, *nay more* Difficult *to eſtabliſh and maintain, than the Syſtem of the* European Union.

WE have ſeen, that the Syſtem of the *Union* is infinitely preferable to the Syſtem of the *Equilibrium*, ſince it is a De-

Defence againſt Wars, Foreign and Civil; ſince it gives incomparably more Security for the preſerving Dominions intire, and procures an unalterable Continuation of Commerce, as well at home as abroad: But tho' the *Equilibrium* procured the ſame Advantages, yet would it be much leſs deſirable, if, to eſtabliſh it, to maintain it, and to re-eſtabliſh it when deſtroy'd, it be more Hazardous, and much more Expenſive, than to eſtabliſh and maintain the Union.

Now, let us but reflect upon all the Expence *Europe* has been at in different Wars for two hundred Years, either to maintain or eſtabliſh that vain Idol to which the Nations have Sacrificed ſo blindly, ſo fruitleſly, and for ſo long a Time, ſo much Blood and Treaſure; and we ſhall ſee that the Treaſure alone is four Times as much as the whole Revenue of all *Europe*; ſo that if, inſtead of contenting themſelves with the Syſtem of the *Equilibrium*, they had Eſtabliſh'd the *European* Society two hundred Years ago, *Europe* would now have been four times Richer than it is; it would not have been ſplit into ſo many different Religions, and Arts and Sciences would have been carried to a much greater degree of Perfection than they are now at.

If the Union is not eſtabliſhed, let any one conſider how much it will ſtill coſt for the next two hundred Years, either to maintain or to re-eſtabliſh that *Equilibrium*; and if the *Engliſh*, the *Dutch* and the other Allies, ſhould now conquer *Spain* for the Houſe of *Auſtria*, Who doubts but that, in a hundred and fifty Years, they would be oblig'd to be at the ſame Expences to re-conquer it in favour of the Houſe of *France*, if that ſhould be too much weaken'd by many Diviſions, or by many ſucceſſive Minorities.

On the contrary, what will it coſt to eſtabliſh and maintain the Union? Almoſt nothing to eſtabliſh it, but the Reſtitution of ſome unjuſt Conqueſts; almoſt nothing to maintain it, in compariſon of the Expences of the War?

I think therefore it is plain, that the *Equilibrium between the Houſe of* France, *and the Houſe of* Auſtria, *procures no* ſufficient Security, *either againſt Civil Wars, or againſt Foreign Wars; and conſequently, gives no* ſufficient Security, *either for the Preſervation of Dominions, or for the Continuation of Commerce*: And this is the Propoſition I intended to demonſtrate.

Concluſion of the DISCOURSE.

THE firſt Idea that offers it ſelf to a leſs powerful Sovereign, to preſerve himſelf againſt the Attacks of a Neighbour

bour much more powerful than himſelf, is to intereſt ſeveral other Powers in his Quarrel; and when he meets with prudent Sovereigns, he eaſily perſuades them, that 'tis very much their Intereſt to hinder his being oppreſs'd by the Stronger, ſince that Stronger, becoming more powerful by his Conqueſts, would ſoon be much more formidable to every one of them. This is the Foundation of moſt of the Treaties of particular Leagues, which the Weaker make for their Preſervation againſt the Stronger.

When the Sovereigns of *Germany* firſt began to enjoy their new Sovereignties, it was impoſſible but the Stronger often attempted to oppreſs the Weaker; and the Weaker, to ſave themſelves from that Oppreſſion, had recourſe to Treaties of League with their Neighbours, for their mutual Preſervation.

This Idea, then, is good; nay, it would be excellent, if, inſtead of confining it to a particular Society of three or four Sovereigns, and for a limited Time, the Allies would try to render it *permanent and ſufficiently powerful*; that is, to make it conſiſt of all the Chriſtian Princes.

When two very powerful Sovereigns ariſe among Neighbours much leſs powerful, then theſe latter, beſides their particular Leagues, naturally begin to deſire to keep thoſe two Princes divided, and to preſerve a ſort of *Equilibrium* between them: They eaſily perceive how much their Liberty depends upon the Liberty of each of thoſe more powerful Houſes, and that they have no longer any Security for their Preſervation, if on one Side each of thoſe Houſes is not maintain'd in its Power; and if, on the other, Care be not taken to keep them divided; this is the ſecond Idea that offers its ſelf to their Mind; this is the ſecond Step of their Policy to avoid a ſecond Danger of being ſubjected by one of thoſe two Powers: It is even impoſſible but that, in the Infancy of the Sovereignties of *Germany*, the weakeſt founded all the Security of their Preſervation upon thoſe two Ideas of Alliance and *Equilibrium*; but 'tis alſo impoſſible but that they ſhould at laſt foreſee, that if thoſe two Methods *did* for ſome time defend them againſt the Invaſion of the ſtronger amongſt them, it would in no wiſe keep them from being often in War one againſt another, at one time to defend their Allies, at another to defend Themſelves.

The Idea of preſerving an *Equilibrium* between the ſtrongeſt, is not then a new Idea: 'Tis ſimple, 'tis natural, 'tis one of the firſt that offers it ſelf to the Mind; and that occa-

occaſion'd the Progreſs of the *Germanick* Polity, as you ſhall hear: The Sovereigns ſaw plainly that that *Equilibrium*, ſo hard both to eſtabliſh and preſerve, did indeed produce a *tranſient Security* againſt the Ambition and Injuſtice of the moſt powerful; but the wiſe Author of the *Germanick* Union, reflecting upon the Sources of the Nation's Misfortunes, ſoon found that that Remedy was ſo far from diminiſhing the Number of thoſe Wars, equally ruinous for the Weaker as well as for the Stronger, that it made them laſt longer, and did not even give any *permanent Security* for the Duration of their States; it was then, that great Genius had occaſion to raiſe himſelf to the third Idea, in order to avoid the Misfortunes of frequent and almoſt continual Wars: It was then he repreſented to the Sovereigns, that it would be infinitely to all their Advantage not to be any longer contented with that *Equilibrium*, which furniſhes no other Means beſides *War* whereby to end future Differences; but to endeavour at a general and permanent Union of the Sovereigns of the Nation, and ſo to order it that they ſhould perpetually be repreſented by their Deputies in the Diets, that they might have a *permanent Security* for terminating future Differences *without War*, either by Reconciliation, or by Arbitration, with a very conſiderable Puniſhment, as that of the Ban, or of the loſs of Dominions, on him who ſhould refuſe to execute the Judgment of the *Germanick* Body, and try'd to maintain his Right *by Force* againſt that whole Body.

It is no wonder, then, that, for their Preſervation, the leſs powerful Princes of *Europe* have practiſed the two firſt Means that the leſs powerful Princes of *Germany* formerly us'd for Theirs, that is, Treaties, and maintaining the *Equilibrium*: But it would be very wonderful, if the Sovereigns of *Europe*, (knowing, eſpecially theſe two hundred Years laſt paſt, by an Experience like that which the Sovereigns of *Germany* had, namely, that particular Leagues, and the maintaining the *Equilibrium*, are Means very inſufficient for the Security of States, and that they are Means wholly uſeleſs in preventing of Wars) ſhould not carry their Politick Views as far as the ancient *German* Princes did; it would be wonderful, if (after having plainly ſeen, that, to avoid ſo great an Evil in *Germany*, there was no other way but the *permanent Union* of all *GERMANY*, perpetually repreſented by Deputies from each Sovereign, in a Free City of *GERMANY*;) they ſhould not ſee, that, to avoid ſo great an Evil in *Europe*, there is but one only Way,

way, which is, the *permanent Union* of all *EUROPE*, perpetually repreſented by Deputies from each Prince, in a Free City of *EUROPE*. We ſhall clear up this Idea more in the following Diſcourſe: In this I confin'd my ſelf to ſhew, that *the Means hitherto us'd to preſerve the Peace, are utterly ineffectual*; and 'tis the Reader muſt judge, whether I have attain'd the end I propos'd to my ſelf.

The SECOND DISCOURSE.

Two Prepoſſeſſions in favour of the Project.

IN this Diſcourſe I only propoſe to ſet in their full Light two powerful Prepoſſeſſions, in favour of the Project of the *European* Society. The Firſt is drawn from the Formation and Duration of the *Germanick Society*. The Second is drawn from the very Plan of the *European Society*, conceived by *Henry the Great*, and, in his time, approv'd of by moſt of the Potentates of *Europe*.

The FIRST PROPOSITION to be demonſtrated.

The ſame Motives, *and the ſame* Means *that formerly ſufficed to form a* permanent Society *of all the Sovereignties of* Germany, *are equally in our Power, and may ſuffice to form a* permanent Society *of all the Sovereignties of Chriſtendom.*

I Think I have ſufficiently prov'd two things in the preceding Diſcourſe: *Firſt*, That in the preſent Conſtitution of *Europe*, Treaties between Sovereigns have no *ſufficient Security* for their Execution. *Secondly*, That it is impoſſible for the Syſtem of the *Equilibrium* to render the Peace durable in *Europe*: That thus the Miſchiefs of War will inceſſantly be renew'd, and will remain, till there be among the Sovereigns of *Chriſtendom* a *permanent Society*, that may give them *ſufficient Security* for the Execution of the Promiſes made in Treaties, and be the Arbiter of thoſe Pretenſions which have either not been foreſeen, or not regulated by thoſe ſame Treaties.

The firſt thing that the Reader now demands, is to know, whether it is abſolutely impoſſible, or indeed, if it be only

difficult, to form, by little and little, ſo deſirable a Society. To reſolve this, we need only penetrate into the Motives and Means which form'd the *Helvetick* Union, the *Belgick* Union, and particularly the *Germanick* Union, and we ſhall find, that thoſe ſame Motives, and thoſe ſame Means, are ſufficient to form a Society ſtill greater, and which might continue to increaſe till it take in all *Chriſtendom*. I intend to examine thoſe Motives and thoſe Means thoroughly in the following Diſcourſes: In this I ſhall content my ſelf with ſhewing, that there will be no more difficulty in forming the *European Union* now, than there was heretofore in forming the *Germanick Union*; and that the *European Union* would, in proportion, bring as great Advantages to the *Sovereigns of Europe*, and their Subjects, as the *Germanick Union* has already produc'd, and may ſtill produce to the *Sovereigns of Germany*, and all the *Germans*.

I know, Arguments fetch'd from Compariſons are not always ſufficient for Conviction; but then, it muſt be allow'd, they at leaſt ſerve to diſpoſe the Mind to be touch'd by direct Proofs; and 'tis that Diſpoſition of Mind in the Reader that I confine my ſelf to in this Diſcourſe, to the intent, that the Proofs of the following Diſcourſe may work upon him the natural Effect that good Proofs work upon good Minds.

I ſhall particularly apply my ſelf to examin the *Germanick Union*. 1ſt, Becauſe 'tis a Model more in great than the reſt. 2dly, Becauſe there was more Difficulty in forming it. 3dly, Becauſe it has more Conformity to this Project.

In the Ninth Century, towards the end of the Reign of *Lewis the Debonnaire*, Son of *Charlemain*; afterwards in the Reigns of thoſe of his Deſcendants, who govern'd the Empire of *Germany*; in proportion as they loſt of their Authority, Dukedoms, Earldoms, and other immediate Governments, were given to the Dukes and Earls for Life; ſome obtain'd Reverſions for their Children: At length ſuch weak Emperors ſucceeded, that thoſe Governments, by little and little, became Hereditary; and as thoſe Governors had abſolute Power in Civil and Military matters, their Governments grew to be ſo many Sovereignties, ſome great, ſome leſs, and held of the Emperor but by very ſmall Tributes, by Acts of Faith and Homage, and by the Ceremonies of Inveſtiture, which the Heir of the Feudetary Sovereign deceas'd took from the Emperor, and which ordinarily the Emperor could not refuſe him. They were only oblig'd, on account of thoſe Imperial Fiefs, to maintain Troops for the Emperor's uſe, in proportion to the Greatneſs of thoſe Fiefs, and that too only when the Empire was at War. A great number of Arch-

Archbiſhops, Biſhops and other Eccleſiaſticks alſo, who had great Fiefs, preſerved to their Succeſſors the Power in Civil and Military Matters; at length, a great while afterwards, ſeveral conſiderable Cities freed themſelves from particular Governments, and got leave to govern themſelves as Republicks, under the Protection of the Emperor and Empire.

Thus, out of the Ruins of the Imperial Power and Sovereignty, there roſe up a prodigious Multitude of little private Powers, and of petty Subaltern Sovereignties: There ſtill remains in *Germany* above two hundred of them; but there were at that time a great many more, becauſe the Empire was then much more extenſive than it is now, and becauſe many Sovereigns have, by different Rights, and under divers Pretences, united ſeveral Sovereignties to their own. This was the Condition of the Empire, when from the Princes deſcended from *Charlemain*, it paſſed to other Princes of different Families, when it ceaſed to be Hereditary, and became Elective.

It would have been very difficult, or rather abſolutely impoſſible, that ſo great a number of Sovereigns, ſuch near Neighbours, ſo ambitious, ſo jealous of their Rights, ſhould have been without frequent Quarrels, either about Succeſſions, or for the Execution of ſome Promiſe, or about Limits; or laſtly, about the Commerce of their Subjects. They had as yet only the Method of Arms to obtain their Pretenſions; and then ſometimes one Country of *Germany*, ſometimes another, ſometimes all the Countries together were ruinated, as well by Wars without, as by Wars within, which latter are by much the more cruel, and which when once they are kindled, cannot be hindered from ſpreading on all ſides; nay, it very often happened, that the Emperor either *could not* remedy them, for want of Strength, or *would not* for want of Will, either thro' Jealouſie, or for ſome private Self-Intereſt; and as that is the Epocha of the greateſt Weakneſs of the Emperors, ſo alſo is it the Epocha of the greateſt Independance of the Feuditary Sovereigns. An Independance which kept up their Diviſions, and which was always very deſtructive to the Nation, 'till they thought of the only means that could preſerve them from the Miſchiefs of War.

In theſe Publick Calamities it was natural for every one, according to the Extent of his Genius, to ſeek ſome Preſervative fit to cauſe them to be avoided, or at leaſt for ſome Remedy fit to bring them to an end. Then was invented the Plan of the *Germanick* Union, to bring all the Members of the Empire into one Body, in order to maintain it in Peace, in its Commerce, and in Plenty; and to give

each Sovereign Security for the Preſervation of his Dominions, and for the Execution of Treaties. I don't know whether this Project was firſt thought of by a Prince, or a private Man. Neither do I know how far the Author carried it at firſt; but *then* it certainly was that the Union began to be formed; it was not formed without a Project; and then appeared that Maſter-piece of Policy ſo worthy a good Prince, a good Citizen, and which was ſo neceſſary for the Welfare of his Country.

Whoever was the wiſe Inventor, every body will eaſily imagine, that many of thoſe who perus'd the Project, prejudiced againſt the Novelty of ſuch a Society, gave leſs Attention to the powerful Motives which might bring about the Concluſion of ſuch a Treaty, than the Difficulties of the Execution: They ſaw a great number of Sovereigns who had an infinite Number of Pretenſions, Intereſts directly oppoſite, and, without examining any further into the Matter, they concluded that thoſe Difficulties would be always inſurmountable; thus they looked upon that Deſign as a Viſion of Peace and Tranquility, which was indeed pleaſant in the Theory, but vain in the Practick; thus they made no ſcruple to decry as Chimerical a Project, from which both themſelves and their Deſcendants were one Day to reap ſuch great Advantages. *For the Execution of this Project* (ſaid they) *the* German *Princes muſt be all of 'em wiſe, reaſonable, equitable, without Paſſion, knowing in their own Affairs, leſs concerned for their domeſtick Happineſs than for the Happineſs of their Subjects; in a word, they muſt be ſuch as they ought to be, and not ſuch as they really are: Now if they all were ſuch as they ought to be, all the Rules they would want to make them always live in perpetual Peace, would be thoſe of Reaſon, and ſo the Project would be entirely unneceſſary.*

Some other Readers, leſs prejudiced, finding That Project of the utmoſt Importance, judged that it would be neceſſary to give equal Attention, both to the Motives which might make every one of the Sovereigns deſire that General Union of *Germany*, and to the Difficulties of the Execution; they ſaw, that in proportion as they examined the Greatneſs of the Motives, the Difficulties vaniſhed of themſelves, ſince thoſe Motives were the great Advantages that each Sovereign might reap from the *permanent Society*, and that the great Difficulties proceeded only from the Hopes or Pretenſions, that is, from the Advantages each of them might flatter himſelf with from *non Society:* Now, the comparing theſe two ſorts of Advantages diſpels thoſe Obſtacles, which at firſt ſeem'd utterly inſurmountable; they even judged

judged that it would not be difficult to make four or five Sovereigns approve of that Union; and that the Treaty being propos'd from one to t'other, the number of Confederates might encreaſe by little and little; and that ſo much the more eaſily, as the Weakneſs of ſome States, the Minority of powerful Sovereigns, the inteſtine Diviſions of thoſe powerful States, the Diſaſters by Foreign Wars, would in Courſe of Time be ſo many favourable Opportunities for the enlarging a Society, in which no Member could loſe any of his Dominions, and wherein he might be a very great Gainer by the Duration of Sovereign Houſes, by the Retrenchment of the Expence of the War, by the Riches and Opulence produced by a Commerce more ſecure, more extenſive and more durable; and to ſtrengthen their Opinion they ſaid, that, to give their Conſent to this Society, it was not at all neceſſary, that the Sovereigns ſhould be without Paſſion, that they ſhould have attained to ſo high a degree of Wiſdom, of Reaſon, of Equity, of Tenderneſs to their People; that it would be enough if they were but moderately Wiſe; if they were Self-intereſted enough to hate extravagant Expences, and to deſire to become much richer; if they had Love enough for their Family to fear its Ruin, and to wiſh its Duration; that it would be enough, if the leſs powerful had ſo much Senſe as to be afraid of being invaded by the more powerful, that it would be enough if theſe latter, taught by the Multitude of Events in Hiſtory, had ſo much Foreſight as to dread, after their Death, the raiſing of Seditions, Revolts, Civil Wars, Diviſions in the Royal Family, Conſpiracies of powerful Subjects during Minorities: Now for this there is no ſuch great Neceſſity, that the Sovereigns ſhould be either without Paſſion, or ſo very Wiſe, or ſuch as they ought to be: In a word, 'tis enough that they are exactly ſuch as they are. *Suppoſing them exactly ſuch as they are,* ſaid they, *for that very reaſon they have need of forming the* Germanick *Society, to encreaſe conſiderably their own Happineſs.*

If I thus relate the divers Judgments that were made, and the different Diſcourſes that were held upon occaſion of that Project of the *Germanick* Union, 'tis not upon the Credit of the Memoirs of the Contemporaries, who might either deceive or be deceiv'd; 'tis upon the Credit of the Memoirs of Nature her ſelf, which are much more infallible; 'tis becauſe 'twas impoſſible but that ſuch a Project ſhould fall into the Hands of two ſorts of Readers, both Perſons of Senſe, the one ſort ſprightly, eloquent, ſomewhat ſuperficial, very poſitive, ſuch as hate the trouble of examining, and who judge of Works by their Title, guided only by their

firſt Prepoſſeſſions: The others are fewer in number, and have neither ſo happy a Memory, nor ſo fruitful an Imagination, but who, being uſed to ſuſpend their Judgment till they have examined the thing, go more ſlowly that they may go more ſurely; theſe latter are not yet got over their Doubts, when the former are arrived at a Deciſion; the Novelty neither diſcourages nor miſleads them: They weigh every *pro* and *con*; they collect together all the *pros* and all the *contras* with as much exactneſs as poſſible: They carefully ballance the Total of the one againſt the Total of the other, and afterwards they give their Opinion. This Proceeding does not pleaſe the former; 'tis too ſlow, and inſtead of an hundred deciſive Judgments which they paſs in eight Days, they would by that Method hardly paſs two; and ſo, as Chance has a great ſhare in their Prepoſſeſſions, and conſequently in their Opinions, and as, thro' fear of the Shame of having given a wrong Judgment, and thro' the Deſire of the Glory of having judged better than the reſt, their whole Mind is afterwards employed in defending the ſide they have imprudently eſpouſed; they are no longer in a Condition either to perceive their Error, or to repent of their Imprudence, or even to be another time more upon their guard againſt the Precipitancy of their Judgments.

What could theſe different ſorts of Perſons do with reſpect to the Project of the *Germanick* Union, but only make very different Predictions? The one maintained that it was impracticable, and that it could never be executed: The others thought it practicable, and that in all appearance it would one Day be executed. Now what do I do in deſcribing the Effects of Nature at that time? I only deſcribe the like Effects of the ſame Nature, in reſpect of the like Work at this time; and would to God, notwithſtanding the different Judgments, and the divers Predictions of this Time, the New Work may have in our Age the ſame Event for the Good of *Europe*, as the Ancient Work had formerly for the Good of *Germany*; the falſe Prophets would eaſily be comforted for being deceived, and the true ones would have a double Joy, both for the Succeſs of the Project, and the Accompliſhment of their Prediction.

If the Author of the Syſtem of the *German* Society was not diſheartned either by thoſe looſe and general Diſcourſes, or by the firſt Obſtacles that occurred in the Execution, 'twas becauſe he plainly ſaw, that all the Intereſts which induced the Princes to a State of Diviſion, could never ballance the hundredth part of the Intereſts which induced them

them all to the Union, and to form a permanent Society: Now Men may indeed at firſt be averſe to an advantageous Treaty out of Prejudice; but they always change their Minds, when it is preſented from time to time, in ſeveral views, from different Hands, when they have before them the Example of others, when the wiſeſt and moſt diſintereſted Miniſters are conſulted, and eſpecially when the Advantages of the right Courſe are ſo great, and put in ſuch a Point of Evidence, that, if I may ſo ſay, they have nothing elſe to chuſe.

Be that as it will, thoſe Sovereigns of *Germany* who firſt ſigned the Treaty of the *Germanick* Union, without doubt plainly perceived that, all things conſidered, they could never ſign a Treaty more advantageous for themſelves, for their Children, for their Succeſſors, and for their Subjects. Thoſe who followed the Example of the firſt muſt needs have been of the ſame Opinion, ſince at length they began to ſign the Treaty which was the Foundation of that great Eſtabliſhment; and from thence I conclude, that nothing hinders the forming another like it, but much broader-bottom'd, if 'tis prov'd that it will be that very breadth of bottom which will make it the more eaſily executed.

Before we proceed, it will be proper to obſerve, that the *Germanick* Union had two conſiderable Imperfections which inſenſibly deſtroyed it within, and which hindered it from increaſing without; and that nevertheleſs it has ſubſiſted 'till now, in a languiſhing Condition 'tis true; but however, in a Condition that may ſhew what it has been, and what it might be; but, what makes for our Subject, it alſo ſhews what may be expected from ſuch a Society that ſhould be free from thoſe two Imperfections.

The firſt is, that the Members, in order to have preſerved to themſelves an entire Liberty to give their Suffrages, and make Propoſitions tending to the Good of the Union, ſhould at the very firſt have formed Circles, and agreed that the Deputy of each Circle ſhould by turns be Preſident of the Imperial Chamber of the Diet, or of that Council Repreſentative of the Nation, which endured ſome part of the Reign of *Maximilian* and *Charles* V. under the Title of Regency, in the Intervals which happen'd between the different Diets: Inſtead of that, 'tis always the Emperor's Deputy that preſides there; now 'tis known that they never deliberate in any Aſſembly upon any thing but what the Preſident propoſes, and as the Intereſts of the Emperor are very often different from the Intereſts of the Empire, it happens but too often that what *He* cauſes to be propos'd has much more relation to his private Intereſt than

to the Intereſt of the Body, and that he takes great care to avert ſuch Deliberations, as by encreaſing the Liberty and Convenience of the Members, might never ſo little tend to diminiſh the Authority of the Head.

The ſecond is, that, in electing the Emperor, they ſhould never have given him Power, either to Command the Armies of the Empire by himſelf, or by his Lieutenants, nor Power to nominate to any of the Employments of the Army, nor Power to levy upon the Members the Quota's for the Neceſſities of the Body; they ſhould have preſerved to themſelves the Right of chuſing their General, one that was brave, prudent, experienced, of no Royal Family, revocable at pleaſure; they ſhould have reſerved to themſelves the Right of naming Commiſſaries to collect the Quota's; they ſhould have reſerved to themſelves the Nomination of the principal Officers.

Theſe two Defects have brought upon that Union two very great Inconveniences, and whoſe Greatneſs could not be well perceived, but in Courſe of Time. The firſt Inconvenience is, that the Liberty of the Members is diminiſhed, in proportion as the Authority of the Emperor is encreaſed; and that Authority did ſo much enlarge it ſelf, that in the Reign of *Charles* V. the *Germanick* Body had almoſt been reduced to nothing, if *Francis* I. had not come in to the Aſſiſtance of its expiring Liberty; and have not we ſeen that ſame Liberty (very much weakned before the Treaty of *Munſter*,) re-eſtabliſhed in that Treaty by the help of our King? And what would again have become of that ſame Treaty, if the King, as Guarantee, had not continually maintained the Execution of it? The Jealouſies and Diviſions of the Members would ſoon have given the Emperor an eaſie Opportunity of ſubduing them all one after another.

The Declenſion of the Liberty of the *Germanick* Body is likewiſe become very ſenſible, by the preſent Condition of the Authority of the Imperial Chamber, which had been ſo long at *Spire*, and which is now at *Vetzelar*. That was, if I may ſo ſay, the Center of the Union; each Sovereign had his Deputy there; the Differences between Sovereigns, the Differences about Commerce between the Subjects of divers Sovereigns, were there either reconciled by Mediators, or adjudged by Plurality of Voices by thoſe Deputies, as Arbiters wiſe, equitable, and fully authoriſed. The Authority of that Chamber, joined to the Authority of the Diet, which was held every Year in ſome free City, made up the whole Force of the Union; it was the Intereſt of the Emperors to weaken Theſe, to fortifie themſelves with what they took from them; this they began to do by ſeparating them, by placing them

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in two different Cities, and they left no Stone unturn'd till they had eſtabliſhed the *Aulic* Chamber, all the Judges of which they themſelves appointed, and till they gave that Chamber the ſame Power as the *Imperial* Chamber; they have even deprived the Imperial Chamber of the Right of deciding in Affairs of Importance, unleſs it be with Conſent of the Emperor; the Diets are held leſs often, thro' the Multiplication of Difficulties, and becauſe of the Expence. Thus the Emperor is become, as it were, the ſole Judge of the Differences of the other Sovereigns: Thus it may be ſaid, that this one Defect has inſenſibly brought the Republick of *Germany* to the Brink of its Ruin.

The other Inconvenience is ſtill much more conſiderable; for the greateſt Inconvenience that can happen to a Republick, is to be liable to be weakened by divers Accidents, without being in a Condition to advantage it ſelf by any favourable Opportunity. Now if the Republick of the Sovereigns of *Germany* had only had alternate Preſidents choſen from among the Deputies of the Members, if it had not had a perpetual Chief for Civil and Military matters, who can doubt but that the greateſt part of the neighbouring Sovereignties, according to the different Poſtures of their Affairs, would, one after another, in theſe hundred and fifty Years, deſired to have been admitmitted into that Republick? Would not the *Switz* have reentered into it as a new Circle? Would not *Geneva*? would not moſt of the Princes and States of *Italy* have entered into it? Would not the Rebublick of *Holland* have deſired to have been admitted into it upon ſeveral Occaſions?

Would not *England* too, in the midſt of its Diviſions under *Charles* the Firſt, have entered into it? Did not *France* it ſelf ſuffer terrible Shakes in the ſixteenth Century? Was it not within a very little of being entirely ruined? And if to be delivered from all his Troubles, *Henry* III. needed only to have entered into a Society that would have kept him in Security, and would have ſtretched out its Arms to receive him, would he have Heſitated? *Poland* on divers Occaſions, and particularly under *Caſimir*; *Denmark* and *Sweden* in ſeveral diſaſtrous Caſes; *Portugal*, eſpecially at the beginning of the Revolution ſeventy Years ago, would have done the ſame. Now if the *Germanick* Union had been form'd in ſuch a manner that it might have made Advantage of all the great Events in the States of *Europe* for theſe laſt five or ſix Centuries, it would in time, and by degrees, have become that ſame *European* Union which I now propoſe. But when thoſe States, thoſe Sovereigns, ſaw that they could not enter into the *Germanick* Union, without taking

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the Emperor for their Maſter, or at leaſt for their perpetual Superior; that ſole Conſideration always deterred them from deſiring to be Members of that Republick. Hence it is that that Union could never be enlarged, and that, by divers Accidents foreign from my Subject, it has loſt ſeveral Members, and a great deal of Territory.

I own, the wiſe *German*, who propoſed the Project of the *Germanick* Union, is very excuſable, becauſe, in all Appearance, he was obliged, in ſome meaſure, to imitate the Plan of the Empire, and to build a ſort of a Republick upon ſome of the Foundations of an ancient Monarchy. Perhaps he was not ſuffered to build all anew, and it was then certainly looked upon as a great Action to make the Empire elective, and to raiſe ſome Mounds againſt the Uſurpations of the Emperors. It muſt be confeſſed, it was very hard to foreſee that in proceſs of Time a great many little Uſurpations, of the Head upon the Members, would make ſo great a Change in the Conſtitution of the Republick, that the Foundations of its Liberty would be almoſt entirely ſapped bythem; and after all, it was very hard to retain any thingofthat Monarchick Edifice, and at the ſame time make, of all thoſe States a more Republican State than that of the *Germanick* Body is; but it muſt likewiſe be confeſſed, that it was with him as with an Architect that ſpoils his new Building, to retain in it ſomething of the old; the Fault, tho' very excuſable with reſpect to the Workman, is ne'er the leſs conſiderable with reſpect to the Work.

The *Dutch*, in the Conſtitution of their Republick of ſeven Sovereign States, never had any perpetual Preſident of the States-General; but they have ſometimes had a Prince for Stadtholder or General, and for perpetual General; there is even one of thoſe Sovereignties which has an Hereditary Stadtholder or General, and he a Prince. Be it as 'twill, the *Dutch* have avoided that Eſſential Fault ever ſince the Death of King *William*. As for the thirteen *Switz* Sovereignties, they have the Advantage never to have been guilty of a Fault ſo Eſſential to a Republick of Sovereigns.

The Example of the *Belgick* Union, and of the *Helvetick* Union, both which ſubſiſt without any perpetual Head, proves that there is no need of ſuch Head; as the *Germanick* Union of its ſide proves, that Powerful Hereditary Sovereigns may find it their Intereſt to form and maintain a *permanent Society* with leſs powerful Princes, with Republicks, with Sovereigns Elective, Eccleſiaſtic and Secular, and with States of quite different Religions: We will be more particular in all the *Parities* and in all the *Diſparities*, which may be of any

any Conſequence, between the *European* Union, whoſe Eſtabliſhment I propoſe, and the *Germanick* Union, which has been long ſince eſtabliſhed.

There are three principal Sources of Reſemblances and Differences. The firſt comes from the Motives which might induce the *Germans* to make their Union. The ſecond comes from the Obſtacles and Difficulties they might meet with in the Formation of it. The third comes from the Means they might have to help them to ſucceed in their Deſign. We muſt therefore examine, 1, Whether thoſe who began the *Germanick Union* had more Motives, and thoſe more powerful ones, than thoſe who may begin the *European Union*. 2. Whether they had leſs Obſtacles, and thoſe in leſs Number. 3, Whether *they* had Means *then* which *we* have not *now*.

COMPARISON *of the* MOTIVES.

1. ONE of their Motives, eſpecially of the leſs powerful Sovereigns, was to preſerve their Territories and Rights againſt the Attempts of the more powerful, and this Advantage they ſought for in the *Germanick* Union.

Now who can ſay, that the weakeſt of that time ſtood more in fear of an Invaſion than the weakeſt of theſe times do?

On the contrary, who is there that does not ſee that this Deſire is the ſame in our preſent Sovereigns, and that they have, more than the Ancients, a much better founded Hope of their Preſervation, ſince the *European* Union would give them, over and above, a *ſufficient Security*, that is a perfect Security, an Advantage which the Members of the *Germanick* Union could never promiſe themſelves? Thus, on that ſide, the Motive of the preſent Sovereigns ought to be much more ſtrong than the Motive of the Sovereigns of that Time. Neither can it be ſaid that there were then two powerful Houſes that were more formidable to the other Sovereigns of that Time, than the Houſe of *France* and the Houſe of *Auſtria* are now to the Sovereigns of this Time. Thus, when I ſuppoſe the Equality of Proportion between the two Times, I think I ſuppoſe nothing but what is reaſonable.

2. One of the Motives of the Sovereigns of that Age was to have, in the Force and Protection of the *Germanick* Union, a ſure Preſervative againſt Conſpiracies, Domeſtick Diviſions, Revolts, and, in a Word, againſt Civil War, and thus always to preſerve the Interior Commerce, each between his own Subjects.

Now who can ſay that the Sovereigns of that Age had more Occaſion to fear Civil Wars, and more Deſire to preſerve

ſerve the Interior Commerce of their States, than the Sove-reigns of this Age.

On the contrary, we, like them, have ſad Experience of thoſe terrible Evils; and we have, more than they, the Hiſtories of their Misfortunes, and of the like Misfortunes which have ſince happened in *Europe*, eſpecially on account of Religion; and as for Interior Commerce, we have ſtill more Reaſon to deſire the Preſervation of it than they had; 1. becauſe it has been very much encreaſed, within theſe laſt five or ſix Ages, by the *perfecting* of Arts, and by the Conveniences that have been invented, namely, Exchanges in Paper, means of Carriage, Inſurances, *&c.* 2. Becauſe Men are grown more skilfull in every thing, and conſequently in what concerns their Intereſt; thus the Sovereigns of this Age would be much greater Loſers than the Sovereigns of that Age, in loſing this Interior Commerce, and they much more clearly ſee what they ſhould loſe than the ancient *Germans* did; but what makes a prodigious Difference in the Motive, is that the Sovereigns of that time could not promiſe themſelves an entire Security againſt Civil Wars, ſince ſeveral of their Aſſociates might ſeparate from the Union *with Impunity* by the help of powerful Neighbours, and afterwards countenance Rebellion againſt their Aſſociates; whereas in the Union of Chriſtendom, no Sovereign can ſeparate from it *with Impunity*, ſince he would have no Neighbour but what would be a Member of the Union; and it is viſible that this great Augmentation of Security, is a great Augmentation of the Motive.

3. It was very much the Intereſt of the Sovereigns of that Age, to preſerve their Families upon the Throne, to procure a powerful Protection for the *minor* Children they and their Deſcendants might leave behind them, and thus to ward againſt all manner of Conſpirators and Uſurpers; and they might expect ſuch Protection in the *Germanick Society*.

Now who can ſay, that our preſent Sovereigns have not the ſame Intereſt in the Duration of their Families, or that they are leſs ſenſible to it than the Sovereigns of that Age were? And who can ſay, that they may not expect the like Protection in the *European Society*?

On the contrary, as it is impoſſible for the preſent Sovereigns not to ſee, that the Protection of the *European Society* will be much more powerful and durable than the Protection of the *Germanick Society*; it is alſo impoſſible, but that *They* ſhould deſire the *European Society* more earneſtly than *Thoſe* did the *Germanick Society*. Thus on that ſide the Motive is ſtill greater, and the Neceſſity to begin and finiſh the Enterprize ſtronger.

4. Ano-

4. Another Motive of the Sovereigns of that Age was, to find in that Society, *a Guarantee*, *a ſufficient Security*, for the perfect Execution of the reciprocal Promiſes in the Treaties they *had* made, or *ſhould* make among themſelves; a Guarantee, a Security which they could never expect, unleſs they became Members of a permanent Society.

Now, who can ſay that the Sovereigns of this Age do not as much deſire ſuch a Guarantee, ſuch a Security, for the Execution of the reciprocal Promiſes in Treaties?

On the contrary, as it is evident that the Security for Execution, which the *Germanick Union* may procure is not perfectly ſufficient, and as that which the *European Union* will procure will be perfectly ſufficient; it is evident, that this latter will be much more deſirable, and conſequently much more deſired by the preſent Sovereigns, than the Guarantee of the *Germanick Union* was deſired by the Sovereigns of that Age.

5. One of the ſtrongeſt Motives to induce Sovereigns to take ſolid Meaſures, in order to avoid future War, is the great Evils cauſed by preſent War; the prodigious Expences, the vexation for preſent ill Succeſs, the great Uneaſineſs about future Events, the Diminution of their Revenues, the Deſolation of their Frontiers, the Loſs of a great many good Subjects, the piercing and continual Cries of the People, who beg for an end to their Miſeries.

Now who can ſay, that the *German* Princes were then more ſenſible of this Motive, to make them ſign the Treaty of the *Germanick Union*, than our *European* Sovereigns are now, to make them ſign the Treaty of the *European Union*?

On the contrary, as the Meaſures they might take to terminate their future Differences *without War*, were not half ſo ſolid as thoſe that are propos'd for the *European Union*; it is evident, that this ſurplus of Solidity makes this Union much more deſirable; and that it will conſequently be much more deſired by the preſent Sovereigns now, than the *Germanick Union* was then deſired by the Sovereigns of thoſe times: And beſides, I doubt whether thoſe Sovereigns were then ſo weary of War, ſo exhauſted, as the Sovereigns of *Europe* are now.

6. *Laſtly*, Another Motive of the Sovereigns of that Age was, to maintain their Commerce with Strangers; which was a Source of great Riches and great Conveniencies.

Now who can ſay, that the preſent Sovereigns have not as great a deſire to ſecure the Continuation of Foreign Commerce, by the Eſtabliſhment of a permanent Society?

On the contrary, As the preſent Sovereigns have a much greater Foreign Commerce, and as the greater part of them are much more advantageouſly ſituated for Maritime Commerce, and Navigation is thirty times greater and eaſier than it was then; it is viſible, that the Intereſt of the preſent Sovereigns ſhould be a Motive thirty times ſtronger, to induce *them* to maintain Foreign Commerce, by the Eſtabliſhment of the *European Society*, than the Intereſt or Motive of the *German* Sovereigns was for the Eſtabliſhment of the *Germanick Society*. So that not only the Augmentation of Commerce ought to augment the Motive; but the Eſtabliſhment of a Society that may preſerve it is ſo much the more deſirable, as it procures a greater Security to preſerve it without Interruption: Now there is no body but what plainly ſees, that if the *European Society* were form'd, it would procure now, for the maintaining that ſort of Commerce, a hundred times more Security than the *Germanick Society* could then: Thus, in this particular, the Motive of our Sovereigns ſhould be incomparably ſtronger, than was the Motive of the Sovereigns of that time.

At the time of the Formation of the *Germanick Body*, the Members could not expect that any of them would never deſert from the Union, becauſe in ſeparating they might be ſuccour'd by Foreign Powers; neither could they promiſe themſelves that their Body ſhould never be either attack'd, or conquer'd, or weaken'd by thoſe Powers: Thus they had no *ſufficient Security*, either for their own Preſervation, or for the Preſervation of Commerce; whereas the *European Body* will be ſo great, ſo powerful, that it will never need to fear, either that a Neighbour ſhould foment Diviſion, or facilitate the Separation of any of its Members, or that he ſhould ever be powerful enough to dare to undertake to hurt any of them. Now as this great Power will not only produce a greater Security, but alſo a *perfect and ſufficient Security*, that every one's Dominions ſhall be preſerv'd intire, that there ſhall never be any kind of War, and that Commerce, as well interior as exterior, ſhall never be interrupted; the Motives inducing to the Formation of the *European Body* Now, will be incomparably more powerful, than thoſe which formerly induc'd to the Formation of the *Germanick Body* Then.

Theſe are all the general Motives thoſe Sovereigns could have to ſign the Treaty of the Eſtabliſhment of the *Germanick Society*; is there any other? I can think of none but what have relation to theſe. Thus I have ſhew'd, that theſe different Motives, theſe divers Intereſts, are as great

great on the ſide of the preſent Sovereigns, nay that they are incomparably greater, and that they ought to look upon 'em as ſuch; ſo that on the ſide of the Motives there is *Parity*, and there is no *Diſparity* to weaken the Proof; on the contrary, there are a great many *Diſparities*, all very advantageous, which very much ſtrengthen the Argument drawn from the Compariſon.

As for the particular Motives of each of the two hundred Sovereigns, who ſign'd the Project for the Eſtabliſhment of the *Germanick Union*, let us hear them, and 'twill appear, that among our eighteeen Sovereigns, thoſe ſame Motives may work the ſame Effects.

There is one Diſparity, I have been told: The Fear of powerful Neighbours formerly united the Sovereigns of *Germany* into one Body; whereas that Fear is not now in ſo great a degree in *Europe*, as it was then in *Germany*; but this Diſparity is eaſily anſwer'd.

Firſt, Is it not Fear that has given the Houſe of *Auſtria* ſo many Allies againſt the Houſe of *France*? And is it not that ſame Fear that is the ſtrongeſt Bond of that Alliance?

Secondly, This degree of Fear muſt needs be much greater now in *Europe*, than it was formerly in *Germany*; ſince that Fear did not then oblige the Society of *Germany* to attack the moſt powerful of its Neighbours; it remain'd in Peace, and only ſtood upon its Guard, it did not Arm, nor put it ſelf to the Charge of attacking; it did not begin the War. Now in the preſent Union of the Allies, the Fear is ſo great, that it does not ſuffer them to live in Peace: The Allies begin the War, and, which was never before known, they aim at Conqueſts, not to aggrandize themſelves, but only to preſerve themſelves; not to ſatisfie their Ambition, but only to deliver themſelves from Fear: Thus, 'tis certain that the Fear the Power of *France* gives to *Europe*, will be a ſtronger Incitement to make the Sovereigns of *Europe* form the *European Society*, than the Fear of powerful Neighbours was to induce the Sovereigns of *Germany* to form the *Germanick Society*.

Thirdly, The Fear the Sovereigns of *Germany* ſtood in of their powerful Neighbours, was not ſo great then as 'tis imagin'd; becauſe, at the time of the *Germanick Union* the Neighbours of *Germany* were not ſo powerful as thoſe it has now. This *Union* was made above five hundred Years ago: let us examine the then Neighbours of *Germany*. *France* it ſelf was ſhar'd between ten or twelve Sovereigns; who, indeed, held of the King of *France*, who was, as it were, their Emperor; but they often made War without his Conſent,

ſent, and ſometimes even made it upon him. The King of *England* poſſeſs'd *Normandy*, *Guienne*, and part of *Poictou*. On another ſide, *Bretagne*, *la Marche*, *Languedoc*, *Provence*, *Dauphine*, *Burgundy*, *Champagne*, were ſo many ſeparate Sovereignties. In *Italy* it was much the ſame. So much for the Weſt and South. The Sea bounded *Germany* on the North; and the *Swedes*, at that time, were neither united into one Nation, nor had Force enough to be formidable. On the Eaſt was *Poland* and *Hungary:* The moſt Populous part of *Poland* made part of the *Germanick Body*; and the Princes of *Hungary* could not be very formidable to the Earls of *Auſtria*, nor to the Dukes or Kings of *Bohemia*. The Empire of the Eaſt was even then ſo weaken'd by Diviſions, and by the *Aſiatick* Wars, that inſtead of being formidable to the *Germans*, it had it ſelf need to be ſuſtained againſt the *Saracens*. Fear of Invaſion, therefore, had no leſs ſhare in the Formation of the *Germanick Union*, than it may have in the Formation of the *European Union*.

COMPARISON *of the* OBSTACLES.

IT is on one ſide certain, that all the Obſtacles, in an Affair of which a Treaty only is the Subject, conſiſt in the Views, in the Conſiderations, in a word, in the Motives every one of the Parties may have to refuſe entring into ſuch a Treaty. Now this whole Affair is about a Treaty; thus all the Obſtacles conſiſt in the Difficulty of obtaining the conſent of the Sovereigns.

On another ſide, it is no leſs certain, that in Affairs, the Succeſs whereof depend wholly upon the Conſent of Parties, that Conſent is ſo much the leſs hard to obtain, as the Views, the Conſiderations, in a word, the Motives to give it are in greater number, and of greater weight. Now we juſt now prov'd, that the Motives, or Intereſts, of the preſent Princes, are incomparably greater in themſelves, to form the *European Union*, than thoſe of the Princes of that Age were, to form the *Germanick Union*. It is eaſie, therefore, to conclude in general, that the Obſtacles which may proceed from the Will of the preſent Sovereigns, ſhould be much leſs than the Obſtacles which might proceed from the Will of the Sovereigns of that Age. But let us examine 'em one by one.

1. The moſt apparent Obſtacle is, the Multitude of the Parties who are to ſign the Treaty; but an eſſential Diſtinction muſt be made, with reſpect to two ſorts of Treaties: The one cannot be made, unleſs all the Parties ſign at the ſame time, either in Perſon, or by Proxy; in that Caſe, one ſingle

ſingle Refuſer, only one being abſent, and not ſending his Proxy, is enough to hinder the others from Sealing. But there are other Treaties which begin at firſt by a few, two, three, or four, and in which a Blank is left for all that ſhall be willing to enter, and ſign them at different times, one after another. Among theſe latter are many Treaties of Society; wherein the Subſcriber enters into all the Laws or Obligations of the Society, in order to enter alſo into the Right of ſharing in all the Advantages: Now the Treaty of the *Germanick Union* was of this kind; and that of the *European Union*, which I propoſe, is the ſame in that particular.

Now who can ſay, that there were fewer Difficulties, fewer Obſtacles, in getting the *Germanick* Treaty ſign'd by two hundred Sovereigns, at different times, one after another, than there will be in getting the *European* Treaty ſigned by eighteen or four and twenty Sovereigns of *Europe*, at different times, one after another, if all things are equal in all other Points?

We have already ſeen, that on one ſide the *European Treaty* would be even much more advantageous to the eighteen, than the *Germanick Treaty* was to the two hundred; and on the other we ſhall preſently ſee, that the other things are at leaſt equal. Hitherto then there is not only *Parity* in the Argument, but alſo *Diſparity*, and an advantageous *Diſparity* too; ſince, all things being equal, there muſt be more Time ſpent in getting two hundred Perſons to ſign, than eighteen or four and twenty: But, I muſt confeſs, Obſtacles that may be eaſily and infallibly ſurmounted by the delay of ſome Months, or even of ſome Years, to obtain an immortal Eſtabliſhment, are not Obſtacles worthy of much Attention.

'Tis likely the Project of the Treaty of the *Germanick Union* had the good Fortune to begin, by pleaſing ſome one of the Sovereigns of that Nation; he propos'd the rough Draught of the Plan to ſome other, who lik'd it; theſe ſoon propoſe it to ſome of the moſt skilful and the wiſeſt, and eaſily gain their Approbation of it: At length, the Plan being made Publick, a great many Sovereigns, after having examin'd it, each of them in their Council, agree to aſſemble their Deputies, in order to rectifie it, and to agree upon the principal Articles: It is rectify'd, the Articles are drawn up and concluded upon, and at laſt they all give their Conſent, at different times. If any body tells me, it could have been done in any other method, 'tis no matter; this very method may be us'd to obtain, by little and little, the like Con-

ſent of the Sovereigns of *Europe*, for the Treaty of the *European Union*, with this difference, that there will be but eighteen, or four and twenty Perſons to deal with, whereas then there were above two hundred.

2. What may hinder Perſons from conſenting to a Treaty is, the Greatneſs of their Pretenſions, when they are oppoſite. Now who can ſay, that the Pretenſions the Sovereigns of *Germany* had one againſt the other, were leſs great Then, than thoſe the Sovereigns of *Europe* have one againſt the other Now? Ought not this Greatneſs of Intereſt to be meaſur'd in proportion to the Power and Riches of the Parties who are to treat? And who does not know that four Villages, a ſmall Toll, may be as important to a petty Prince, or a little Republick, as four great Cities, or a great Taxation may be to a great Republick, or to a very powerful Prince? Thus, on that ſide, there is an Equality of Obſtacles; yet, notwithſtanding the Greatneſs of contrary Intereſts, the *Germanick Union* was eſtabliſh'd; let any one tell me what Motives made them ſurmount thoſe Obſtacles, for at length they were ſurmounted, and it will appear, that nothing hinders our making uſe of the ſame Motives to remove the like Difficulties.

3. 'Tis not only the multiplicity of Pretenders; 'tis not only the Greatneſs of oppoſite Pretenſions, that form Obſtacles in Treaties; 'tis the Multitude of thoſe Pretenſions: Now who can ſay, that two hundred petty Princes, who had certainly as many things to demand of each other, to diſpute, and to divide, as thoſe that were more powerful, had not alſo a greater Multitude of Pretenſions one againſt the other, than if there had been but eighteen, or but twenty four? Is it not then evident, that on that ſide the Obſtacle was not only not leſs great, but that it was really eight times greater? And yet the *Germanick Union* was form'd, and that too, becauſe the Members that enter'd into it certainly found that, all things conſider'd, it was more advantageous for them to ſign the Treaty, than not to ſign it.

4. What might be a conſiderable Obſtacle to the Eſtabliſhment of the permanent Society of *Germany*, was that there were in that Country Sovereigns ten times, fifteen times, twenty times more powerful than ſome others of their Neighbourhood: For the moſt powerful had much more grounds to hope to conquer others, than they had to fear having Conqueſts made upon themſelves: By the Union they depriv'd themſelves of all manner of Liberty of aggrandizing themſelves by Arms; yet notwithſtanding this Obſtacle, the Union was formed. The moſt powerful Houſes therefore muſt

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at that time have judged that, all things conſidered, they ſhould procure themſelves much greater Advantages by their Conſent to the Treaty, than by their Refuſal. Now the moſt powerful of our Sovereigns are not more ſo with reſpect to the leſs powerful, than the moſt powerful among the *Germans* were with reſpect to the leſs powerful of that Nation. Thus this Obſtacle is equal in both Societies, and is not inſurmountable, ſince it has been already ſurmounted, and that too, in all Appearance, by the Greatneſs of the Advantages that each of them expected from the Union.

Let us hear what thoſe great Advantages were, and we ſhall ſee that our Sovereigns of *Europe* may expect them with as much Reaſon from the *European* Union, as the Sovereigns of *Germany* might from the *Germanick* Union, and let no body ſay that 'tis impoſſible to trace back thoſe great Advantages which the Princes of that Age had in view in that Union; for, in ſhort, we are not of a different Nature: We need, therefore, only Study, only interrogate that ſame Nature, ſhe will dictate them to Us now, as ſhe dictated them to Them then; and this is what excellent Genius's ought to do, if they are true Patriots, or at leaſt encourage thoſe who devote themſelves to that important Search.

5. It will be, ſay they, a main Obſtacle to the *European* Union, that none of the Members ſhall be allow'd to enlarge his Territories; and that each in his Differences ſhall be obliged to ſubmit, whether he will or no, to the Deciſion the other Sovereigns ſhall give by their Deputies. In the following Diſcourſe I ſhall ſhew, that this Regulation ought not at all to be looked upon as an Obſtacle. On the contrary, I ſhall ſhew that as no body can preſerve either the Liberty of enlarging his Territories, or the Power of righting himſelf by Arms, without undergoing great Inconveniences, and manifeſtly expoſing himſelf to the greateſt Misfortunes; inſtead of the Method of Arbitration's being an Obſtacle to the Formation of a permanent Society, the Deſire of avoiding thoſe great Misfortunes becomes a powerful Motive to form it; but, however, we'll ſuppoſe it an Obſtacle, and a very great one; exaggerate its Greatneſs as much as you will, I conſent. It is at leaſt certain it was a no leſs great one to the Sovereigns of *Germany*, than it is now to the Sovereigns of *Europe*: Yet They overcame it. Let any one tell me what engaged them to ſurmount ſuch an Obſtacle, and it will appear that it was the very ſame thing which may engage the preſent Sovereigns not to mind it in the leaſt.

Theſe are the greateſt Obſtacles that offered themſelves, when the *Germanick* Union was forming. Now who is he among the Mockers of the *European* Project, that, had he lived in thoſe Times, would not equally have mocked the *Germanick* Project as a Chimera, and as impracticable: For I defie him to give any Reaſons why he ſhould think the *European* one impoſſible, but what are common to the *Germanick*. Yet, to the Shame of the Mockers of their Age, who had at leaſt as much Reaſon as the Mockers of ours, the Project which ſeemed to them a pure Viſion, is become a pure Reality; that impracticable Project has been put in Practice; that Body, conſiſting of ſo many Members, ſtill ſubſiſts, notwithſtanding its Imperfections and has preſerved almoſt two hundred Sovereigns for ſeven or eight hundred Years, by preſerving it ſelf.

I have had two Difficulties propoſed to me. The firſt is, that in *Germany* they ſpoke but one Language, whereas in *Europe* they ſpeak ſeveral. To this I anſwer, that if Treaties could not be made between Sovereigns, unleſs they and their Subjects ſpoke the ſame Language, there would never be any made at all. Yet they are made daily. How comes that about? Becauſe they treat only by Deputies; and it is ſufficient if the Deputies of Sovereigns underſtand a Language common to the Deputies with whom they have to Negotiate. They even often Negotiate and Treat by the help of Interpreters, tho' the Deputies do not underſtand each others Language.

The ſecond Difficulty is, that *Germany* is much leſs extenſive than *Europe*, and that thus the Correſpondence the Sovereigns were obliged to have with their Deputies at the Diets, was more eaſie than the Correſpondence of the Sovereigns of *Europe* would be, with their Deputies at the Aſſemblies in the City of the Congreſs. But 1ſt, If we conſider that ſince ſix hundred Years the Roads have been made much better and ſhorter, as well by Pavements, as by Bridges and the Grubbing up of Foreſts, and that Poſt Offices have been ſet up, which greatly facilitate Correſpondence, it will ſoon appear, that the Ancient Sovereigns of *Germany*, being deſtitute of thoſe Conveniencies, had as much difficulty in their Correſpondence with their Deputies, as the preſent Sovereigns will have with theirs, tho' at a greater diſtance. 2dly, May not the Roads be made better ſtill, and the Poſts put into a better Condition of Service? 3dly, When the Sovereigns have once agreed upon their Limits, and the Articles of Commerce, when they have eſtabliſhed Chambers of Commerce to decide the Controverſies of the Subjects of different Princes,

Princes, they will have but very few Differences; neither will they have any very important, or very much in haſte, and conſequently ſuch as neceſſitate the Deputies to receive ſuch preciſe Inſtructions, or ſuch ſpeedy Anſwers. Thus in that reſpect there will be no more difficulty in executing and maintaining the *European* Eſtabliſhment, than there was ſix hundred Years ago, in executing and maintaining the *Germanick* Eſtabliſhment.

Now let us ſee if they made uſe of ſuch Means to make their Eſtabliſhment, as we cannot uſe to make ours; and if we cannot even find out ſome which they had not, and make uſe of more Commodious ones than any they had.

COMPARISON *of the* MEANS.

I. THE firſt Means the *German* Sovereigns made uſe of, was to agree that each of them ſhould be contented with what he was in actual Poſſeſſion of, by the Terms of the laſt Treaties of Peace. This Convention was, properly ſpeaking, but a reciprocal Renunciation of all Pretenſions beyond what had been regulated by paſt Treaties. It was neceſſary for them, in their Deſign to maintain the Peace, to begin by ſettling a fixed Peace, and by laying down immutable and inconteſtible Bounds. Now let any body ſtudy a little, and it will appear that it is not poſſible to find any other fixed Point for Territory, than actual Poſſeſſion and the Terms of the laſt Treaties.

Now what hinders the preſent Sovereigns from ſeeing the Neceſſity there is that every one ſhould be contented with what he actually poſſeſſes, if every one is willing to avoid the Misfortunes of War, and to procure himſelf the Advantages of a perpetual Peace? Why cannot our Princes, then, make uſe of the ſame Means? Will any body ſay, that they *Will* not? But why then were the *German* Sovereigns *willing* to do it; the ſame Reaſons which could then perſuade the one, may equally now perſuade the others.

II. As there might be Obſcurity and Equivocation in the Treaties, as there might daily happen Subjects of Diſpute between the Members, and as there was ſtill ſomething remaining to be done in the Regulations of Commerce, they thought fit, as a ſecond Means, to agree to ſend and always to maintain in ſome free and neutral City each of them their Deputies, with Power to reconcile thoſe Differences, or elſe to adjudge them, as Arbiters upon the Inſtructions of their Maſters, either by Plurality, or by three fourths of the Voices.

Now what hinders the preſent Sovereigns from making the like Convention, as a ſure Means to terminate their future Differences *without War*? What hinders them even from perfecting that Convention, as we ſhall afterwards ſhew? Will any one ſay that our Princes are not *willing* to do it? But why then were the other *willing*? Let any one produce a reaſonable Diſparity.

III. It would be in vain for People to agree, that each ſhall ſtand to Treaties, and punctually execute the Judgments of Arbiters, if each *with Impunity* might omit to execute them. A Stranger, being formerly charmed with the good Order he ſaw obſerved at *Athens*, praiſed *Solon* for having, by his good Laws, procured his Country ſuch great Advantages: "Obſerve, *ſays* Solon *to him*, that the Laws are good "only when the Legiſlator has ſo ordered it, that Equity and "Force are never ſeparated from each other." Therefore, as the third Means, it was neceſſary for them to agree upon ſome very great, and, if poſſible, inevitable Puniſhment upon him, who, by refuſing to execute Treaties and the Sentences of the Arbiters, ſhould endeavour to break the Union. Thus the *Germanick* Union, following the Counſels of the *German Solon*, agreed that the Refuſer ſhould be put to the Ban of the Empire, look'd upon by all the Members as an Enemy, and if poſſible, diſpoſſeſs'd of his Dominions. Now here the Puniſhment, or rather the Menace, is indeed very great; but, unfortunately for the *Germanick* Society, it is not inevitable, becauſe of the Protection and Succour the Refuſer may receive from Foreign Powers.

Now who can hinder the Members of the *European* Society from putting the Refuſer to the Ban of *Europe*, with this infinite Difference, that it not being poſſible for him who is put to the Ban of *Europe*, to be protected and ſuccoured by any Power equal to *Europe*, he would be infallibly puniſhed? Thus the Infallibility of a very great Puniſhment will certainly keep him to his Duty and his true Intereſt; and as in the *European* Society Force will never be ſeparated from Equity, Peace and Plenty will never deſert the Members of that Society.

Thus, far from remaining in a Parity as to the Means, it is evident that the *European* Union will in that have even an infinite Advantage over the *Germanick* Union.

IV. 'Tis one of the Means neceſſary to the forming and maintaining an Eſtabliſhment, or a Society, to take Meaſures to ſupply its Wants and Exigencies. The *Germanick* Union, as a fourth Means, impoſed upon the Members Quota's proportionable to their Riches; and what hinders the *European* Union from making uſe of the ſame Method? Theſe

Theſe are the principal Means the *Germanick* Union made uſe of to eſtabliſh and maintain it ſelf: Now is there any invincible Obſtacle to hinder the preſent Sovereigns from making uſe of the ſame Means? May they not even make uſe of better, as will appear by and by?

Nay, we have two Advantages that the ancient *Germans* had not. The firſt is, that they had not before their Eyes any ſubſiſting Model of a *permanent Society among Sovereigns*, continually repreſented by Deputies at a perpetual Congreſs. 'Tis true, they might have ſome Idea of the Aſſembly of the *Amphictyones*, which, two thouſand Years ago, conſiſted of the Deputies of the *Greek* Republicks, to reconcile their Differences; but that Society did not then ſubſiſt, whereas we have ſubſiſting Models of *permanent Societies between different Sovereignties*. We have alſo, for our Inſtruction, Experience of their Faults, and certainly that is another very great Advantage. Thus, on that ſide, We have more Facility than They had. The ſecond Advantage is, that as all Arts and Sciences are vaſtly improved ſince that Time, it is not poſſible but that the Art of Negociating, and the Science of Politicks, ſhould be improved too. Thus, on that ſide, we ſhall find Facilities in treating which they had not; yet they did treat, and make their Eſtabliſhment; and that Eſtabliſhment ſtill ſubſiſts, notwithſtanding its great Defects.

CONCLUSION.

I have ſhewn, that as to the Motives, the Sovereigns of *Germany* had none ſtronger, to ſign the Treaty of the *Germanick* Union, than the preſent Sovereigns have to ſign the Treaty of the *European* Union, and that, on the contrary, the Motives of our Princes are incomparably ſtronger than thoſe of the *German* Sovereigns. I have ſhewn, that as to Obſtacles we have not more than they, and that we have even leſs. I have ſhewn, that as to Means, our Sovereigns have all thoſe the *German* Princes had, and that they have ſtill more, and thoſe too more effectual. All I have further to do then, is to conclude, that *ſince the* Germanick *Society was formed, notwithſtanding the Predictions of the ancient Mockers, the* European *Society may yet more eaſily be formed, notwithſtanding the Prediction of the modern Mockers*; and this is what I propoſed to demonſtrate in this Diſcourſe.

SECOND PROPOSITION.

The Approbation that moſt of the Sovereigns of Europe *gave to the Project of an* European *Society, which* HENRY *the Great propoſed to them, proves, that it may be hop'd that the like Project may be approved by their Succeſſors.*

IT falls out happily for this Project, that I am not the Author of it; 'twas *HENRY* the Great was the firſt Inventor of it; 'twas that *European Solon* whom God firſt of all inſpired with the Means to make the Sovereigns of *Europe* deſirous to eſtabliſh among them an equitable Polity: And if, in ſearching for a Preſervative againſt the Evils of War, I have, by dint of Thought, hit upon a Plan in the main like that of that excellent Prince, my having hit upon it too, does not in any wiſe diminiſh the Glory of Invention due to him; but on the one ſide I make uſe of his Deſign as a Guide, that I may be ſure not to err in mine; and on the other I make uſe of it as a Buckler, to ward off the Inſults of thoſe who, either out of Littleneſs of Mind, or thro' Inattention, might look upon me as whimſical. I have the Advantage not to have my ſelf to defend, but only to defend, from Extravagancies in Politicks, a Prince known by all the World to be very wiſe in the Government of his Kingdom. 'Tis not my Ideas then that I am to improve, I am only to juſtifie his. Thus I do not pretend to have created any thing anew, I only revive the fineſt and moſt glorious Project that ever could enter into the Mind of the beſt of Princes. I only deſire to know of the Sovereigns of this Age, what can hinder them from entering into the ſame Views that their Predeceſſors were ſo much pleaſed with in the preceding Age. I have two things to do, therefore; the firſt is, to ſhew the Thoughts of *Henry* the Great, and of the other Potentates of *Europe* in his time, upon the Syſtem of the *permanent European Society, to ſettle an everlaſting Peace among Chriſtians.* The ſecond is, to ſhew that their Approbation may reaſonably give us hopes of the like Approbation in the Sovereigns who govern *Europe* at preſent.

HISTORY *of the* FACT.

IMMEDIATELY after the Peace of *Vervins*, concluded in 1598 between *France* and *Spain*, *Henry*, who had ſeen his Kingdom and Family brought to the Brink of Ruin, as well by Civil Wars, as by foreign Wars, and found that all *Europe* ſtill felt the Effects of that general Diſorder, thought that nothing could be more worthy his Attention, than

than to find out the propereſt Means to make the Peace among Chriſtians durable, and, if he could, everlaſting. He ſaw that the uſeful Regulations and Eſtabliſhments, he was about making for the Good of his People, depended ſolely upon the Duration of the Peace, becauſe War neceſſarily employs all the Mind, all the Strength, and all the Riches of Sovereigns.

* He judged, by what paſſes in the *Germanick* Body in Point of Religion, that Peace might be preſerved in a Society of Sovereigns, notwithſtanding Difference and Contrariety of Religion; but he looked upon the great Inequality there was between the Potentates of *Europe*, as one of the principal Sources of all the Wars: He ſaw that the Eaſe wherewith the Stronger might oppreſs the Weaker, and enrich himſelf with his Spoils, would always be a great Obſtacle to the maintaining the Peace. To remedy this Inconvenience, he propoſed to have thoſe Powers equalled: Now this could not be done without taking ſome Provinces from the Houſe of *Auſtria*, to fortifie therewith ſome too weak States; but he did not conſider that it was very uncertain whether all the Potentates could be made to agree to this Expedient, and that it would coſt a great deal of Blood and Treaſure to put it in Practice. Therefore I am perſuaded he would not have pitched upon ſuch a Remedy, had he reflected that the *European* Society would eaſily remedy that Inequality of Power, without taking any thing from any Body; that it might be remedied without Expence or Effuſion of Blood; that to do it there was only need to make uſe of the ſame Means that the *Germanick* Society does, to hinder all manner of Uſurpation of the Stronger upon the Weaker. For indeed it is certain, that in the *Germanick* Body there are Members that are twenty times, thirty times more powerful than others that are in their Neighbourhood, and that yet the Weaker have poſſeſſed in Peace the Sovereignty of their Anceſtors for above ſix hundred Years.

He thought that the principal Source of Wars was the want of a perpetual Arbitration, to terminate, *without War*, the Differances of Sovereigns, either about Limits, or about the Execution of paſs'd Treaties, or about Injuries and Damages, or about Commerce, or, in ſhort, about any other ſort of reciprocal Pretenſions; and indeed that want of a *permanent Arbitration ſufficiently intereſted to be* willing *to execute its Deciſions, and ſufficiently* powerful *to cauſe them to be executed*, is the ſole and true Source of all Wars. He perceived

*Sully's *Memoirs, folio Edition, Vol.* 2. *Page* 4.

perceived the Neceſſity of that *permanent Arbitration*, ‡ and in all appearance had taken the firſt Model of it from the *Germanick* Society, and had made that eſſential Point ſtill more perfect than it is in *Germany*.

The Duke of *Sully* ſays he had a great many Memoirs concerning the *European Society*, † quite finiſhed; but, unhappily, they are not come down to us; ſo that we are ignorant both of the *Motives* by which he made his Project be approved of by all the Chriſtian Sovereigns he communicated it to, and the *Means* he thought moſt proper for putting them in Execution, and 'tis, in ſome ſort, to repair this great Loſs, that I have endeavoured to recover them.

What is important to our Subject is, he found that, to maintain the Peace, it was neceſſary for every one to confine all his Pretenſions to what he actually poſſeſſed; he wanted neither lawful Right, nor good Pretenſions to ſeveral Territories which the other Sovereigns poſſeſſed; he wanted not Power to do himſelf Juſtice by Arms; yet, in Conſideration of the great Advantages which he and his Subjects might reap from the Society of Chriſtian States, ‖ he declared, that, to make the Peace everlaſting, he would for ever bound his Territory to what he actually poſſeſſed, and that he would conſent to have immutable Boundaries put to it, as there were to be to the Frontiers of other Dominions.

* The Project was to make one ſingle Republick of all the Chriſtian States, and to make it ſubſiſt always pacifick in it ſelf, and among all the Potentates it could conſiſt of, and it was to be agreed what Quota each Potentate ſhould pay, which the Duke of *Sully* calls a *proportional Aſſeſſment*. §

The Project was agreed to by the Queen of *England*, in 1601. It is related more at large, and in greater Order, in the Hiſtory of *Henry* the Great, written by the late M. *de Perefix*, Preceptor to the King, and Archbiſhop of *Paris*, who ſays he has it all from the Duke of *Sully*. 'Tis ſaid that the famous *Mezeray* of the *French* Academy helped M. *de Perefix* in the diſpoſal of the Facts of that Hiſtory, and in the Style of the Narration. The Plan of this great Project may be found at the End of that Hiſtory, Page 561, and the following, in the *Amſterdam* Edition in 12*mo*, in 1661, by *Antoine Michiel*. Here follows the things that I thought moſt conſiderable with Reſpect to our Subject, in the Recital that Hiſtorian makes of them. Henry *was very uneaſie*, ſays he, *that ſome private Affairs ſhould retard the Execution of*

‡ Sully's *Memoirs*, *Ibid.* † *Page* 22. ‖ *Page* 4. * *Page* 141. § *Page* 4.

of the great Deſign *be had in Hand for the perpetual Repoſe of Chriſtendom.*

He promiſed the Chriſtian Princes, that if the Chriſtian Republick ſhould think fit to make Conqueſts upon the *Turk*, * he would contribute his Quota, and would nevertheleſs leave all the Conqueſts to be divided among the other Chriſtian Sovereigns: He was contented with what he poſſeſſed.

† His Project was communicated to the King of *Poland*, and the Lords of *Bohemia*, of *Hungary*, and of *Tranſilvania.*

‡ *There was even a Treaty about it made with the Pope, who approved and commended his Undertaking, and deſired that he might contribute to it, on his Part, as much as lay in his Power.*

He deſired ſo perfectly to unite all Chriſtendom, that it might be but one Body, and might actually be in its Nature, as well as Name, The CHRISTIAN REPUBLICK.

§ *To regulate all the Differences between the Confederates, and to terminate them without Force, there was to have been eſtabliſhed an Order and Form of proceeding by a general Council conſiſting of ſixty Perſons, four from each of the fifteen States, which ſhould have been placed in ſome City in the middle of* Europe, *as* Metz, Nancy, Cologne, *or ſome other, and three others ſhould have been made out of it in three ſeveral Places, each of twenty Men, all which three ſhould be conformable to the general Council, which might have been call'd the Senate of the Chriſtian Republick: He was in hopes to form this Body in leſs than three Years.*

‖ *On the ſide of* Italy, *the Pope, the* Venetians, *and the Duke of* Savoy, *were well informed of the King's Deſign, and were to have aſſiſted in it with all their Power----On the ſide of* Germany, *four Electors, he of* Palatine, Brandenburg, Cologn *and* Mayence, *were made acquainted with it alſo, and were to have favoured it.*

*** The Duke of *Bavaria*, who was not then an Elector, had alſo concurred unto it.

††† *The King had reſolved to renounce all Pretenſions, and to keep no part of what he ſhould conquer from the Houſe of* Auſtria----*to the End that he might be generally eſteemed as the Deliverer of Nations, and the Procurer of Peace and Liberty.*

‡‡‡ *He had taken his Meaſures, and made his Preparations to bring this Project about, with all the Care imaginable, for his*

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* *Page* 563. † *Page* 564. ‡ *Ibid.* § *Page* 567. ‖ *Page* 569. *** *Page* 570. ††† *Page* 575. ‡‡‡ *Page* 576.

his laſt eight or nine Years, that is, from the Approbation Queen Elizabeth *had given it in* 1601.

This was the Plan of his Deſign, which, without exaggerating it, was ſo great, that it may be ſaid to have been conceived by an Underſtanding more than Humane; but however high it might be, it was not above his Genius: God only knows what would have been the Succeſs of it; yet we may ſay, that in all Appearance it would have been put in Practice, for there was no Prince or State in all Chriſtendom but what would have favoured it, except the Houſe of Auſtria.

PROOFS *of the* TRUTH *of the* FACTS.

THESE are the principal Facts. Now upon what will the Doubt fall? Will it fall upon the Quotations? Every one has it in his Power to compare them. Will it be upon the Recital the Duke of *Sully* makes of them in ſeveral Parts of his *Memoirs*? In what can his Teſtimony be ſuſpected?

1. Can it be any way his Intereſt to deceive his Readers upon that Article? But he could never have done That, without purpoſely intending to diſhonour himſelf; for he himſelf caus'd his Works to be Printed, and it was ſpread about in his Life-time: He brings in all the Nations of *Europe*, to which the Project of the *European Society* had been communicated, as Witneſſes of that Project. Now, would he have Printed a Fact of this Nature, if it had been falſe, in the Face of all *Europe*, unleſs he had a mind to paſs for an Impoſtor, or at leaſt for a Madman?

2. Can any one ſay, that he was deceiv'd in relating thoſe Facts? But how can this Thought come into the Mind of the Reader? For if the Queſtion was concerning ſome Affair, which it was impoſſible for him to be acquainted with, but by the Teſtimony of another; 'tis true, he might have been deceiv'd: But 'tis an Affair which paſs'd thro' his own Hands, which he continually negociated, as his Maſter's Prime Miniſter, for nine or ten Years, and was ſent about it upon an Ambaſſy into *England*. Now, 'tis in vain to ſuppoſe, that a Man could want Memory; it can never be ſuppos'd, that he wanted it to ſuch a degree, as to make it credible that the whole Negotiation was but a Dream of M. *de Sully*: Tho' he were ſuppos'd ſo extravagant as that came to, at certain Intervals; yet at leaſt he could not be ſo at the time when he Printed a Work, in which there are ſo many wiſe and ſenſible things ſaid by him.

The Reader may, perhaps, be diſpleas'd at my taking ſo much pains to prove the Truth of a Fact, which no body can diſpute; but I have had Experience of the contrary: A cer-

certain Man of Senſe finding himſelf nonplus'd by the Conſequences I drew from it, found himſelf oblig'd to deny the very Truth of the Fact: And beſides, 'tis my Opinion, nothing ought to be neglected to put it in its true Light; one Page more or leſs is nothing to a Reader, and it ſometimes is of great Moment to the Solidity of a Work.

CONSEQUENCES *which may be drawn from the* FACT.

NOTHING is more natural than to believe, that the Project of a Treaty, which has been approv'd of as very advantageous, by eighteen or nineteen Sovereigns of *Europe*, a hundred Years ago, may again be approv'd of by their Succeſſors, if the ſame Reaſons for that Approbation ſtill ſubſiſt, and if there are no ſufficient Reaſons to the contrary. Now I aver, that ſince that time there has been no new Motive, ſufficient to hinder any of their Succeſſors from approving of it Now: Thus the Proof remains as it was; we ſhall therefore proceed to examine the *Parities* and *Diſparities*, and ſhall ſee the Reſult.

Let not any one pretend to ſay, that Men are not wiſe enough to take ſo reaſonable a Courſe; that they are too much given up to their Paſſions to hear Reaſon; that their Intereſts are too contrary; that they are too ſubject to Jealouſie, to Revenge, to Ambition, to Injuſtice: thoſe threadbare Topicks conclude nothing, becauſe they conclude too much; they might as well ſay, that Men can never poſſibly make any ſort of Treaty with one another, or any ſort of permanent Society; which is diſprov'd by Experience.

But to return to the preſent Fact; were not the Sovereigns that were Contemporary with *Henry* IV. Men, as well as the preſent Sovereigns? Were they more free from Paſſions than the preſent? Had they not their Jealouſies, their Ambition? Were not their Intereſts as oppoſite as at preſent? Yet, in ſpight of theſe general Reaſons, they approv'd that Treaty of an *European Union*; why then ſhould thoſe ſame general Reaſons hinder the preſent Sovereigns from approving that ſame Treaty? Is Nature ſo very much chang'd within theſe hundred Years?

In the Treaty in hand, we have not to do with Mankind in general, but only with thoſe whoſe Approbation is neceſſary. Now who were the Sovereigns that had already given their Approbation an hundred Years ago? The *Pope*, *Venice*, the Duke of *Savoy*, the Dukes of *Tuſcany*, *Genoa*, and all the other Princes of *Italy*, the *Switz*, ſeveral of the Electors, *Poland*, *England*, *Holland*, and the King of *France* particularly. Now we ſhall ſee, that thoſe who now govern

vern the ſame Sovereignties, have either the *ſame* Motives, or at leaſt *equivalent* Motives to approve it.

There is a diſtinction to be made. 'Tis true, the Sovereigns who were to have an Advantage from the Conqueſts which the *Union* propos'd to make from the Houſe of *Auſtria*, were more concern'd to ſign the Treaty than the reſt; but this does not prove, that they would not have ſign'd it without that Condition; nay, we have an evident Proof, that without any expectation of aggrandizing themſelves, they would have ſign'd it, ſince they would have had the ſame Motives as other Sovereigns who had ſign'd it, without any expectation of Aggrandizement, and only in the ſole Conſideration of being always ſure, both of enjoying all the Advantages of a perpetual Peace, both at home and abroad. Thoſe Sovereigns who approv'd that Treaty, without any expectation of Aggrandizement, were *Genoa*, *Florence*, and the petty Sovereigns of *Italy*; *England*, *France*, and the Electors.

One thing did very much diminiſh even the Deſire of aggrandizing themſelves in the former; and that was, they foreſaw the great Expence neceſſary to do it, and the Uncertainty of the Succeſs of the War, and of their hop'd-for Conqueſts; and they might happen to pay too dear for ſuch an Aggrandizement.

As for the Sovereigns who were to have contributed to the Expences of the common War, without any hopes of aggrandizing themſelves, and only to aggrandize the others; that diſpoſition of Mind proves, that the Motives which induced them to the Treaty of the *European Union* muſt needs be very great, ſince they approv'd that Treaty, notwithſtanding the great Expences they were to be at for the Advantage of their Allies: And this eſſential *Diſparity* makes very much for my Argument; for in the Treaty I propoſe, there is no Conqueſts to be made by one Sovereign to enrich another; there is to be no Charges nor Hazard about that; every one remains as he is: If therefore *France*, *England*, the petty Princes of *Italy*, moſt of the Electors, then approved this Treaty, notwithſtanding the great Riſques and Charges of a future War, much more willingly muſt the ſame Potentates approve it, when it is without thoſe Riſques and Hazards. Beſides, they had greater Obſtacles at that time, than our Sovereigns have now; yet they had already got over them; therefore they muſt needs have had very great Motives, that is to ſay, they muſt have found very great Advantages in the Effects of this ſame permanent Society I again propoſe to all the Chriſtian Sovereigns.

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Let no body then ſay, that the Sovereigns will never renounce their Pretenſions upon their Neighbours: Did not the eighteen or nineteen Sovereigns, who agreed to the Project, renounce theirs upon all the Neighbouring States?

Let no body then ſay, that it will be impoſſible to perſuade the Sovereigns, to renounce all Aggrandizement of Territory by Force; did not *France* and *England*, and the other Sovereigns renounce it? And why did they renounce it, but becauſe they ſaw that, without that Renunciation, they could never have a perpetual Peace? Therefore they muſt perceive, in the Perpetuity of the Peace, Advantages real, certain, and of a Value much greater than the real Value of their Expectations and Pretenſions.

Let no body then ſay, in general, that there are inſurmountable Obſtacles, and real Impoſſibilities, to execute ſuch a Project: Is there need of any thing elſe to bring about the Execution of it, but the Will of the Sovereigns? The Buſineſs is only concerning a Treaty, a Convention; thus who can tell whether 'tis impoſſible better than themſelves, ſince no body can tell better than they, whether they will approve it, whether they will conſent to it? All thoſe pretended Impoſſibilities therefore are vaniſhed; thoſe inſurmountable Obſtacles were then ſurmounted, when the Project was approv'd of by all thoſe to whom it was propos'd.

Let no body then ſay, that it will never be poſſible to bring the Sovereigns to conſent, to have their future Differences regulated and terminated by the other Sovereigns, their Equals, as permanent and perpetual Arbiters in the General Diet of *Europe*. Let no body then ſay, that it is not poſſible to bring them to acknowledge other Judges beſides God and their Sword. Let no body then ſay, that it will be accepting of Maſters, putting themſelves under Tutors, giving themſelves Chains, and ceaſing to be Independant; ſince there were eighteen or nineteen Sovereigns, great and little; ſince there were powerful Republicks; and eſpecially two Sovereigns, very wiſe, very powerful, very jealous of their Independency, who conſented to eſtabliſh a permanent and everlaſting Arbitration, and punctually to comply with the Deciſions of the Arbiters.

Let thoſe who ſo clearly perceive a perfect Impoſſibility to get from Sovereigns, and eſpecially from the moſt powerful ones, a Conſent to make theſe Renunciations, and to eſtabliſh the Arbitration, anſwer to theſe Facts: It is then no longer utterly impoſſible, that Sovereigns, tho' very powerful, ſhould give ſuch a Conſent, ſince here are ſome that have given it; the thing has been done; the like thing then

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is not utterly impoſſible, in the like Circumſtances: Therefore theſe Gentlemen muſt unhappily be oblig'd to deny the Fact; or elſe let them tell us, how the thing paſſed, or the Motives that could force an impoſſible Conſent from the Sovereigns of the laſt Age; is that Conſent a Miracle of Wiſdom, or a Miracle of Extravagance, the like of which can never be expected again? Whatever thoſe Motives be, let 'em tell them us, and we ſhall ſee, whether it is utterly impoſſible for the preſent Sovereigns to be induced to the like Conſent by the like Motives.

Be it as it will, thoſe Princes muſt needs think they ſhould loſe nothing of their true Independence, but get very much by waving to terminate their Differences by Force, and by the Sword, by chuſing the Expedient of Arbitration; certainly none of them ever found, that they gave themſelves Chains, that they put themſelves under Tutors; or at leaſt, if they did loſe ſome things, they muſt needs think, that the Loſs was not to be mention'd, in compariſon of the great Advantages that would accrue to them all, from a Treaty that furniſhes Means, whereby to terminate all their future Differences without any War.

If that Diminution of Independence be real, how came it to be perceptible to private Readers, without being perceptible to nineteen Sovereigns, who alone are concern'd in the Project, as to what regards Independence? Let us hear this Fact explain'd; and if they *did* perceive it, let them tell us why they did not mind it? Why did they paſs it over, without inſiſting upon it? Surely they had ſome Reaſon for not doing it: I have ſtudy'd for thoſe Reaſons, and believe I have, with much ado, found them out; they are thoſe which make the Subject of the following Diſcourſe: In this I ſhall draw, from the Conduct of the Princes of the laſt Age, a very probable Inference; that if the ſame Project were explain'd and propos'd to the Sovereigns of this Age, it would not be impoſſible for them to enter into the Sentiments of their Predeceſſors.

I have now nothing to do, but to make one Reflection upon the Project of *Henry the Great*, with reſpect to the Houſe of *Auſtria*; it is; That if before they began the War to deſpoil it, and to enrich with its Spoils the *Dutch*, the *Swiſs*, the *Venetians*, the Duke of *Savoy*, and the *Pope*; they had ask'd that Houſe to enter into the Union, and to have agreed to all the Articles that might hinder all future Wars, and all enlarging of Territory, it would willingly have done it, to free it ſelf from the Fear of the Forces of the other Sovereigns of the *Chriſtian Union*; and that if it had agreed

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to it, all the other Sovereigns would have laid aſide the Deſign of a long and tedious War, for an invincible Reaſon; namely, becauſe, ſuppoſing their Union well eſtabliſh'd and ſettled, they would always be ready to take up Arms, if that Houſe ſhould offer to diſturb the univerſal Repoſe, and to reduce it to the ſame Foot as *Henry the Great* propos'd; which was, to deprive it of *Flanders* for the *Dutch*, the *Milaneſe* for the Duke of *Savoy*, of *Naples* for the *Pope*, of *Sicily* for *Venice*, of *Bohemia* for the *Bohemians*, of *Hungary* for the *Hungarians*, of *Tirol* and the *Trentin* for the *Switz*. But the whole Union being infinitely more powerful than that Houſe, it never need to have fear'd it; and, in all appearance, the *European Union* would have been form'd, even then, upon the ſame Plan as I now propoſe; and as the Houſe of *France* is not now more powerful than the Houſe of *Auſtria* was then, the ſame Motives that might make the Union be approv'd of then, may make it be approv'd of now.

CONCLUSION.

THE Reader, I believe, is now able to judge, that *the Approbation which moſt of the Sovereigns of* Europe *gave to the Project for an* European Society, *which* Henry the Great *propos'd to them, proves, that it may be hop'd, ſuch a Project will be approv'd of by their Succeſſors*; and this is what I propos'd to demonſtrate.

We have endeavour'd to ſhew the Poſſibility of the Project, by proving, that the *European Union* had neither leſs Motives, nor leſs in Number; that it had neither more Obſtacles, nor thoſe more great; that it had neither leſs Means, nor leſs in Number, to be form'd in our time, than the *Germanick Union* had to form it ſelf ſix or ſeven hundred Years ago: On the contrary, we have ſhewn, that the Diſparities are very great in favour of the *European Union*.

We juſt now ſhew'd the Manner in which the Sovereigns look'd upon the Plan of *Henry the Great*, in the beginning of the laſt Age. Theſe, I think, are two very reaſonable and very great Prepoſſeſſions, for the Poſſibility of ſuch a Project: They plainly ſhew us, that 'tis poſſible to find Motives powerful enough, to put the Sovereigns in Motion upon the moſt important Affair of *Europe*; that it is poſſible to find out convenient Means to attain to the Maſter-piece of Human Policy. Now theſe *Motives*, and theſe *Means*, which I have prov'd in this Diſcourſe to be poſſible to find, ſince they have already been found; in the following Diſcourſe I mean to ſhew, that they are already found again.

To conclude: Tho' there never had been any Model of a *permanent Union* between Sovereigns, neither among the *Greeks*, nor among the *Germans*, nor among the *Switz*, nor among the *Dutch*; tho' the Project of the *Union of Europe* had never yet been either invented, or propos'd, or approv'd; yet, I hope, the Motives to form this Union, will, in the following part of this Eſſay, appear ſo powerful, and the Means ſo eaſie, that they may induce our Sovereigns to form the Union, and aſſemble their Deputies, to ſettle the Articles of ſo deſirable a Treaty.

The THIRD DISCOURSE.

PROPOSITION to be demonſtrated.

If the European Society, *which is propos'd*, can *procure for all the Chriſtian Princes a* ſufficient Security *for the Perpetuity of the Peace, both without and within their Dominions, there is none of them that will not find it more advantageous to ſign the Treaty for the Eſtabliſhment of that Society, than not to ſign it.*

I THINK I have demonſtrated, in the firſt Diſcourſe, that neither Treaties, nor the *Equilibrium*, were ſufficient Preſervatives to guard *Europe* againſt the Miſchiefs of War; that thus the Chriſtian Sovereigns will be continually tormented with perpetual War, which can never be interrupted, but by two ſorts of Events: One is, by Treaties of Peace, or rather by ſhort Truces, which will never have any *ſufficient Security* for their Obſervation. The other is, by the Deſtruction of ſome Sovereign Family, which will fall from time to time, and which, in its Ruin, will only lead the way, by ſome few Ages, to all thoſe which reign at preſent.

In the ſecond Diſcourſe I have ſhewn, by ſubſiſting Models, that there is one *ſufficient Preſervative* againſt War; and that is, the Eſtabliſhment of a *permanent Society*, conſiſting of all the Chriſtian Sovereigns, repreſented in a perpetual Congreſs by their Deputies, to regulate, *without War*, by three fourths of the Voices, their future Differences, and the Conditions of Commerce. By what has already been practis'd *in great*, I have ſhewn what we our ſelves may

may yet put in practiſe *in greater*. I ſhall now endeavour to trace back the Motives, which could induce the ancient Sovereigns to form their Societies, and which may conſequently induce the preſent to form the *European Society*.

Theſe Motives are the *Advantages* which our Sovereigns may reap from them: Thus, to demonſtrate the Propoſition which is the Subject of this Diſcourſe, it will be ſufficient to compare the Advantages of the Chriſtian Sovereigns in the preſent Syſtem of an almoſt continual War, with the Advantages that would accrue to them, in conſtituting the Syſtem of an unalterable Peace. For if, in numbring up the Advantages of each Syſtem, and in oppoſing the one to the other, I clearly ſhew, that the Advantages are much greater, and more numerous, in the Syſtem of the Peace: The ſole Compariſon will be a perfect Demonſtration of the Propoſition.

When I ſpeak of the Advantages of Sovereigns, I do not confine thoſe Advantages to their own Perſon, which laſts but a ſhort time; I chiefly regard the Advantages of their Family, which may endure as many Ages, as they themſelves may live Years.

I ſhall firſt ſhew the Advantages of the Syſtem of Peace, above the Syſtem of War, with reſpect to Sovereigns in general, and eſpecially with reſpect to the moſt powerful. I ſhall afterwards make ſome Reflections upon the particular Intereſt which the leſs powerful and the Republican States may have, in giving the Preference to the Syſtem of Peace; and as I begin the Proof by conſidering the Advantages of the more powerful, that is, by that part which ſeems moſt difficult, that Method will make the reſt much more eaſie to the Reader.

FIRST ADVANTAGE.

The Grounds of Hope of Aggrandizement, compar'd with the Grounds of Fear of Deſtruction.

THE firſt Difference that offers it ſelf between theſe two Syſtems, is founded upon the perpetual Immutability of States and Sovereign Families, which *will be* the natural Effect of the one; and upon the Revolutions and Deſtructions of thoſe ſame States and Families, which *are* the natural Effects of the other.

In the Syſtem of War, the moſt powerful Sovereign of *Europe* may, on one ſide, hope, that the Territories of his Kingdom will be inlarged double, and even gain the reſt of *Europe*; and that thus he ſhall very much increaſe the Revenue of his Family, either by his own Conqueſts, or by

thoſe of his Deſcendants; becauſe War puts every thing in Agitation; in That nothing is ſecure, and what ſeems moſt firm, may eaſily be overthrown in a few Years, according to the different Conjunctures: But for the ſame Reaſon he may, on the other ſide, fear, leſt very unfortunate Events ſhould happen to his Family, and leſt, inſtead of doubling his Revenues, and enlarging his Territories, both the one and the other be one day very much diminiſh'd, if not intirely loſt to his Family, either by the Conqueſts of ſome Head of a powerful League, or by the Revolt of ſome Provinces.

On the contrary, in the Syſtem of Peace, as every one is look'd upon to have ſet Bounds to his Territories by preceding Treaties, and eſpecially by *actual Poſſeſſion*; and as thoſe Treaties become *infallible in their Execution*, becauſe of the *ſufficient Guarantee* of the Union of the Sovereigns; thoſe Bounds, when once eſtabliſhed, will be immutable; there will be no Revolts of Provinces to apprehend: Thus as no Sovereign will have any further cauſe to fear having the Bounds of his Territories contracted, ſo he will have no further room to hope, that thoſe Bounds will ever be enlarged.

It remains then to examine, whether the moſt powerful Sovereign in *Europe* has more room to hope for a conſiderable Enlargement of his Territories, and of the Revenue of his Family, in the Syſtem of War, than he has cauſe to fear the Weakning, or the entire Deſtruction of them: I ſpeak *of his Family*, becauſe I mean to take in ſeveral Generations and ſeveral Ages; and indeed, what Benefit would it be to his Family, for a Prince to conquer two or three Provinces during his Reign; if, by the ſame Rule he follow'd, that is, by the Syſtem of War, his Grandſon ſhould loſe four or five? What good would he do, even by doubling his Dominions, if his Great Grandſon, by the ſame Means, ſhould loſe them all.

Had he more Reaſon to expect the Aggrandizement, than to fear the total Deſtruction of his Family, he would loſe that Surplus of Expectation, by entring into the Syſtem of the Union; ſince the Union, preſerving every State entire, would hinder every one from hoping to aggrandize himſelf on the ſide of Territory; and then it would not be reaſonable for him to ſign the Treaty, unleſs the Loſs of that Expectation were recompenc'd by ſome Equivalent of another nature. But if he has really more cauſe to fear the total Deſtruction of his Family, than grounds to hope for the double Enlargement of his Territory, he would be a Gainer

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in ſigning a Treaty, which would for ever free him and his Poſterity from all Cauſe of Fear. Thus, to ingage him to enter into the Syſtem of Peace, there is no need of any other Motive, beſides that Exemption from Fear. 'Tis true, if the Good to be expected, were equal to the Evil that is to be fear'd, and the Grounds of Hope and Fear were equal, then, to incline the Ballance, there would need ſome further foreign Motive, ſuch as the Expence of the War: But we ſhall ſee, that to induce the moſt powerful Prince to enter into the Syſtem of Peace, if he be prudent and circumſpect, and if he is careful of the Intereſts of his Family, he needs no foreign Motives; and it will afterwards appear, that even thoſe foreign Motives are ſo numerous and powerful, that we muſt ſuppoſe him deſtitute of common Senſe, to remain in the Syſtem of War.

If that Prince has hopes, that his Family may inlarge its Territories by one half, at the Expence of his Neighbours; thoſe ſame Neighbours, by forming a League among themſelves, will have the like Hopes of inlarging Theirs as much, at his Coſt. If the Hopes of that Prince may create the Fear of his Neighbours, the Hopes of his Neighbours may create the Fear of that Prince. If he pretend to have a Right to Their Dominions, they pretend to have a Right to His. If He confides in his Forces and Alliances, They confide in Theirs. If He hopes to take advantage of a Regency, a Minority, a Civil War, a Rupture of a League; They, in the ſame Courſe of time, may hope for the ſame Opportunities. If he is animated by Ambition, by Jealouſie, by Revenge; are the ſame Paſſions leſs likely to animate Them? If he be ſtronger than four Confederates, he may be weaker than five or ſix; hitherto every thing is equal.

I ſhall, in the reſt of the Diſcourſe, make no Diſtinction between the Term *Pretenſion*, and the Term *Hope*; becauſe moſt Princes *hope* to Conquer the Territory they *pretend* they have a Right to, and never fail to *pretend* they have a Right to the Territory they *hope* to Conquer.

If there were but two Sovereign Houſes in *Europe*, and thoſe two were equally powerful, it is certain they would in Courſe of Time, equally have Grounds to *hope* and *fear* different Minorities, and divers Events of War. Thus it is plain, that if they mutually gave up their Hopes of Enlarging their Territories, their Pretenſions, their Right to each others Provinces, they would give up Things intirely equal; and if they could mutually give each other a *ſufficient Security*, that their Agreement ſhould be executed *without War* only for a hundred and fifty Years, whatever does Re-

ſult from that mutual Ceſſion of all Enlargement of Territory, would be entire Profit to them both. Now, only the two Articles of the Continuation of Commerce, and the Retrenchment of the Expence of Troops, may eaſily double the Revenue of each of their States, and of thoſe two Families, as we ſhall by and by demonſtrate; and what more could either of them hope for from the Succeſs of a War of a hundred and fifty Years, but to double the Value of their State, and the Revenue of their Family? Now in the Syſtem of War, each Family runs the Riſque of loſing all, in hopes to make it ſelf twice as great as before, by the Ruin of the other; whereas, in the Syſtem of Peace, neither the one nor the other runs any Riſque, and yet doubles his Revenue, without being oblig'd to ruin the neighbouring Family to do it.

War is full of Hazard. How many deciſive Battles have been loſt by meer Hazard? How many have been kill'd by meer Hazard? How many Seditions have had fatal Conſequences by meer Hazard? I believe, if one of thoſe equal Princes hazard his half of *Europe* againſt the other half, he hazards more than he can gain; ſince he hazards the *Neceſſary* he poſſeſſes, againſt an equal *Superfluity*, which he has a mind to poſſeſs, but which he may do without, better than he can without his *Neceſſary*. Now if on one ſide he has as much reaſon to fear loſing his Dominions, as to hope to Conquer thoſe of his Neighbour; and if what he runs the Riſque of loſing, is of more Value to him than what he has a chance to win, it is plain, he has more reaſon to *fear* than to *hope*; not becauſe of the Hazard, which we ſuppoſe equal, but becauſe of the things hazarded; which, though equal in themſelves, are unequal, as to the Effects they may produce for the Good or Ill Fortune of the Hazarder. Here, then, is already, on the ſide of the Enlargement, or the Loſs of Territory, not only an Equality in the two Syſtems, but alſo a great Advantage for the Syſtem of perpetual Peace, without reckoning the Exemption from Charges, and from the Miſchiefs caus'd by War.

Let us now ſuppoſe that *Europe* were divided, not between two Families, but between three, all equally powerful; the Demonſtration does not change; it even becomes the ſtronger: Theſe three Families will have the ſame Intereſt as the former, mutually to give up their Hopes of inlarging their Dominions, in order to get a perfect Security, that thoſe Dominions ſhall never be either loſt or diminiſhed, neither in their own Reigns, nor in the Reigns of their moſt diſtant Succeſſors; and it may eaſily be demonſtrated,

and

and it will afterwards appear, that if they could mutually give each other a *ſufficient Security* to remain in Peace only for a Hundred and fifty Years together, and to terminate their Differencces *without War* all that time; each of them would double his own Revenue, and that of his Subjects, without founding this Augmentation upon the Ruin of each other.

But in the Syſtem of War, thoſe three Sovereign Families are indiſpenſably neceſſitated each of them to hazard all he has of his own, in order to ſtrip the other two of theirs, with this Difference from common Hazards, that this is not voluntary but forced; the wiſeſt will be obliged to hazard their Fortunes, whether they will or no, they will always be forced either to *ruin* others, or to *be ruined* by others.

On the contrary, in the Syſtem of an everlaſting Peace, as there would be no War, none of the Heads of thoſe three Families would be forced to hazard his State to gain another thereby; and each of them would have it in his Power, by other ſorts of Aggrandizements, to reap the Fruits of his OEconomy and Wiſdom.

Let us ſuppoſe that the Heads of theſe three Families, after having remained a hundred and fifty Years in the Syſtem of Peace, ſhould be ready to re-enter into the Syſtem of War, and that each Prince ſhould hope at the long run, by taking advantage of Hazards, to ſubdue the two others, and thereby to become ſole Maſter of *Europe*; 'tis the ſame as if we ſhould ſuppoſe that three Gameſters, who had each of them a Million of Livres in all, ſhould make a Match not to leave off playing till one of the three had all the three Millions in his Power, and had ruin'd the t'other two. 'Tis certain, that he who lived upon a Million, may much more eaſily do without the two other extraordinary Millions, than he can without his own Million, which ſupports his ordinary Expence. Yet, at an equal Wager, three maybe laid againſt one, that he will loſe all and not win all; and what he may poſſibly chance to win, tho' it be in it ſelf three times as much as what he can poſſibly loſe, yet with reſpect to him it cannot be three times as much. It may perhaps be thought, that this Argument is the ſame as that which I juſt now uſed upon the Hazard of winning the double of what he had before; but there is ſo much the more Difference, as that the Gameſter's Happineſs does not depend ſo much upon the Triple, as it does upon the Double; becauſe the ſenſibility for Gain does not encreaſe in the Gameſter in the ſame Proportion as the Gain it ſelf, and every body knows, that he who has made his Fortune a hundred times greater than it was, is not a hundred times

happier than he was, when he had made it but twice greater. Thus, the more Adverſaries a Gameſter who ventures all his *Neceſſary* has to fear, the more unequal is the Game to him, that is, he has really ſo much the more Diſadvantage, as he hazards all he has againſt a greater number of Gameſters, in order to win their Fortunes.

Now if, ſuppoſing that there are but two Sovereign Houſes, equally powerful in *Europe*, it is demonſtrated, that if they could give each other a *Sufficient Security* to preſerve the Peace among them unalterable, it would be infinitely advantageous for them to enter into the Syſtem of Peace: It is much more demonſtrable, that, ſuppoſing *Europe* to be divided between three Houſes equally powerful, if they could give each other *a Sufficient Security* to preſerve an unalterable Peace among them, it would be yet more advantageous for each of the three to quit the Syſtem of War, and enter into the Syſtem of Peace.

But here is a Conſideration which will make the Scale incline ſtill more in favour of the Syſtem of Peace; 'tis, that one of thoſe three equal Sovereigns cannot deſire to remain in the Syſtem of War, but only in hopes that his Family may in time deſtroy the other two, and raiſe it ſelf upon their Ruins. Now we ſhall ſhortly ſee, that it cannot ruin the two others, without ruining itſelf. Thus the Hazard becomes ſtill more diſadvantageous, ſince in the firſt Place, 'tis three to one he loſes all; and in the ſecond, if his Family ſhould happen to win all, it would neceſſarily find it ſelf in an evident and continual Danger, or rather in a certainty of loſing, in leſs than fifty Years, not only all it has won, but alſo all it poſſeſſed before it expoſed itſelf to the Hazards of War. Let us explain this Myſtery.

I ſuppoſe, that in Two hundred Years, in 1912. by the Succeſs of Battles, in the Syſtem of War, the Houſe of *France*, for Example, is become Miſtreſs of all *Europe*, that *Spain*, *Italy*, *Grece*, *Hungary*, *Poland*, *Muſcovy*, *Germany*, *Sweden*, *Denmark*, *Holland*, *England*, are no longer look'd upon but as Provinces of its Empire. *Auguſtus* and his Succeſſors, *Conſtantine*, *Theodoſius*, *Juſtinian*, and their Succeſſors had an Empire yet more extenſive; but let any one conſider the Duration of Imperial Houſes, and the fatal Cataſtrophes of the Emperors; 'tis worth while: Let him not confine himſelf to the Facts, but give attention to the Cauſes why ſo many Imperial Houſes have been deſtroyed by ſo many Murthers, by ſo many Poiſonings committed upon the Perſons of the Emperors and their Kindred, and it will appear on one ſide, that no Imperial Family has ſat upon

on the Throne fifty Years, one with another; and on the other ſide it will appear, that the Cauſes of that Deſtruction are neceſſary, and ſuch as can have no Remedy applied to them. Thus it were an even Wager, that if the Houſe of *France* had got the Empire of *Europe* by 1912. that Houſe would be dethroned, and entirely reduced to nothing Fifty Years afterwards, or at leaſt two to one, that in a Hundred Years it would be wholly fallen to nothing.

Now a Houſe, which, by the help of its different Branches, may ſit for above three thouſand Years, for above ſix thouſand Years, nay to the very End of Time, upon the chief Throne of *Europe*, is it not a very great Loſer by ſitting but fifty or a hundred Years upon the Throne of all *Europe*? Is there any proportion?

But let us ſee what is the Cauſe of the Ruin of Imperial Families, and whether it be not poſſible to find a ſufficient Preſervative againſt ſuch a Misfortune. This Cauſe is Ambition, a violent Deſire of aggrandizing a Man's ſelf: It is impoſſible to hinder this Deſire from riſing, and becoming very violent in all Ages, in all Courts, and in a great number of Courtiers; it is alſo impoſſible ever to curb it, but by a Fear ſtronger than the Deſire, as would be that of infallibly deſtroying himſelf and his Family.

Now among all the Subjects of Fear that can deter a Conſpirator, who endeavours to ſet a Crown upon his own Head, the chief may be ſaid to be the Fear of the Neighbouring Sovereigns, who either as Relations, or as Allies, or as Friends, or ſimply as Sovereigns, are concerned to protect the unhappy Remains of a Royal Family, eſcaped from a Conſpiracy, and ſharply to purſue the Puniſhment of the Conſpirator. But this Fear can no longer take place in the Mind of Ambitious Men, if there are no longer any Neighbouring Sovereigns. Now ſuppoſing *Europe* in the Power of One, that Sovereign would no longer have any Neighbours in *Europe* able to protect his Deſcendants, or the Princes of his Blood, nor to revenge his Death, becauſe either he or his Predeceſſors had taken care to deſtroy all the Sovereigns of *Europe*.

Yet in proportion as the Object is greater, the more Conſpirators it excites, and the more it engages them to their Undertaking. It is impoſſible for the Emperors not to fear either their Brothers or their Kindred; and this Fear often drives Barbarian Emperors to rid themſelves of them, and to oppoſe the Duration of their Family themſelves. On another ſide, it is impoſſible for an Emperor to be without Miniſters, Generals, Favourites. It is impoſſible for him not to communicate his Credit

dit to them, and to truſt them with his Armies. Now theſe Miniſters, theſe Generals, theſe Favourites are Men generally very Ambitious, and what may we expect from a Paſſion ſo violent as Ambition, when it can no longer be curbed by its firſt Bridle, which is Fear? Thus the more extenſive the Empire is, the more eaſie and frequent will be the Conſpiracies againſt the Emperor and the Imperial Houſe. Thus the Danger of the Ruin of that Houſe encreaſes in proportion to that Elevation, and it will never be nearer its own Ruin than when it ſhall have deſtroyed all the others.

Let a Deſcendant of that Emperor be a ſhallow Man, given to Eaſe and Pleaſures, deſpiſed by his Subjects; and a General, bold, ſucceſsful, in credit at Court, beloved by his Officers and Soldiers, ſhall cauſe himſelf to be proclaimed Emperor by his Army, march towards the Capital City, cut off but one Head, and he is Maſter of the Empire; he has no need to fear being dethroned by the Help of the Neighbouring Sovereigns.

Let an Empreſs Regent fall in Love with one of the Grandees of her Court, a Man that is cunning and bold, he ſhall ſoon make himſelf Creatures, marry the Empreſs, Poiſon the Heir, let the Princes of the Blood periſh in Priſon, ſeize the Government; and a new Imperial Family is raiſed, eſtabliſhing itſelf upon the Ruins of that which had deſtroyed all the reſt.

Let an Emperor of *Europe* die, and leave the Regency to a prime Miniſter, in order to keep it from a Brother, or a Relation, whoſe Fidelity he ſuſpects; that Miniſter ſhall in time win over the principal Officers of the Army and the Council, he ſhall ingage them to follow his Fortune, deſtroy the Minors, and eaſily ſet the Imperial Crown upon his own Head. Who ſhall hinder any of thoſe from attempting ſuch Enterprizes, and who ſhall ſtop them in the Execution?

Theſe are not Viſions, nor ſubjects of Fear that are chimerical; we need only open the Hiſtories of Nations, and we ſhall ſee that they are Realities. We need only open *Herodian*'s Hiſtory of the *Cæſars*, and we ſhall ſee that in ſixty Years there were fourteen Imperial Houſes dethroned one after another. Let any one examine the divers Cataſtrophes of the other Imperial Houſes, from *Conſtantine* to the *Paleologus's*, whom *Mahomet* the Second deprived of the *Greek* Empire, and they will find above fifty different Families which were all overthrown one by the other, by Conſpiracies of Miniſters, of Generals, of Favourites againſt

their

their Maſters; ſo that we may ſay, that in twelve hundred Years, no Sovereign Houſe, taken one with t'other, has laſted four and twenty Years. This ſeems incredible; yet it is very true; and what Glory can there be for an Imperial Houſe to be confounded, in twelve Centuries, with fifty other Houſes of Subjects of mean Birth and little Conſideration? But ſuppoſe, if you will, that inſtead of fifty there had been but five and twenty deſtroyed, and that each of them reigned eight and forty Years. What is eight and forty Years for the Duration of a Family!

To Propheſie ſurely what ſhall happen to the Family of this Emperor of *Europe*, we need only read what has happened to the Families of the like Monarchs; we ſhall find, that the ſole Cauſe of the Deſtruction of their Family was, that at their Death they did not leave to their Children Protectors powerful in the Neighbourhood; and where ſhould they find them, when their ſole Aim had been to ruin their Neighbours, in deſtroying of whom they unwittingly deſtroyed the ſole true Protectors of their Poſterity? 'Tis true, they had ſo brought it about, that they had no Foreign Enemies to fear; but by the ſame Means they had multiplied their Domeſtick Enemies, and in proportion as they deſtroyed the one, they made the others both more numerous and more formidable.

Ambition is a Paſſion, which, upon the like Occaſions, will always produce the like Effects: Beſides, Ambition is not always the only Motive of a Conſpirator; Hatred, Revenge, the Fear of being ſhortly prevented and deſtroyed by an oppoſite Cabal, often urge him to attempt the Dangers of a Conſpiracy. Such is the Neceſſity of a great many different Conſpirators; theſe are mortal Diſeaſes to the Families of Emperors, and there can never be any ſure Preſervative againſt theſe Accidents; this, then, is a certain and terrible Inconvenience to the Family of the Monarchs of *Europe*, and an Inconvenience without any Remedy.

Yet this is the Gulph which too great Power leads to: This is the Iſſue of luſting after the Univerſal Monarchy of *Europe*. Now is it reaſonable, when a Family is already raiſed very much above the reſt, to deſire to carry it ſo high, that its own Elevation would infallibly be its total Ruin five and twenty Years, fifty Years, a hundred Years afterwards?

'Tis not the ſame as to the Aggrandizements of a private Family: Its Elevation cannot cauſe its Ruin, becauſe it is always protected by the Laws, which are themſelves maintained by the Authority of a *permanent Society*, and by the en-

entire Strength of the whole Society; but as to the Emperor of *Europe*, there can no Protection for him be expected from the Laws, when the Conſpirator ſets himſelf above them, by ſeizing the Reins of the Government.

Theſe Conſiderations have led me to an Argument which I think unanſwerable; for either the Hopes of the Enlargement of Territory are very vaſt, or elſe they are but very moderate; if they are very vaſt, and the Sovereign longs for the Monarchy of *Europe*, they are very ill grounded; but ſuppoſe them well grounded, and that the Succeſs anſwer his Deſires in two hundred Years time, does he not ſee that the ſame Family will be ſoon after overthrown and reduced to nothing by its own Subjects? Could he deſire to overthrow, annihilate his own Family? Will he thus deſire to procure the Eſtabliſhment of a hundred other Imperial Families of mean Birth, which would even ſtifle all Remembrance of his in after Ages?

If his Hopes are moderate, and he only deſire ſome few Provinces more, let him compare the Object of his Deſires, which is very uncertain and will coſt him more than it is worth, with the immenſe, real, and certain Advantages he ſhall reap from an Everlaſting Peace, ſtrengthened by the Treaty of Union; and if he has any Prudence left he will perceive the Extravagance of his firſt Deſigns, ſince they would have led him by a way very odious, very difficult, and full of Hazard, to the total Ruin of his Family.

To make the Demonſtration plainer, I have ſuppoſed two other Houſes in *Europe* equal in Power to that of *France*: But at preſent I have no need of this Suppoſition; to make the Force of the Argument more perceptible, I need only find in *Europe* a League either already made, or elſe only poſſible to be made among ſeveral Sovereigns, who form a Power equal to that of the Houſe of *France*. This League is not only poſſible, but is already form'd; its Power is not only equal to that of the Houſe of *France*, but even ſuperior; there is not only a ſuperior League already formed, but there may likewiſe another be formed which may conſiſt of other Sovereigns, who have not epouſed either Party in the preſent War between the Houſe of *France* and the Houſe of *Auſtria*, and who, if they were well united, would form another Power ſuperior to the Houſe of *France*.

But tho' there were but one equal League, the Force of the Argument would ſubſiſt entire, ſince the Heads, or the Head of that League, might then be tantamount to the Head of a Family equal in Power; and as inſtead of being equal, it is ſuperior, the Argument is therefore the ſtronger to induce *France* to prefer the Syſtem of Peace.

There is one Conſideration which very much ſtrengthens the Demonſtration, and that is, that in the preſent Conſtitution of *Europe*, *Spain*, a Female Monarchy, may, in leſs than a hundred and fifty Years, by Means of a Daughter, paſs to another Houſe than that of *France*; may not what has happened in our Days, a hundred and fifty Years after the Death of *Charles* V. happen again, at the like Diſtance of Time, to the Deſcendants of *Philip* V? Now if that ſhould happen, the Houſe of *France*, which at preſent makes at moſt but the third part of *Europe*, would then make but the ſixth part of it. Thus in the Neceſſity it is in, in the Syſtem of War, either to *dethrone* the other Families, or to be *dethroned* by them, it would be an even Wager at ſix to one, that it would one Day be dethroned; whereas at preſent there is but three to one, about the Poſſibility of that Dethronement. Thus, then, the Houſe of *France* has more Reaſon to fear the Diminution, than to expect the Enlargement of its Territories.

I well know that the other Houſes of *Europe* are inferior to the Houſe of *France*: I alſo know that the preſent League may chance to be broken; but who is there that does not know that That may happen in Courſe of Time, which has already happened above ten times within three thouſand Years; that the Sovereign of a State ſo ſmall as *Savoy* is at preſent, as *Macedon* was formerly, may find an Opportunity of overthrowing, in a few Years, the greateſt, the moſt powerful State on Earth? *Seſoſtris*, *Cyrus*, *Alexander*, *Attila*, *Alaric*, *Almanzor*, *Gengluskan*, *Tamerlane*, the *Turkiſh* Princes, the laſt Prince of *Tartary* who invaded *China* ſeventy Years ago; all theſe Princes were, ſome ten times, others twenty times, ſome thirty times leſs powerful than the Kingdoms they ſubdued. 'Tis true, Conjunctures favoured them; but may not thoſe Conjunctures again be met with, from time to time, as they have already ſo often? They had not ſo much as the Aſſiſtance of Leagues, as now; yet we ſee what Succeſs they had. Beſides, the leſs powerful thoſe Sovereigns are, the more there are of them; and is it not eaſier to find, in a great Number than among a few, Princes audacious, raſh, and fortunate? So that if, on one ſide, the Poſſibility of deſtroying a Family, diminiſhes thro' the little Power of its Neighbours; it encreaſes, on the other ſide, in Proportion as they are more numerous. Thus the full Force of the Demonſtration ſubſiſts.

'Tis true, it does not ſeem any ways poſſible, to ſtrike powerful Sovereigns with the reaſonable Fear, that their Poſterity ſhall one day be dethron'd and brought to nothing; they have

have liv'd all their Life-time in perfect Security, and what they have not at all been afraid of for themſelves, they don't know how to fear for their Great-Grand-Children; but they are ne'er the more prudent for that. The Kings who were conquer'd by *Seſoſtris*, thoſe who were dethron'd by *Cyrus*, were not under any Apprehenſion, either for their Families, nor for themſelves, ten Years before they were attack'd: Some of them were much more powerful than thoſe Conquerors, and the others too far diſtant from them: 'Tis true, they did not fear; but had they no Cauſe to fear? *Darius* was not at all afraid of the petty King of *Macedon*; but had not he reaſon to fear him? Does the Security of the conquer'd Princes juſtifie their Imprudence? A Sovereign, who has ſeen no Diviſions, no Schiſms in his Kingdom, does not think there ever will be any, no, not in a hundred Years after him. *Francis* I. did not foreſee the Civil Wars which the Diſputes of the Theologiſts afterwards rais'd, and which waſted his Dominions, after his Death, for above fifty Years together; he did not ſee, that the Royal Family ſhould be, for fifteen Years running, within a Finger's Breadth of being dethron'd, and even of being entirely exterminated; but yet thoſe ſad Misfortunes were ne'er the more remote, nor the leſs to be fear'd, for not having been either foreſeen, or fear'd. Let any body call to mind the laſt Civil Wars of *England*; King *Charles* I. even but ten Years before his Death, was in no Apprehenſion of the Conſequences of the growing Differences he had with his Parliament; but were they not to be fear'd? *Cromwel* Uſurp'd the Crown, under the Title of *Protector*. What inſpir'd him with that Boldneſs? One ſole Conſideration; he thought he ſhould be potent enough to ſupport himſelf againſt any foreign Power that ſhould attempt to revenge the Murther of the King. If the Power of *England* had been leſs by half than it was, the Regent of *France* would have reveng'd her Siſter-in-Law. Thus, it was the Strength of the *Engliſh* Monarchy that cauſed the Uſurpation, and that defended the Uſurper from the Puniſhment he deſerv'd.

'Tis certain, the Multiplicity of the Sovereignties of *Europe* (which, that they may have Right of Suffrage, I ſuppoſe reduc'd to four and twenty) does in no wiſe weaken the Demonſtration I have made in the Suppoſition, that there were in *Europe* but three Sovereign Houſes, all equal in Power; but this Multiplicity of Sovereignties gives us an Advantage of an infinite Value, which thoſe three Houſes neither would nor could ever have; 'tis, that tho' the three Heads of thoſe three Houſes ſhould Now agree to decide

their

their future Differences *without War*, and by the Arbitration of the third, who might not be concern'd in them; yet there would be no *ſufficient Security* that this Convention would be executed; becauſe two of thoſe Heads may change their Minds in their Life-time; and their Succeſſors, through ill Advice, may be of a very different Opinion, and, without conſidering what they ſhall loſe by the diſcontinuance of the Peace, madly make a League, and invade the Dominions of the third; I very well know, that in ſo doing they would commit a great piece of Folly; and that when they have dethron'd that third Potentate, they could not long ſubſiſt, without one of the two's dethroning the other: I know great Follies are rarely committed, but yet they may be committed, ſo long as they are not reſtrain'd by great Fears.

But the Convention to be made between the four and twenty Sovereigns would not be liable to that dreadful Inconvenience; becauſe every thing would be decided in the Congreſs by three fourths of thoſe Voices. Now the three fourths of thoſe Voices are of leſs powerful Princes, who not having ſo much Hopes to invade, as Fear to be invaded, would be always very much concern'd to maintain the Union, and ſtrongly engag'd to the Execution of the Treaty. As all together they would be much ſtronger than thoſe who, thro' a mad Ambition, ſhould undertake to diſturb the Union and the Peace, they would be perfectly ſure, either that it would never be diſturb'd, or at leaſt, that the Diſturbers would be ſoon dethron'd; and the Fear of ſo great and evident a Danger, would hinder thoſe Ambitious Princes from attempting, and even from forming ſuch a Project. Thus it appears that, on one ſide, the great Fear of being invaded, and of loſing the ineſtimable Fruits of Peace, would be a *ſufficient Security* for the Wiſdom of all the leſs powerful Sovereigns; and on the other ſide, the Wiſdom of thoſe leſs powerful, when well united, would be a *ſufficient Security* againſt the Birth or Progreſs of the Madneſs of the more powerful, who ſhould attempt to deſtroy the Society.

It is eaſie to judge, that it is advantageous for a Sovereign to ſign a Treaty, when on one ſide it is evident, that what he gives up is of the ſame nature, and equal to what is given up to him; and when, on the other, he acquires ſomething more than what he had before. Now what will the moſt powerful Sovereign in *Europe* give up in ſigning the Treaty of the Union? He will give up the Hopes which he and his Poſterity might entertain, of aggrandizing his Ter-

Territories at the Expence of his Neighbours. But what do his Neighbours give up to him? The like Hopes, *equally well grounded*, which they and their Poſterity might entertain, of aggrandizing their Territories at the Expence of his: I ſay *equally well-grounded*, ſince that Equality is neceſſarily produc'd by Equality of Power, and by the Equality of future Opportunities. I juſt now ſhew'd, that by the Help of Leagues, there may be found, in *Europe*, a Power equal to the Power of that Sovereign; that there is one already form'd, that it is even ſuperior; and that there may be even two ſuch Leagues, and each of them as powerful as the moſt powerful Family.

I ſhall not now examine the true Value of that Expectation of aggrandizing of Territory, which the moſt powerful Sovereign gives up in favour of the other Sovereigns: It is enough that I have remark'd, that it is of the ſame Nature, and grounded upon the ſame Hopes of Aggrandizement of Territory, as thoſe Sovereigns, on their ſide, give up in favour of that Sovereign.

There is alſo one Conſideration in favour of the moſt powerful Family; that as it is nearer the Throne of all *Europe* than any other, it is conſequently nearer to its total Ruin; and thus it will reap more Advantage from the *European Society*, than a Family leſs powerful, becauſe that Society will hinder its attaining to ſo pernicious a Pitch: It is not at the Pinacle of *Greatneſs*, but it is at the Pinacle of *durable Greatneſs*; for were it any greater, it could not be ſupported by any Society; whereas, by the Eſtabliſhment and Duration of the *European Society* it will endure for ever; but without that Eſtabliſhment, this Family is in the unhappy Neceſſity of being overthrown, either by the other Families, after a great many Wars, or by its own Subjects, in the midſt of Peace.

It is therefore demonſtrated: 1. That in the Syſtem of War, in the Courſe of ſome Ages, Sovereign Families muſt neceſſarily ruin and deſtroy each other, and even be deſtroy'd by the Conſpiracies of their own Subjects.

2. That the moſt powerful Family in *Europe*, ſuch as is the Houſe of *France*, has, in the Syſtem of War, twice as much Grounds to fear that it ſhall be deſtroy'd by ſome of the others, as it has to hope that it ſhall deſtroy them All.

3. That tho' It ſhould happen to deſtroy them all, 'twould be therefore in a Danger the more near at hand and inevitable, of being infallibly deſtroy'd by ſucceſſive Conſpiracies of its own Subjects.

Thus

Thus it is certain, that if in the *Syſtem of Everlaſting Peace*, and by Means of the Eſtabliſhment of the *European Society*, it is poſſible to ſet the Houſe of *France* in an Impoſſibility of having its Territories diminiſh'd, or loſt, and free it from all Cauſe to fear being deſtroy'd, either by Others, or by its own Subjects; upon Condition, to renounce all Aggrandizement of Territory, and to give *ſufficient Securities* for that Renunciation: It will be very much its Intereſt to prefer the Syſtem of *Everlaſting Peace*, to the preſent Syſtem of War, and *it will be more advantageous for it to ſign the Treaty for the Eſtabliſhment of that Society, than not to ſign it*; and this is what I was to demonſtrate.

SECOND ADVANTAGE.

Plan of ſubſtituting the Monarchy of Spain *to the Males of the Houſe of* France. *Impoſſibility of making that Subſtitution ſufficiently ſolid in the Syſtem of War. Facility of making it ſufficiently ſolid in the Syſtem of Peace.*

Plan of making the Monarchy of France *and the Monarchy of* Spain *abſolutely incompatible in one and the ſame Head. Impoſſibility of having any ſufficient Security for that in the Syſtem of War. Facility of having their Security in the Syſtem of Peace.*

IT is certainly of the utmoſt Importance to *Europe*, to have a *ſufficient Security*, that thoſe two Monarchies ſhall never be united under one and the ſame Head; as it is of the utmoſt Importance to the Houſe of *France* to have a *ſufficient Security*, that ſo long as it ſhall have Males, neither of thoſe Monarchies ſhall ever devolve to another Family. Now let any one compare the two Syſtems upon this Head, how can *Europe*, how can the Houſe of *France* find in the Syſtem of War, wherein every thing is in a perpetual Uncertainty; how, I ſay, can they therein find that *ſufficient Security*?

On the contrary, in the Syſtem of Peace, wherein nothing can change, wherein all is fix'd and permanent, wherein War is impoſſible, wherein the Society is all-powerful, unalterable, wherein Covenants will be always maintain'd by that All-powerfulneſs; how is it poſſible not to find in That, this *reciprocal Security*, whether in favour of the Houſe of *France* for the Duration of its Luſtre, or in favour of the other Sovereigns for their own Tranquility? There can be but one Doubt, which is, whether it is indeed poſſible to form this Society in ſuch a manner as to make it *unalterable*; but for this I muſt deſire Credit till after the

Reading of the following Diſcourſe, and I hope the thing will appear to be perfectly demonſtrated.

The Houſe of *France* can never have a ſure Guarantee for the above-mention'd Subſtitution, unleſs it be by the Conſent and Eſtabliſhment of the *European Society*; and *Europe* can never be quite at Peace, and exempt from the Expences which are neceſſary, in order to ſtand upon it's Guard, till that Family ſhall aſſiſt in the Eſtabliſhment of that Society, and conſent to the Incompatibility of the two Monarchies: Thus there will be made, between the Houſe of *France* and the reſt of *Europe*, an Exchange of Rights, Pretenſions, Hopes, which will be infinitely advantageous to both Parties.

Therefore, *If the* European Society *can procure for the moſt powerful Sovereign, a* ſufficient Security *for the Perpetuity of the Peace, both without and within his Dominions, he will find it much more advantageous to ſign the Treaty, for the Eſtabliſhment of that Society, than not to ſign it.*

THIRD ADVANTAGE.

The Means of Force to terminate Differences, compar'd with the Means of Arbitration.

I HAVE ſhewn in the firſt Diſcourſe, that in the preſent Conſtitution of *Europe*, namely, in the Syſtem of *Diviſion* and *War*, the Sovereigns have no other Means to decide their Pretenſions, and to terminate their Differences, but Force; and that thoſe Pretenſions will continually renew, and never be really terminated, but by the Ruin and Deſtruction of one or other of the Pretenders; becauſe the Treaties cannot well foreſee and regulate all future Pretenſions; and tho' they could foreſee and regulate them, the Sovereigns have hitherto *no Guarantee, no ſufficient Security* for the Execution of thoſe Treaties.

On the contrary, in the Syſtem of *Union* and *Peace*, there is a ſure and effectual Way to terminate all future Differences *without War*; and that is, the perpetual Arbitration of the Sovereigns of *Europe*, continually repreſented by their Deputies, aſſembled in a perpetual Congreſs; becauſe the Arbiters, when thus united, are *ſufficiently intereſted*, reſolutely to *will* the Execution of their Sentences, and *ſufficiently powerful* really to procure the Execution of them, notwithſtanding the Will and Power of him who ſhould pretend to reſiſt them.

Theſe two Methods are very different, and yet they are the only Methods; no other can be found out that may be ſufficient: And as the Means of Force is the principal Character

racter of the Syſtem of Diviſion and War; ſo the Means of a perpetual and all-powerful Arbitration, is the principal Character of the Syſtem of Society and Peace. The Buſineſs then is, to find out which is the moſt advantageous to the moſt powerful Sovereign in *Europe*, ſuch as is the *French* King; for if the Means of Arbitration is the moſt advantageous to the moſt powerful, that is, to him who has the moſt to hope for *from his own Force*, and the leaſt to fear *from the Force of Others*; much more will it be the moſt advantageous to the leaſt powerful Sovereign, that is, to him who has the leaſt to hope for *from his own Force*, and the moſt to fear *from the Force of Others*.

It is certain, that if the ſtrongeſt was *ſufficiently aſſur'd*, that he and his Deſcendants ſhould be always the ſtrongeſt, notwithſtanding the Artifices of Enemies, the Hazards of Battles, the Leagues that may be form'd againſt his Family; notwithſtanding that Family's time of Weakneſs; notwithſtanding the Revolts that might, in time, be rais'd in his Dominions, and in his own Family; it is certain, I ſay, that with ſuch a *Surety*, his Family would be Loſers, by conſenting to have their Pretenſions decided otherwiſe than by Force; ſince he would be ſure to have them always decided according to his own Pleaſure, and fully to reimburſe himſelf, as well for the Charges of the War, as for the Damages his Subjects may have ſuffer'd, whether by the Hoſtilities of the Enemy, or by the Interruption of Commerce.

But when we conſider the Conſtitution of *Europe*, we find, that the moſt powerful is far from having ſuch a Security. I deſire the Reader to obſerve what paſſes before his own Eyes. Can the two Branches of the Houſe of *France* ever be more firmly united, than they have been within theſe eleven Years, that is, ever ſince the beginning of the War? Can they ever make ſtronger Efforts than what they have made? And, on the other hand, it is evident, 1. That the Allies may yet be more firmly united. 2. That they may make ſtill greater Efforts. 3. That they may ſtill enlarge their League; and that, if the Force of the one may increaſe in fifty Years, in a hundred Years the Force of the others may increaſe in the ſame Proportion. Now if the ſtrongeſt Sovereign, even in the time of his greateſt Strength, cannot be aſſur'd, that any thing ſhall be decided as he would have it, what follows, but that all the Expences that his Deſcendants ſhall afterwards be at, to obtain, by force, favourable Deciſions upon their Pretenſions, will be all thrown away, as are the preſent Expences.

Hitherto, then, the moſt powerful Sovereign has no Advantage in deciding his Pretenſions by Force, rather than by Arbiters, even tho' we ſuppos'd the favourable Judgment of Arbiters to depend as much upon Chance, as the Succeſs of a Battle does. But here is an Advantage for him in the Syſtem of Arbitration, which he has not in the Syſtem of Force.

1. If every time that the moſt powerful takes up Arms, he were *ſufficiently aſſured*, that at the worſt of the Deciſion, which he promiſes himſelf by Force, he ſhould only loſe the Charges he ſhould be at in the War, and the Damages his Subjects ſhould ſuſtain from it; perhaps, for want of well computing all theſe Loſſes, and of comparing them to the true Value of the Pretenſion, which is the Subject of the War, he would be ſo ill-adviſed as to reſolve to run the riſque, and to undertake it; but he is not even aſſured that his Enemies will have done with him ſo; for if they have a ſufficient Superiority in the War, who ſhall hinder them from depriving him of the third, the half, nay the whole of his Dominions, to repair their paſt Loſſes? This great Inconvenience is not in the Syſtem of Arbitration. The moſt powerful Sovereign can never loſe any thing more than what he ſubmits to the Judgments of the Arbiters; he is at no great Expences; his Frontiers are not laid waſte; his Commerce is not interrupted, and he never has any Coſts to pay his Enemies: Now let any one compute the Greatneſs of this Advantage.

2. There is another. In the Syſtem of War, the moſt powerful, the moſt pacifick, the moſt wiſe Sovereign, is conſtrained, whether he will or no, to eſpouſe ſome Party or other in the Differences and in the Wars of his Neighbours; thus he has not only his own Differences to decide by Force, but he is alſo neceſſitated to do his utmoſt Endeavours to decide the Differences of others, conformably to his own Security; whereas in the Syſtem of Arbitration, as each Sovereign has *a reciprocal and ſufficient Security* againſt the ill Will of the reſt, none has any Differences to be involved in beſides his own, and is himſelf a Judge of all the Differences of the others. Now I ask whether this too is not a great Advantage?

3. No body muſt pretend, that the moſt powerful Family is in an abſolute Independance: Whoever has Cauſe to fear is in Dependance; whoever has great Cauſe to fear, and to fear a great Evil, is in a great Dependance. Thus we may truly ſay, that all the Sovereigns, howſoever Independant they may be imagined, are really dependant upon each other, becauſe they have really Cauſe to fear each other; and a Family is ſometimes more, ſometimes leſs dependant, in proportion to the Force of the Heads of the other Families,

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and to the Force of their Leagues; and this Dependance is ſo much the greater to the ſame Sovereign, in the Syſtem of Force, as his Family is in continual Danger of being utterly deſtroyed by one, or ſeveral of his Enemies, who ſhall be grown more ſtrong; 'tis true, he does not depend upon any body as to taking up Arms; but he is dependant as to the Succeſs after having taken them up, and the Succeſs of his Arms depends upon the Strength of his Enemies.

On the contrary, let any one conſider what that Sovereign has to fear in the Syſtem of Arbitration; and it will appear, that as he has much leſs to fear from his Arbiters than he has to fear from his Enemies, he will be in a Dependance much leſs great in the Syſtem of Arbitration, than in the Syſtem of Force; for he has no need to ſtand in any Fear of the Arbiters, but in proportion to the Value of the things that may be put in Arbitration. Now that can never be but about Frontiers, Commerce, or ſome perſonal Injury.

As for Frontiers, Treaties determine them; or if they do not determine them with all the Exactneſs that is requiſite, actual and peaceable Poſſeſſion ſupplies that Defect. Now all that is worth diſputing for poſſeſſion of, is actually poſſeſſed, and has evident Marks of actual Poſſeſſion, ſuch as Juriſdiction, Tribute; or if there is neither Juriſdiction nor Tribute ſettled, the thing is not worth being poſſeſs'd, and the Poſſeſſion is not worth the making it the Subject of a Diſpute. Thus there never will be a Difference about a Province, nor for a City, nor for a Borough.

As to Differences about Commerce, thoſe do not concern the Sovereign ſo much as they do his Subjects: But beſides, as it will be agreed, that the Laws of Commerce ſhall be equal and reciprocal between the Nations, the Arbiters, who are the Sovereigns themſelves, thro' the Organ of their Deputies, cannot wrong the Subjects of that powerful Sovereign, without doing the ſame Wrong to their own Subjects.

As to Perſonal Differences between the Succeſſors of the preſent Sovereigns, it may be ſaid, that, on one ſide thoſe Differences happen but rarely between Sovereigns who live at ſo great a diſtance of Time: Beſides, the Offended has the Means of Complaint and Reparation; and each of them, to avoid the Shame of making Reparation, will be very averſe to giving Occaſion of Complaint. In ſhort, were theſe Differences very affecting, they would not be ſo much Differences of Families, as Differences of Perſons. Now the Perſons die, and the Families remain: The Perſon of the Sovereign may then, for a time, be dependant upon Arbiters, but his Family, with reſpect to Arbiters, is in perfect Inde-

pendance. Now as he is neceſſitated, for the Reparation of a perſonal Wrong, to depend either upon Force, or upon the Arbiter; and as Dependance upon Force is infinitely greater and harder, he is an infinite Gainer by this Change of Dependance.

4. But tho' we ſuppoſed theſe two ſorts of Dependance equal, yet that Sovereign, in entring into the Syſtem of Peace, acquires as much as he gives up; for if he gives up to the other three and twenty Sovereigns the Right and Liberty of taking up Arms againſt them, whenever he ſhould think fit, to do himſelf Juſtice in ſpite of them; do not the other three and twenty give up to him the Right, the Liberty they had before to take up Arms againſt him, whenever they ſhould think fit, to do themſelves Juſtice in ſpite of him? If by this Treaty of Union he for ever renounces the Means of Force againſt them, and if he chuſes the Means of Arbitration for their Sakes, to terminate the Differences which he or his Deſcendants may have with them; do not thoſe Sovereigns, by the ſame Treaty, for ever renounce uſing the Means of Force againſt him or his Deſcendants, and do not they, for his Sake, chuſe the Means of Arbitration, to terminate all the Difference they may have with him, or with the future Heads of his Family? If by that Treaty he gives to them the Right of being his perpetual Arbiters, a Right which they had not before; do not they on their part give to him the Right of being their perpetual Arbiter, a Right which he had not before? Thus whatever Superiority this Sovereign gives to the other Sovereigns, by eſtabliſhing them his perpetual Arbiters, they give him as much, by eſtabliſhing him their perpetual Arbiter: Whatever Dependance he puts himſelf into with reſpect to them, the ſame Dependance do they alſo put themſelves into with Reſpect to him.

5. Beſides the preceding Conſiderations, which infinitely diminiſh this ſort of Dependance, it is certain that a Man has ſo much the leſs need to fear his Judges, when he thinks his Demand juſt, as he is ſure that thoſe Judges are wiſe, equitable, and moved to do Juſtice by their own Intereſt. Now the Sovereigns, who know that their Arbitral Judgment ſhall ſerve for a Law and Rule againſt themſelves, and againſt their Succeſſors in all the like Caſes, cannot be more concerned than they will be, to give Sentences perfectly equitable. Now the leſs this Sovereign need to ſtand in fear of the Judges, the leſs will his Dependance be perceptible; ſo that the Dependance he ſhall put himſelf into with reſpect to Arbitration, will be but the Shadow of that which

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he is actually in with reſpect to Force, and from which both he and his Succeſſors ſhall be for ever delivered.

6. Tho' the Dependance his Family is in in the Syſtem of Force were no greater nor harder, than the Dependance it will be in in the Syſtem of Arbitration; yet there would be nevertheleſs an infinite difference between theſe two Means of terminating their Diſputes, were we only to conſider the immenſe Charges of the Means of War; but that is another of the Advantages that we ſhall by and by ſpeak of.

Therefore *if the* European *Society can procure for the moſt powerful Sovereign* a ſufficient Security *for the Perpetuity of the Peace, both without and within his Dominions, he will find it much more advantageous to ſign the Treaty for the Eſtabliſhment of that Society, than not to ſign it.*

FOURTH ADVANTAGE.

The Power and Independance in the Syſtem of War, compared with Power and Independance in the Syſtem of Peace.

IF there were in *Europe* but two Princes, and thoſe equally powerful, they would *de jure* be abſolutely Independant of each other; but as they would ſtand in fear of each other, they would *de facto* be Dependant of each other; for every Man, in Fact, depends upon him of whom he ſtands in Fear, and the more he has need to fear him, the more he depends upon him. In this Suppoſition, thoſe two Princes, having equally need to fear each other, would be in an equal Dependance *de facto*, which is a natural and very real Dependance.

It is plain, that if they could find an Expedient to free them from that Neceſſity of Fear, it would be a very great Advantage to them, ſince it would take them out of that Dependance. Now as the moſt powerful Prince in *Europe* may and will always meet with Leagues as powerful as himſelf, if he could find a way to rid himſelf of the fear, both of thoſe Leagues, and of any of the Members of thoſe Leagues, it is plain he would be freed from a Dependance in Fact, which is always very hard and a very great conſtraint. Now this Expedient can never be found in the Syſtem of War, wherein Force and Violence is the only thing that is had in View; and on the contrary, it is already found in the Syſtem of Society and Peace, wherein Equity and Juſtice is all that is followed, and wherein they will never need to ſtand in fear of each other, becauſe all will be under the Protection of the Society.

Why does a Citizen with Reaſon ſay that he does not depend upon another Citizen his Neighbour? Becauſe he has no need to fear him. Why has he no need to fear him? Becauſe his Neighbour cannot, *with Impunity*, come and by main Force take away his Goods and murther him. And why cannot he do it *with Impunity*, and without its coſting him his Life? Becauſe they both live in a Society, careful and concerned to cauſe the Laws to be obſerved upon pain of Death, in a Society ſufficiently powerful to procure the Obſervation of them, notwithſtanding any that ſhould reſiſt. Theſe Citizens are really independant one of the other; were it not for the Society they would not be ſo. The Heads of Families, among Savages, have not this happy Independance; their Goods may be taken from them *with Impunity*; they may at any time be murthered *with Impunity*. Thus, for want of Laws, for want of Society, they live in the hardeſt of Dependances upon each other.

Let us ſuppoſe, as it but too often happens, that the Head of the Family of the Sovereign we ſpeak of, is a Child or an Idiot; that Family, in the Syſtem of War, ſhall be in a greater Dependance with reſpect to its Neighbours: So that if it is a great Advantage to it, to be freed from Dependance in the time of its very greateſt Strength, much more will it be a great Advantage to it to be freed from that Dependance in the time of its Weakneſs. Thus that Sovereign, in the Treaty of Union, finds out the Secret, ſo deſirable to every wiſe and provident Prince, of making the Time of the Weakneſs of its Family, equal to the Time of its greateſt Strength; an Advantage it can never find but in ſuch a Treaty.

This is his Condition with reſpect to his neighbouring Sovereigns. But if we conſider the Power that Sovereign has over his Subjects, and the Dependance they have upon him in the Syſtem of War, and compare them with the Power he has over them, and their Dependance in the Syſtem of Peace, we ſhall find a plain and very conſiderable Advantage; which is, that in the Syſtem of War the Subjects may rebel, and in that Rebellion flatter themſelves that they ſhall better their Condition, becauſe they may hope for Succour from the neighbouring Sovereigns, or at leaſt that they ſhall be able to ſupport themſelves with their own Forces; thus their Dependance is much leſs, and the Power of the Sovereign very much curbed. But in the Syſtem of Peace, the Subjects of that Sovereign will not only have no Succour to expect in their Rebellions, but on the contrary they will ſtand in awe of the Succour which the *European Soci-*

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ety will always have in a Readineſs to help their Sovereign to puniſh them.

I think it is now demonſtrated that the Independance *de jure* remains the ſame in both Syſtems, but that the Dependance *de facto*, which make us always ſtand in fear of the ſecret or open Force of our Neighbours and Enemies; I ſay, I think it is demonſtrated that this Dependance is abſolutely inſeparable from the Syſtem of War, whereas it would be deſtroyed in the Syſtem of Peace. Now I'll be judged by every good Computer, whether the Exemption from that terrible Dependance is not of infinite Uſe to the Happineſs of Life, and the Duration of Sovereign Houſes.

The Augmentation of Power with reſpect to Subjects is no leſs ſenſible: This Advantage is even ſo great to the Sovereign, that it has been objected to me that that Augmentation of Power would facilitate Tyranny, that is, the Abuſe of that great Power. I ſhall anſwer this Objection in another Place; I ſhall here content my ſelf with ſhewing that the Power of the moſt powerful Sovereign would very conſiderably augment in the Syſtem of Peace.

Therefore *if the* European *Society can procure for the moſt powerful Sovereign a* ſufficient Security *for the Perpetuity of the Peace, both without and within his Dominions, he will find it much more advantageous to ſign the Treaty for the Eſtabliſhment of that Society than not to ſign it.*

FIFTH ADVANTAGE.

Progreſs of Laws, of Regulations and Uſeful Eſtabliſhments in the Syſtem of War, compared with the Progreſs they would make in the Syſtem of Peace.

EVERY Body knows that the more the Laws and Regulations of a Kingdom improve the more flouriſhing it becomes, the more Riches and Advantages the Sovereign draws from it: Now Laws and Regulations are ſo far from improving in time of War, that that is the very time when they are moſt neglected and worſt obſerved; uſeful Eſtabliſhments, inſtead of encreaſing, daily fall to decay.

1. There is, for Example, in moſt States good Laws to prevent Occaſions of Law-Suits between Subjects, to terminate them without much Expence: But it is eaſie to ſhew that they might be perfected, that the Number of Law-Suits might be diminiſhed by one half, and terminated full as equitably, more ſpeedily, and at leſs Expence. What hinders the encouraging thoſe who might uſefully go about this? War. What hinders the making uſe of the good Memorials that have already been given in about it? War. What can give a So-

Sovereign Time and Means to look into it? Peace, nothing but an Everlaſting Peace.

Nothing would contribute more to encreaſe the Happineſs of the Sovereign and his Subjects, than to find out the Secret of obliging them, by their own Intereſt, to think of nothing but making themſelves perfect in the Talents of their Condition, and practiſing the Vertues of it with more and more Exactneſs every Day: The only way to do this would be to find out the Secret of making the Sovereign certainly acquainted with the different Degrees of Merit of thoſe who offer themſelves for Publick Employments; and this is not the hardeſt of things to find. But what hinders the propoſing Prizes for thoſe who ſhould give in the beſt Memorials about this? War. And when they are given in, what hinders the putting them in practice? War. On the contrary, would not there be all poſſible Leiſure and Facility to ſucceed, in the Syſtem of Peace?

3. There are in the great Cities and in the Provinces a great many Excellent *Genius's*, who have Time and Capacity to dive into the moſt difficult Subjects, and to give in Excellent Memorials, in order to produce very important Regulatſons. What hinders the forming, under the Direction of each Miniſter, an Aſſembly of Excellent Spirits, to cut out Work for theſe Excellent *Genius's*, to direct their Labour, and to judge by their Works which would be moſt worthy of honourable Recompences? Is it not War? And is there any Syſtem more commodious to make ſo uſeful an Eſtabliſhment, than the Syſtem of Everlaſting Peace?

4. Every Body knows how important it is to a State to have ſecure and convenient Roads. There are good Regulations about that matter; but nothing better proves that they are not perfect enough, than their being ſo ill executed. Regulations never attain to their Perfection, without there are Perſons *enow* ſufficiently concerned to cauſe them to be executed with Exactneſs. Now what hinders theſe Regulations from being made perfect? War. I know ſome that have given in Memorials. The Examination of them has been deferred till after the War. Becauſe War takes up all Minds, and every thing that is not War is without Diſtinction put off 'till the Peace.

5. Every Body knows that 'tis a great Misfortune to a State, to be from time to time expoſed to Famine. The Expence that it is neceſſary to be at in Magazines and Granaries to avoid this Misfortune, would not amount to the hundredth part of the Loſs the State ſuſtains every Age. What hinders the Sovereins from taking Care of this? The Expence, the Cares

of War. On the contrary, would any thing be more eaſie to practiſe with Order and Exactneſs in the Syſtem of Everlaſting Peace? A very important Reflexion may be made upon this Subject: 'Tis, that Famine is much more terrible in time of War, becauſe of the Interruption of Commerce; whereas in Peace, as all the Countries of *Europe* may not labour under an equal Scarcity of Corn, Commerce would make that Misfortune much leſs to be dreaded.

6. States flouriſh in proportion to the number of Excellent *Genius's* and good Patriots that are in Publick Employments. Now we know that Knowledge and Virtue encreaſe only accordas the Mind and Heart have been exerciſed in a Man's Youth. May not the Education of Children be improved? Who doubts but that private Schools may be made more frequent and better in Cities and Towns? Who doubts but that there might be Convents of Nuns, ſolely for the Education of Girls, and to make that Education by little and little much better than it is? Who knows not the Difference there is between one Woman and another in a Family, and the Diſtinction that more or leſs of Education puts between Women as well as Men? How many young Men leave the Colleges for the Army, at the time when they ſhould be ſtudying, in order to form their Minds? How much might the Methods be abridged, to teach them ſo much of each Science, of each Art, as every Age is capable of comprehending? But able Men muſt be employ'd about this. It would require a continued Application, and Inſpectors to give an Account of it to the Miniſters of each State. What hinders the making of theſe Regulations and Eſtabliſhments? The preſſing Cares of War; 'tis War that brings back Barbariſm into the moſt polite States. It has been an old Saying, *That the Laws are dumb in Time of War*: It may be ſaid, That if in all parts People improved the Methods for the Mind, and the Diſcipline for the Manners, the great Men of this Age would be, if I may ſo ſay, but School-Boys in compariſon of the great Men of future Ages. Now what can procure *Europe* this great Perfection, but the Eſtabliſhment of an unalterable Peace?

7. There is none of us but what believes it poſſible to make the Revenues of Sovereigns much greater, by encreaſing the Revenues of the Subjects; that it is not impoſſible to make the Impoſitions more proportionable to the Riches of each Subject, leſs prejudicial to Commerce, and eſpecially much more eaſie to be gather'd in: But for this, there ſhould be a Company eſtabliſhed to examine the Memorials upon this Matter with great Exactneſs: Before the Sovereign could make ſo great an Alteration, he muſt be ſure of a long Peace both at Home and Abroad.

Abroad. Now how can that certainly be found in the Syſtem of War?

If I propoſe theſe Matters for Examples rather than any other, 'tis not becauſe there are not others very important, and that deſerve good Regulations; but 'tis becauſe having ſearch'd moſt into theſe, I have perceived the Importance of them beſt: I ſhall add one thing more; 'tis, that to cauſe good Regulations to be executed, 'tis abſolutely neceſſary to find a way to make it very much the Intereſt of part of the Subjects to procure the Execution of them; that cannot be done without new Eſtabliſhments; Models muſt be fetched from the Neighbouring Countries, of thoſe that are already made there; there muſt be more Leiſure to think thereof; there muſt be Funds proper to be employed in 'em; nay, ſometimes the Sovereigns, in order to make theſe Eſtabliſhments, muſt have more Authority over their Subjects than they have. Now can theſe Advantages ever be hoped from the Syſtem of War, or can they ever be hoped for the tenth part ſo great, as they would infallibly be in the Syſtem of Peace?

Further; when ten ſucceſſive Sovereigns ſhall have taken the Pains to poliſh the ſame State, a Conqueror, at the Head of barbarous Nations, ſhall come and invade that State, and re-involve it for ten Ages in the greateſt Barbarity. Examples of this kind are not wanting. Theſe are the Effects of the Syſtem of War; theſe are the Effects of the Syſtem of Peace. Now let the Reader put himſelf in the Place of the moſt powerful Sovereign of *Europe*, and let any Body propoſe to him to ſign a Treaty of Society among all the other Sovereigns, to make the Peace unalterable; would he refuſe to ſign it? On the contrary, would he not feel the greateſt Joy, to contribute on his part to an Eſtabliſhment ſo advantageous to him, his Family, and his Subjects?

SIXTH ADVANTAGE.

The Difficulty of concealing one's Deſigns in the Syſtem of War, compar'd with the Commodiouſneſs of acting above-board in the Syſtem of Peace.

I DO not ſay that in the Syſtem of Peace a Sovereign will never have any thing to conceal; but it is certain he would have three times leſs to conceal, whether from his Neighbours, or from his Subjects. Becauſe with reſpect to his Neighbours, as all the future Treaties he ſhall make with them, will be made in the City of Peace, in the Sight, with the Knowledge, and with the Conſent of all the other Sovereigns, he will have no fear of being deceived, nor any Hopes of deceiving. Thus none would ever dare to propoſe any thing 'till he was himſelf aſſured that he propoſes nothing but what is convenient and juſt.

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As for his Subjects, what might oblige him to conceal his Deſigns from them, might be the Fear of their oppoſing him by ſome Rebellion if he diſcovered them, tho' thoſe Deſigns might at the Bottom be very advantageous to them; but as he need not be at all afraid of any Foreign War, and as he will alſo be ſupported by the Aſſiſtance of the Union, he will not need to be at all myſterious; on the contrary, if he be a good Prince, he may (communicating ſometimes one laudable Deſign, ſometimes another) propoſe Recompences for thoſe who ſhall furniſh him with the beſt Memorials to facilitate the Execution thereof. Now what a great Advantage is it to a Sovereign to be able, for the Advancement of his Deſigns, to ſet to work, at a cheap Rate, the moſt excellent *Genius's* in his Dominions, for his own Uſe, and for that of his Subjects?

On the contrary, in the Syſtem of War, the moſt powerful Sovereign is under a very great Conſtraint, by being obliged to Secrecy; if he communicates his Deſigns but to a few Perſons, he ſhall be aſſiſted but by little Advice; if he communicates them to many, he loſes the Advantage of Secrecy: Becauſe in this Syſtem he has both Neighbours and Subjects to fear; he is in dependance on them; he is even often as it were forced to conceal his Deſigns, and to deceive both the one and the other, for fear of being ruined by them: The People are often incapable of ſeeing that an Eſtabliſhment is, at the bottom, more advantageous than diſadvantageous to them. Thus even a good Prince is in a neceſſity to diſſemble, and to make no Innovations, but by imperceptible Degrees; and this Conſtraint, and theſe long Delays, infinitely retard his great Deſigns: On the contrary, what a great Difference will he find as to this in the Syſtem of Peace?

SEVENTH ADVANTAGE.

Progreſs of Arts and Sciences in the Syſtem of War, compared with the Progreſs they would make in the Syſtem of Peace.

EVERY body knows how much Arts and Sciences may help to make a State rich and flouriſhing; with the Aſſiſtance of Art a Man may do as much as twenty others that ſhall be without Art: He may do that with ten Crowns, which another without Art could not do with two hundred Crowns. Any body may convince themſelves of this Truth, by caſting their Eyes upon Printing, Graving, and upon Arts more Ancient, upon Mills, Carriages by Water, and on a hundred other Arts; on another ſide, the Sciences help to improve the Arts, and even the Speculative Arts themſelves, by

by their Lights and Methods, may very much ſerve to improve Phyſick, Law, Morality, and eſpecially Polity, upon which depends the Happineſs of Sovereigns and their Subjects.

Now who does not perceive the prodigious Difference there would be in the Arts and Sciences, if the Expences and Cares of War did never retard the Progreſs of them? How many Families are there, which during the War are unable to be at the Expence of a ſuitable Education? How many that are now taken up with the Buſineſs of War, would ſucceſsfully have applied themſelves, ſome to the Arts, others to the Sciences? How much would Penſions and Prizes have excited Emulation among good Genius's? And is it not plain, that the more there are of good Wits that apply to a Science, the more their Efforts are ſtirred up by Emulation, the more the imperceptible Progreſs they daily make becomes perceptible, even every Year? How many things might be borrowed from Foreign Nations, and perfected, were it not for the Interruption of Commerce? Theſe are the true Means of aggrandizing and enriching a State, of giving it Splendor. Now, can the moſt powerful Sovereign ever find Means to facilitate and procure a great Progreſs of Arts and Sciences, but by ſigning a Treaty that may give him entire Security for the Perpetuity of the Peace?

EIGHTH ADVANTAGE.

Duration of Monuments in the Syſtem of War, compared with their Duration in the Syſtem of Peace.

THE great Augmentation there would be of the Revenues of Sovereigns, and eſpecially of the moſt powerful ones, would give them a wonderful Facility to build noble Palaces, magnificent Temples, to make convenient Roads, Canals, Aquaducts, Hoſpitals, Ports and Bridges, it would put it much more in their Power to encreaſe the Academies, the Colleges, the Houſes of Piety, to enrich the Publick Libraries and the curious Cabinets, to form a great many other uſeful Eſtabliſhments, Monuments of their Magnificence, Goodneſs, Wiſdom; but what would be more important for theſe Sovereigns, and for their Poſterity, is that theſe Monuments ſhould be durable. Now what Duration can be hoped for in the Syſtem of War, wherein each Age ſees ſomething deſtroyed that deſerved to endure? How many excellent Works of Sculpture, Graving, Architecture, how many curious Hiſtories and Publick Regiſters do we regret? What was it that deſtroyed them? War. How many Ancient Books, and other Monuments of Antiquity, were burnt in

in the ſingle Library of *Alexandria*, at the time of the Civil War of *Cæſar*? How many have periſhed thro' the *Goths*, the *Vandals*, the *Turks*, and the other Barbarians? What can preſerve our preſent Monuments from the ſame Fate as the Ancient ones had? Nothing but a perpetual Tranquility, which may hand them down to Poſterity. Now what can ſecure this Tranquility to the States, and to the moſt powerful Sovereigns unleſs it be the Treaty of Union now propos'd to them? Then, every thing that ſhall deſerve to endure will endure, and nothing ſhall be buried in Oblivion, but what deſerves to be forgotten.

NINTH ADVANTAGE.

Reputation of the Sovereigns in the Syſtem of War, compared with the Reputation they would acquire by contributing to make the Peace everlaſting.

WHAT do the Sovereigns do for their Reputation in the Syſtem of War, I ſpeak even of the beſt and moſt human Princes? They are often obliged to oppreſs their Subjects with Subſidies: They are often neceſſitated to ravage and burn the Provinces of their Enemies, and even their own Provinces: What reſults from theſe Evils which they bring upon ſo many innocent Perſons? A Reputation with Poſterity, very odious in the Works of ſeveral Writers, glorious in the Writings of ſome Mercenary Pens, but certainly very doubtful and very much mixed, ſuch as no Man would deſire the like; becauſe the Misfortunes the Conqueror cauſes both to the Enemies, and to his own Subjects, ſets Mens Minds very much againſt him: He is hardly at all eſteemed either for his good Qualities, or his great Talents; thoſe who ſuffer, or who have ſuffer'd, mind only his Faults: A great Conqueror is a Prince almoſt generally hated by all People, and even by his own: He is look'd upon as our Anceſtors looked upon *Attila*. Such is the Reputation he leaves behind him in the Syſtem of War.

On the contrary, let us ſee what that Sovereign may expect in point of Reputation, in the Eſtabliſhment of the everlaſting Peace; the Glory of having had a Hand in the greateſt and moſt deſirable Eſtabliſhment that ever was, or that ever will be in the World, is certainly a Glory worthy a Sovereign, whoſe Sentiments are noble, and whoſe Views exalted. It is plain, that among the Sovereigns, he who ſhall be the moſt powerful, and who ſhall moſt earneſtly ſollicit the ſigning of this Treaty of Union, will have the greateſt ſhare in that Glory; ſince on one ſide he will give up more Hopes and Pretenſions than the others; and on the other,

other, by his Credit, his Power, and his Example, will act much more effectually than any other.

He will be for ever looked upon by his Nation, as him, of all its Princes, that had done it the moſt durable Piece of Service; he will alſo be looked upon by all the other preſent Nations, and by their moſt diſtant Generations, as one of the Pacifiers of the Earth, and as the greateſt of all their Benefactors: And indeed, is there any ſort of Glory comparable to that of doing Good, a very great Good, very durable, not only to a great many Perſons of all ſorts of Merit, not only to all his own Subjects, but alſo to all the People of the Earth, and of all future Ages? Is there any thing that can raiſe a Man nearer to Divinity? Can any thing be more glorious than to labour effectually to deſtroy for ever a furious Monſter, ſuch as is War, which yearly devours ſo many thouſand Men, which ruins ſo many magnificent Cities, which lays waſte ſo many opulent and fruitful Provinces, and which inceſſantly revives out of its own Aſhes? What is the Glory of the *Hercules's*, the *Theſeus's*, and the other Hero's who have been talked of for theſe three thouſand Years, in Compariſon of this Glory?

What ought not a Prince to give, what ought he not attempt, to deſerve and obtain ſuch a Glory in his own Age and in future Ages? And is it not fortunate for a powerful Sovereign to have upon this Occaſion greater Hopes than the others, to make a Sacrifice of the Felicity of Mankind? Is it not even a great Happineſs for him to find, in the Execution of ſuch an Eſtabliſhment, Difficulties that ſeem inſurmountable?

Yet ſuch will be the Glory of the firſt Sovereign that ſhall undertake to ſurmount theſe Obſtacles, and that ſhall ſurmount them: 'Tis true, the others who ſhall join with him to help him to ſurmount them, ſhall have their Shares in the ſame Glory; but the firſt that ſhall put his Hand to this Work ſhall always, and with Juſtice, paſs for the chief Promoter of it: And what other Deſign can ever get him more Honour, or contribute more to fill the remaining part of his Life with Satisfactions, and Subjects of a reaſonable Joy? What other Project, what other Work, what other Monument can make his Memory more certainly Immortal, and his Name for ever bleſſed by all good Men?

Princes willingly Sacrifice all their Labours, all their Cares, all their Fatigues, all their Dangers, to acquire Portions of Glory, which all together do not amount to the hundredth Part of this; for in this every thing is Glory in the Supreme Degree, the Object, the Sacrifice, the Obſtacles.

cles. Now let any one tell me of an Advantage ſo conſiderable to a Man ſenſible of true Glory.

But I go further than human Glory, I carry my Views higher; what Project can there be more worthy of a wiſe Man, of a Chriſtian Hero, who loves to do good, and to make others happy, without any regard to the lawful Praiſes that Man may give to his Virtue?

TENTH ADVANTAGE.

The Diſpoſition of a Sovereign's Mind in the Syſtem of War, compared with the Diſpoſition of his Mind in the Syſtem of Peace.

WE have ſhewed, that even the moſt powerful Sovereign in *Europe*, in the Syſtem of War, has much more grounds to fear the Deſtruction of his Family, than he has to expect the Aggrandizement of his Territory. We juſt now ſhew'd, that with Reſpect to Reputation, he cannot poſſibly be a Gainer; and that a Reputation founded only upon the Misfortunes and Ruins of a great many Families, upon the Maſſacre of an infinite Number of innocent Perſons, and upon the Deſolation of Mankind, is a very odious Reputation: What is there then remaining for him, if he has neither Grounds to hope, nor even Cauſe to deſire the Monarchy of *Europe*, nor the Hopes of a deſirable Reputation? Would he have his Name remembred only as is that of the Villain, who, to render his Name immortal, burnt the Temple of *Epheſus*, one of the Wonders of the World? Can he take no Pleaſure but in the midſt of Blood and Carnage? If it be ſo, he is not a Man, nor can he ever be beloved; he is a Monſter, and ought ſpeedily to be cut off.

But if he makes War only to obtain Juſtice, will he not have it in the Syſtem of Peace, and will he not be ſure even that he ſhall never be deprived of any thing, neither He, nor His, of what he already poſſeſſes? Beſides, is it not certain, that whatever Confidence a Sovereign may put in the Number and Valour of his Troops, the Hazard of Battels, and other Events of War, always give him great Uneaſineſſes in Summer, and many Cares to make Preparations in Winter? Now tho' he had always hitherto had good Succeſs, ſhould he not deduct from it the Trouble with which he purchaſes it? But the moſt Succeſsful have croſs Chances, and they are ſo much the more grieved at unfortunate Accidents, as they had been accuſtomed to the Pleaſure of Succeſs.

I very well know that a great Genius, a great Courage, an active and laborious Conſtitution, cannot live without Employment; but as much as an Employment agreeable to to his Character may bring him Content, ſo much the cruel Agitations caus'd by Uneaſineſs may make him unhappy; the Soul requires Motion, but not an exceſſive Motion: Let it deſire, and let it endeavour to attain its Deſire, no Body is againſt it; but, if poſſible, never let it be in the cruel Agitations of a great Fear.

In the Syſtem of War, that Sovereign is not only employed, he is agitated, and ſometimes cruelly agitated; he is often obliged to make War whether he will or no. On the contrary, in the Syſtem of Peace, he has no Employment but what he thinks fit to chuſe; he has nothing to fear, neither from his Neighbours nor his Subjects. Thus he may peacefully enjoy all the Pleaſures of a wiſe Prince; he may win the Love of his People, by his Application to render them daily more happy than other Nations; if he love true Glory, he may thus ſatisfie his Deſires.

Let any Body now judge how much the Diſpoſition of Mind, that may ariſe from the Syſtem of Peace, is preferable to that cauſed by the Syſtem of War.

ELEVENTH ADVANTAGE.

Product of Commerce during War, compared to the Product of Commerce during Peace.

THE Revenue of the Kingdom of *France* in Land, including that of the Clergy, amounts to about four hundred and fifty Millions *; the Foreign Commerce by Land and Sea, and the Interior Commerce, from Province to Province, from City to City, amounts at leaſt to as much; but the Foreign Commerce alone may at leaſt be reckoned the third Part of the whole Commerce, that is to ſay, a hundred and fifty Millions.

France is at War at leaſt ten Years of every twenty, that is, half of every Age is ſpent in divers Wars, the other half in divers Truces; we may therefore reckon that *France* loſing her Foreign Commerce for half the Age, loſes fifty times a hundred and fifty Millions, or ſeven thouſand five hundred Millions in an Age, or ſeventy five Millions every Year during each Age, one Year with another.

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* *We are always to underſtand Millions of* French *Livres, not of* Engliſh *Pounds Sterling.*

I know, private Men, and not the King, carry on Commerce; but the King, by his Duties of Import and Export, by the Interruption of Commerce of Salt, by the Diminution of Conſumption, and by Diminution of the Maritime Commerce from Province to Province, does himſelf ſuſtain above the fifth part of this Loſs; thus, on that ſide, if out of ſeventy five Millions, his Subjects loſe ſixty Millions, he on his part loſes fifteen Millions a Year, one Year with another, out of his ordinary Revenues.

It is alſo certain, that part of the Subjects who are not employed in War, would be employed in the Foreign Commerce, and nothing enriches a State more than the Subjects applying themſelves to Commerce. Thus it is viſible, that *if the* European Society *can procure, to the moſt powerful Sovereign*, a ſufficient Security *for the Perpetuity of the Peace both without and within his Dominions, it will be much more advantageous for him to ſign the Treaty for the Eſtabliſhment of that Society than not to ſign it.*

TWELFTH ADVANTAGE.

Multiplication of Subjects.

THOSE who are killed in Battel cauſe to the State a Weakneſs proportionable to their Number. That great Number of Soldiers and Officers who periſh in thoſe Occaſions, would have ſerved to multiply the Subjects. Now the more Subjects there are, the more Manufactures they do produce; the better the Lands are cultivated, the more do they bring forth; beſides, the more People there are employed about Commerce, the more rich does the Country grow; there is no Compariſon, therefore, to be made on that ſide, between the Syſtem of War wherein we do live, and the Syſtem of Peace wherein we may live.

THIRTEENTH ADVANTAGE.

The Tribute of the Frontier Provinces in the Syſtem of War, compared with the Tribute of the ſame Provinces in the Syſtem of Peace.

I BELIEVE the Reader is not ignorant that Countries daily laid waſte by Forragings, often by Burnings, are entirely unable to pay the ordinary Tributes. Now this Loſs amounts, in time of War, in *France*, to above two Millions Yearly; thus as it is War ten of every twenty Years, we may reckon that one Year with another the King loſes by it above one Million, and his Subjects above five Millions. Now

it is viſible that in the Syſtem of Everlaſting Peace, neither the King nor his Subjects would ever ſuffer ſuch Loſſes.

FOURTEENTH ADVANTAGE.

Expence in Troops in the Syſtem of War, compared to the Expence in Troops in the Syſtem of Peace.

THIS is one of the moſt important Articles, or at leaſt one whoſe Importance is the moſt felt. In the Syſtem of Diviſion and of War each Sovereign has all his Neighbours for Enemies; thus he is not only obliged to be at a prodigious Expence in time of War, whether to offend, whether to defend; but he is obliged even in time of Truce to be likewiſe at a very great Expence, only to keep himſelf upon his Guard in all his Towns, and particularly about his Frontiers and in his Ports.

Let us ſuppoſe a State, for Example, whoſe Sovereign has a hundred and thirty Millions, ordinary Revenue, and that in time of Truce he lays out forty Millions of it in Garriſons, in the Navy, and in other Troops; let us ſuppoſe that in time of War he has need of fourſcore Millions extraordinary, as well for the Augmentation of his Troops, as for what more it coſts when the Troops are in Action: 'Tis true, as to this Extraordinary, he does not raiſe it all upon his own Revenue, but he always raiſes part of it thereon, even tho' it be but five Millions. It is evident that if by means of the Treaty of the *European* Society his Kingdom is freed from all manner of Fear, and if inſtead of thoſe forty Millions, which is the ordinary Expence, he were to lay out but ten, he would ſave thirty Millions clear Profit, beſides the five Millions which it coſts him of his own in time of War, that is, one Year in two; thus in the Syſtem of Peace he would gain thirty two Millions and a half, without reckoning the Gain he would bring to his Subjects, by diſcharging them from great part of the extraordinary Expence; for if that Extraordinary amount to forty Millions one Year with another, and if he reſerve only fifteen Million for the *Quota* of Troops to be maintain'd on the Frontiers of *Europe*, he will even then ſave his People five and twenty Millions Yearly.

If, then, by the Eleventh Advantage the King gains fifteen Millions, and his Subjects ſixty Millions; if by the Thirteenth Advantage he gains one Million, and his Subjects five; if by this Fourteenth Advantage he gains thirty two Millions and a half, and his Subjects five and twenty, it would be forty eight Millions and a half Annual Revenue in clear Profit to him;

him; and if we have any Regard to the Diminution of the Interior Commerce from Province to Province during the War, and eſpecially that of the Maritime Provinces, and if we reckon for that eight Millions one Year with another becauſe of this Diminution, it will then amount to above a hundred Millions, which would accrue to the Subjects, clear Profit.

Now the Loſs which the Subjects ſuſtain occaſions another to the King; becauſe we may ſuppoſe that if they had a hundred Millions a Year more, moſt of them would put thoſe hundred Millions out to Intereſt, or other Advantage; I ſay moſt of them, becauſe thoſe who ſuffer that Loſs are three parts of them Merchants, who put all out to Advantage, and never let their Money lie idle: It may perhaps happen that half of the remaining Fourth would lay out their Share uſeleſly, but that would be but the eighth part of the whole: Now we may juſtly reckon that the other ſeven Eighths of the hundred Millions, being in the Hands of ſuch good Husbands as Merchants generally are, would produce about five Millions a Year; thus the King, in taking the tenth upon different Duties, would Yearly encreaſe his Revenue by five hundred thouſand Livres; thus in a hundred Years the Revenue of that Sovereign, without having taken of his Subjects any more than the Ordinary, would be augmented by fifty Millions.

Every Body knows that the Lands are worſe cultivated in time of War, and that they produce at leaſt a tenth part leſs: Now the tenth part of four hundred fifty Millions is forty five Millions; that then is two and twenty Millions and a half one Year with another. In ſhort, Commerce would not only ſupport it ſelf but would even encreaſe Yearly, at leaſt a tenth part by new Eſtabliſhments, by the Augmentation of Arts, and of Manufactures: The tenth part of four hundred and fifty Millions is forty five Millions: Theſe two Articles, then, of two and twenty Millions five hundred thouſand Livres, and of forty five Millions, would make ſixty ſeven Millions and a half: Now the Product would be above three Millions, and the King, taking the tenth part of that by divers Duties, his Revenue on that ſide too would encreaſe by almoſt three hundred and fifty thouſand Livres *per Annum*; and this one Article in one Age would encreaſe his Revenue by thirty ſeven Millions: Fifty, and thirty ſeven, make eighty ſeven Millions and a half, beſides the preſent Augmentation of above thirty two Millions and a half. Thus it preſently and with Evidence appears, that *that if the* European *Society can procure to the moſt powerful Sovereign a* ſufficient Security *for the Perpetuity of the Peace*,

both without and within his Dominions, it will be much more advantageous for him to ſign the Treaty for the Eſtabliſhment of that Society than not to ſign it.

FIFTEENTH ADVANTAGE.

The Duration of Sovereign Houſes upon the Throne in the Syſtem of War, compared to their Duration in the Syſtem of Peace.

IN the Syſtem of War ſeveral Cauſes conſpire to diminiſh the Duration of Sovereign Families upon the Throne, and none of theſe Cauſes would ſubſiſt in the Syſtem of Peace.

1. Many Sovereign Families have been dethroned by Foreign Wars. How many Examples of this have there been in ancient Hiſtory, and of later Years? Was not the Imperial Family of the *Paleologi* dethron'd by the *Turks*? Was not the Imperial Family of *China* driven from the Throne by a *Tartarian* Conqueror? The Royal Families of *Mexico*, *Peru*, &c. Now all theſe great Revolutions, which have happened within theſe two hundred and fifty Years, all theſe fatal Overthrows, would they not become henceforth impoſſible thro' the Perpetuity of the Peace?

2. An infinite number of Sovereign Families have periſhed by Conſpiracies in Civil Wars: I have related a great many Examples of this in the Imperial Families. How near was the Houſe of *France* to periſh thereby ſix-ſcore Years ago? How near was that of *England* to be entirely ſwallowed up ſixty Years ago? Was it not the Spirit of Rebellion that deſtroyed *Henry* III. at St. *Cloud*, and even *Henry* IV. at *Paris*? Was it not the ſame Spirit that deſtroyed King *Charles* I. at *London*? Was there the leaſt Likelyhood of theſe ſad Events, of theſe terrible Rebellions, thirty Years, twenty Years before they happened? Sovereign Houſes are like Cities built near *Vulcanoes*, an Earthquake happens in the midſt of the greateſt Calm, and all is overthrown. Ambition is a perpetual and ſubterraneous Fire, which never ſhows it ſelf but when it is become ſtrong enough to ſurmount all Obſtacles. Now in the Syſtem of War there is no Preſervative againſt ſuch an Evil, and there is a ſure one in the Syſtem of Peace; namely, a very great and abſolutely inevitable Puniſhment upon the Conſpirators and the Ringleaders of Rebellions.

3. How many Sovereigns and Princes of Sovereign Families are ſlain in Foreign Wars? Who knows but that the ancient Family of *Portugal*, which was a Branch of the

the Houſe of *France*, might ſtill have ſubſiſted, had not Don *Sebaſtian* been killed a hundred and twenty Years ago in the Battle of *Alcacer* againſt the *Moors*? Who knows but that that of *Vaſa* would ſtill have ſubſiſted, had not *Guſtavus Adolphus* been killed at the Battle of *Lutzein* within theſe fourſcore Years? How many Princes of Sovereign Houſes have been ſlain in Cruſades? How many Families are extinct, which, had it not been for thoſe Battles, would ſtill have ſubſiſted?

4. How many Princes of Royal Blood periſhed in the Civil Wars of *England*, in the Civil Wars of *Germany*? And who knows but that many great Families, had it not been for thoſe Loſſes, would ſtill have ſubſiſted in Splendor? I indeed know that if *they* had ſubſiſted, others that have raiſed themſelves upon their Ruins, would not now have flouriſhed: Not that I am ſorry for the Eſtabliſhment, or Splendor of the new ones; on the contrary, I ſpeak only for their Advantage; I do it that other new ones may not in time eſtabliſh themſelves upon the Ruin of theirs; I teach them the Secret, the only Secret how to make them remain ten times longer than any Sovereign Family ever remained; that is by the Treaty of a *permanent Society*.

5. Several Sovereigns abſtain from ſecond Marriage, for fear there ſhould be Diviſions between the Children of different Wives; and theſe Diviſions are undoubtedly very much to be fear'd in the Syſtem of War, becauſe of the Credit which the new Wives generally have with the Sovereign, and in the State. But as they would not be at all to be fear'd in the Syſtem of Peace, becauſe of the perpetual and all-powerful Protection of the *European Society* in favour of the Laws of each State, no Sovereign will be hindered by ſuch a Fear from marrying a new Wife, one of an Age to have Children.

6. In the Families of Catholick Sovereigns, as well as in the Families of private Perſons, the younger Brothers are ſometimes made Eccleſiaſticks: Now in our Religion, when they are engaged in Orders, they cannot marry. We have ſeen in *France* the Cardinals of *Bourbon*; in *Portugal*, another Cardinal, the Uncle of *Sebaſtian*. Now who knows but if this Uncle had been married betimes, he might have left ſome Male Poſterity, which might now have reigned in *Portugal*? There have been a great many Cardinals in the Family of *Medicis*, and thro' that Conduct it is almoſt extinct.

If the *European* Society had been eſtabliſhed in 1400, the Puniſhments of Aſſaſſinations and Poyſonings had been from that time abſolutely inevitable, there would no Wars have hap-

pened ſince; ſo that *Albert* of *Auſtria*, the firſt of the Name, would not have been aſſaſſinated by his Nephew. *Albert* II. *Rodulphus*, his Brother; *Albert* IV. would not have been poiſoned by thoſe againſt whom they made War; *Albert* V. would not have died of the Epidemical Diſeaſe of his Army, when he was at War in *Hungary*; thus in all Appearance there would ſtill have remained ſome Branches of thoſe Princes. If *Ferdinand* of *Auſtria*, Son to *Philip* III. King of *Spain*, had not been a Cardinal; if *Charles* of *Auſtria*, Brother to the Emperor *Ferdinand* the Second, had not been Biſhop of *Breſlau*; if *Leopold-William* of *Auſtria*, who lived in 1647, had not been Biſhop of *Strasburg*, it is likely the Houſe of *Auſtria* would not now have been reduced to one ſole Head. Now as Sovereigns in the Syſtem of Peace will have a much leſs Expence to ſupport, they will have no need of Eccleſiaſtical Revenues for their Children, and as they will have much more Authority over their People, they may eaſily obtain new Subſidies for the new Princes of the Blood that may be born, which would be very juſt, ſince the People would be indebted to the Family of their Sovereign for the Perpetuity of a Peace that enriches them. Now we ſee that if theſe Penſions for each new-born Prince of the Blood were eſtabliſhed, the Princes would not be afraid to marry betimes; therefore they would multiply more: Thus the Sovereign Family would remain much longer.

Now in the ordinary manner of thinking, can any one ever offer to the moſt powerful Sovereign an Advantage ſo real and great as this eternal Confirmation of his Family upon the Throne? Was it not ſuch an Advantage that the Prophets promiſed from the Moſt High to *David*, to *Solomon*, and to the other Kings of *Iſrael*, if they obſerved Juſtice themſelves, and cauſed it to be exactly obſerved by others? Becauſe for a Family, there is nothing ſo important as a Throne; and for a Royal Family, there is nothing ſo important as its Duration in the Royalty.

This Advantage is the more conſiderable for being as it were the *Baſis* of all the others; and indeed what uſe would it be of to that Sovereign to heap up for his Poſterity great Riches, to build it magnificent Palaces, to leave it, by means of his good Conduct and great Capacity, the largeſt Territories in *Europe*, the moſt peopled, the beſt ordered, the moſt rich and the moſt flouriſhing that ever was, if he is not ſure that his Family ſhall not be ſoon utterly extirpated by the ſubterraneous Fire of Ambition, againſt which all Human Foreſight has been hitherto uſeleſs, and againſt which there

there is no other effectual Preſervative, beſides the *European* Society?

What is moſt terrible both for Monarchies and Republicks, is that in the preſent Condition of *Europe*, they hardly dare to wiſh for long Truces, becauſe 'tis generally in thoſe calm Times wherein the State fears nothing from without that *Diſſentions* are kindled within. And who does not know that Civil Wars are even more pernicious to States, than Foreign Wars? All terrible Inconveniences; from which we ſhall be for ever delivered by the Eſtabliſhment of the *permanent Society*.

Let any Body therefore tell me, if the wiſeſt and moſt powerful Prince in *Europe*, tho' he ſhould ſtudy nothing elſe all his Life-time, could ever find out a way more ſolid, than the Syſtem of this Society, to make his Family durable, and to make it continue upon the Throne, notwithſtanding all the Inſtability of Humane Affairs.

In order to weigh down the Ballance, and to decide between ſigning and not ſigning the Union, I had need but of one ſingle Advantage, and that too of but little Value; For however little an Advantage is in a Treaty which is offered to us to ſign, provided it be real and evident, there is no wiſe Man but what it is ſufficient to determine to ſign it. What will it be then, if I offer to the moſt powerful Sovereign, not only a ſmall Advantage, but if none of thoſe that I propoſe to him are ſmall? What will it be, if among them there are ſeveral almoſt of an infinite Value? What will it be, if in whatever View we conſider this Treaty, all of it is advantageous, and if that Sovereign has nothing to ſacrifice that is real or ever ſo little important, to obtain thoſe fifteen immenſe Advantages? I ſay it loudly: I defy any Body to ſhew me one ſingle Advantage on the ſide of the Syſtem of War; and why do I ſay it loudly? Becauſe I have defied Wits, the moſt fruitful and the moſt prepoſſeſſed againſt this Project, to do it, and not one of them ever told me of one but what diſappeared like a Phantom after the moſt ſlight Examination: But tho' I ſhould be told of one, at leaſt I ſhould be ſuffered to examine and weigh the true Value of it. Then I hope the ſole comparing it with one of the fifteen Advantages of the Peace, would be ſufficient to make the Reader judge that this ſolitary Advantage could never counterballance all the others together. Thus I aver that the Demonſtration which reſults from the Compariſon of the two Syſtems with reſpect to the Intereſts and Motives of the moſt powerful Sovereign in *Europe*, is arrived

to

to the ſame Degree of Evidence with any one that is ever ſo little vers'd in Politicks, as a Geometrical Demonſtration is with a Geometrician.

'Tis certain that the Motives proper to induce the moſt powerful Princes in *Europe* to ſign a Treaty, are moſt of them common to the leſs powerful and to the Republicks, and that they would be ſufficient to induce them to do the ſame: But as there are alſo Motives which are particular to them alone, all I have to do is to ſet them down in a few Words.

PARTICULAR MOTIVES

Of the leſs powerful Sovereigns.

1. SO ſoon as by the Syſtem of War the Door is opened for the ſtrongeſt to ſubdue the weakeſt, the leaſt powerful Prince cannot ſupport himſelf againſt the moſt powerful, but by Alliances, by Confederacies, which make him at leaſt equal in force to that ſtrongeſt. But I think I have demonſtrated that without the Formation of a *permanent Society* of all the Sovereigns of *Europe*, he will never have a ſufficient Security for the Execution of any Treaty, and conſequently of any Treaty of Confederacy. Thus he cannot at all heſitate for his own Preſervation, and for the Preſervation of his Family upon the Throne, to prefer the Syſtem of the *permanent Society*, to the Syſtem of Everlaſting Diviſion, Peace to War.

2. If, for Example, as we have demonſtrated, there are ſix Degrees of Probability againſt one, that in Courſe of time the King of *France* will be rather dethroned by ſome of the other Kings of *Europe*, than he will dethrone them all, becauſe the Dominions of *France* cannot be look'd upon as more than the ſixth part of the Power of *Europe*; it is manifeſt that there will be eight and forty Degrees of Probability againſt one, that the Duke of *Savoy*, in the ſame Courſe of time, ſhall be rather driven from his Dominions by ſome of the other Sovereigns, than he ſhall drive them all from theirs, becauſe the Dominions of that Duke being equal in force but to the eighth part of *France*, cannot be look'd upon as any more than the eight and fortieth part of the Power of *Europe*. It is therefore viſible that the leſs powerful Prince has incomparably more Grounds to fear being invaded by ſome one, than he has to hope invading the others. Thus the Syſtem of Peace deprives him of very little by depriving him of that Hope, and gives him a great deal more than it does to the moſt powerful, by delivering him from that Fear.

We

We may therefore reaſonably judge that if this Project comes to the Knowledge of the King of *Denmark*, the King of *Portugal*, the Duke of *Savoy*, and the other Princes of *Italy*, the Duke of *Lorrain*, the Electors, and the other Princes and States of the *Germanick* Body, it is as it were impoſſible but that they ſhould make ſuch a Confederacy with the moſt powerful, and propoſe it to all the other Potentates.

PARTICULAR MOTIVES

Of Republicks.

1. REPUBLICKS are more afraid of loſing part of their Territories, than they are deſirous of enlarging them by War, becauſe Conqueſt is a very dear way of Purchaſing: They generally buy a Conqueſt at a ten times dearer rate than it is worth, becauſe of the great Expences of War: They have therefore a Motive, an Intereſt yet more great than Monarchs have, to maintain Peace.

2. To attempt to win any thing by Force, is hazarding the whole State: For when the Fire of War is once kindled, who can be ſure of putting a ſtop to the Flame? And is it to be preſumed, that ſuch wiſe Governments would voluntarily put themſelves, without very great Neceſſity, into ſuch a Danger?

3. In the Reſolutions of Republicks, great regard is had to the Intereſts of the Subjects; becauſe in them the Subjects decide every thing. Now the Profit that can accrue from a Conqueſt to each Subject is ſo ſmall, ſo remote, ſo uncertain in compariſon of the Subſidies, which are great, certain, preſent; the Goods of the Inhabitants of the Frontiers are expoſed to ſuch great Ravages; the Traders ſuffer ſuch great Loſſes by the Interruption of Commerce; that ſuch Reſolutions ſeldom go any further than juſt to preſerve the State and Commerce entire. Now will not the certain Effect of the *European* Society be, to preſerve States and their Commerce entire?

4. Republicks have alſo more Reaſon to fear Schiſms and Diviſions than Monarchies have. Every one there freely ſpeaks his Opinion concerning State Affairs, and may publickly maintain it with Warmth. Every one is free to Cabal to enlarge his Party, and when there are at the Head of each Party proud, turbulent, ſeditious Spirits, the Parties daily encreaſe, and the Difference in an Opinion, which at firſt was, if I may uſe the Expreſſion, but a ſlight Scratch, feſters by little and little, and by divers Accidents which ſucceed each other, does in the End become a very great Wound. But it is not ſo in Monarchic States. The Fear of Puniſhment hinders private Men from ſpeaking their Opinion publickly, from main-

maintaining it with Warmth, and none dares even privately make a Cabal to enlarge his Party. Thus in the latter, Difference in Opinion can never cauſe Diviſion, unleſs the Government be very weak, and the Sovereign for ſome time neglects to ſilence and puniſh thoſe whoſe Sentiments he diſapproves of; and this is becauſe he alone has all the Power in his own Hands, whereas in Republicks the Power is ſhared among thoſe very Men who are at Variance. Therefore there are always Parties, and thoſe too very great ones, formed in Republicks, particularly when they are become ſo powerful, that thoſe Parties are not obliged to re-unite for fear of a Foreign Power.

The Fear the *Romans* ſtood in of *Carthage*, of *Pyrrhus*, of *Antiochus*, did for a long time preſerve *Rome* from the Misfortunes of Diviſion. So ſoon as Victory had diſpelled that wholſome Fear; ſo ſoon as it ceaſed to unite all Minds for the Publick Good, and for the common Preſervation, Parties blazed out, Civil Wars were kindled; Wars which were a hundred times more pernicious to the State than Foreign Wars. It would have had a Remedy, and even a ſure Preſervative againſt that terrible Diſeaſe, if the Republick had then had a Society with its Neighbours, ſuch a one as we propoſe, in order to maintain the Peace both at Home and Abroad. But *Rome* had deprived itſelf of ſo great an Advantage, by depriving itſelf of its Neighbours, and by raiſing itſelf upon their Ruins. Thus the exceſſive Elevation of that famous Republick become the neceſſary Cauſe of its Fall. Now as in the Syſtem of the *European* Society, all the Republicks would have a ſufficient Security againſt that State Diſeaſe, it is evident they have a ſtill greater Motive than Monarchs, to deſire the Eſtabliſhment of ſuch a Society.

5. In the Syſtem of this permanent Union, the Republicks would have a ſufficient Security for the exact Obſervance of the Articles of Commerce, and they might alſo promiſe themſelves that their Merchants would no longer need to fear either Banditti on Land, nor their Ships Pyrates at Sea. Now this Advantage would be yet more ſo to them than it would be to Sovereigns, who do not carry on Trade themſelves.

6. Theſe Intereſts are not only very real and very great, but they will be ſo much the more eaſily perceived by Republicks, as their Councils are more free from Tranſient Paſſions than Monarchies; and they conſequently almoſt always go more directly to their true and ſolid Intereſt. Indeed in their Councils Opinions are very liable to be contradicted,

tradicted, either thro' the natural Inclination Men have for Contradiction, or becauſe of the perſonal Jealouſies and Hatreds which are inſeparable from all Societies, or becauſe of the different manners of thinking of thoſe, who all give their Opinions with equal Freedom and Authority. Now this Contradiction of Opinion is the Cauſe, that while ſome give too much into the Hopes of good Succeſs, the others give too much into the Fear of unfortunate Events; while ſome propoſe Means and Facilities for Enterpriſing, the others think of nothing but finding out Difficulties and Obſtacles in the Enterprize; while the one do all they can to excite the Indignation and Anger of the Conſulters againſt the Neighbouring Sovereigns, the others are attentive to diminiſh the Faults of thoſe Sovereigns, and to ſhew the Advantages the State reaps from their Neighbourhood by Commerce; ſo that Things being thus conſidered in all their different lights, the Reſult is, that the Paſſions have leſs Influence in theſe Councils, and conſequently the true Intereſt of the State is generally more followed than in Monarchies, in which all the Reſolutions depend upon one ſole Man, who ſeldom has any in his Council to contradict him.

'Tis true, even in Republican States, there may be Miniſters that may have a private Intereſt to remain in the Syſtem of War, and under-hand to exclude the Project of Everlaſting Peace. In this Caſe, ſuch ought to oppoſe the Publication of this Eſſay in their Dominions; for if it becomes common by being printed there, and by being tranſlated into the Language, and if every Body is able to talk of it, it is certain none of thoſe Miniſters would then be ſo bold as to maintain, againſt every Body, that it is the Intereſt of the Republick to oppoſe the Eſtabliſhment of the *permanent Society*; they will not dare to ſay, that the Execution of it is impoſſible, unleſs they bring good Proofs; and where can they find ſuch?

If by the Treaty of Union (I have been told) Commerce encreaſes in *France*, in *Spain*, in *Denmark*, in *Portugal*, and elſewhere, that Increaſe cannot be made but to the Prejudice of *England*, and eſpecially of *Holland*, who now carry on the greateſt part of the Commerce of the World: But it is eaſie to anſwer this Objection, and to ſhew that this Augmentation of the Commerce of one, will not at all hinder the Augmentation of the Commerce of the others; the truth is, Commerce will augment among all the Nations; but then it will augment among all proportionably; the Nation which carried on the twelfth part of the

the Commerce of *Europe*, ſhall carry on a greater Commerce; but as all the others ſhall encreaſe theirs in Proportion, it ſhall ſtill carry on but the ſame twelfth part of the Commerce; that Nation which alone carried on the third part of that Commerce, ſhall encreaſe hers, and ſhall continue ſtill to carry on the third part of the whole. Thus thoſe Nations which have the moſt Conveniencies to carry on Trade, ſhall continue to have the greateſt Share in Trade. Now as the *Engliſh*, and eſpecially the *Dutch*, will always have, *ſo long as they pleaſe*, more of thoſe Conveniencies than any other Nation, they will be able, *ſo long as they pleaſe*, to preſerve the ſame Superiority over all other Nations in Commerce, as they have always hitherto had; and when they ſhall ceaſe to *pleaſe*, the other Nations will then do them no wrong to pick up what they do not any longer think worth their while to gather.

Upon this Occaſion I ſhall here compendiouſly ſhew the principal Means proper to make Commerce flouriſh which the *Dutch* have in a ſuperior Degree to other Nations.

1. They have a great many Ports for Foreign Commerce.

2. Their Country is full of Canals, which very much facilitates Interior Commerce.

3. They are a Republick; thus the Regulations of Commerce are made and executed by the Authority of Miniſters who are concerned not only to make them very uſeful, but, which is of more Importance, they are very much concerned to cauſe them to be obſerved in every Place and at all Times with the greateſt Exactneſs, eſpecially when the State takes care to chuſe its principal Miniſters from among the Traders, or from among thoſe whoſe Wealth is in the Hands of Traders.

4. They have few of thoſe lazy Sparks who, in *Spain*, are called Nobles: They give but little heed to Birth; the greateſt Eſteem is deriv'd from publick Employments and great Riches. Thus every one is there more ſtirred up, than any where elſe, to be frugal, to turn himſelf to Trade, the ſureſt and moſt innocent Means of enriching himſelf.

5. Offices there are not venal; thus the Merchant, to acquire Reſpect, is not obliged to quit Commerce to buy the Magiſtracy; if he gains a Reputation for Capacity and Probity, he at the ſame time gains that right of Judging his Fellow-Citizens; thus the Son-Merchant ſucceeds the Father-Merchant, without any other View than to merit a good Reputation, and to make his Commerce yet more convenient and profitable, than he received it from his Father.

6. There

6. Their Climate is cold, and conſequently more fit for Labour; and ſo, inſtead of ſetting up for Gentlemen and doing nothing, they ſtrive who ſhall ſhew themſelves moſt laborious.

7. There are no lofty Dignities there, as in Monarchies, to tempt them to quit their Commerce and their Labour; the Hopes of Favour there does not change a plain downright Merchant, one that is uſeful to the Republick, to a ſupple, polite, complaiſant Courtier, agreeable to the Prince and of no uſe to a State.

8. They ſpend leſs in Habits, in Furniture, in Equipages; thus they have more Caſh to turn to their Commerce.

9. The Toleration they give in point of Religion is exceſſive; but this Exceſs of Indulgence draws and retains among them a great many People, who finding themſelves under a Conſtraint elſewhere, fly to the Country where there is moſt Liberty, and thither carry their Merchandizes, their Mony, and their Induſtry; the *Dutch* turn away none who ſubmit themſelves to the Laws of the Society, and receive with open Arms all that are willing to ſubmit to them.

10. They have in all the Countries of the World many more Settlements for Commerce, and thoſe more conſiderable than any other Nation has; thus it will be much more eaſie for them, in preſerving and encreaſing theſe Settlements, to light upon good Bargains, and conſequently always to ſell Cheaper than any other Nation.

11. They are much more skilful in Navigation, and may conſequently much more eaſily inſtruct themſelves in what they are unacquainted with, and in that reſpect always ſurpaſs the other Nations.

12. They are the greateſt Builders of Ships; *Holland* is properly the World's Work-houſe for all ſorts of Ships; thus they are able to make them better for every Uſe, and for each ſort of Commerce, and to ſell them a fourth part cheaper than any other Nation.

13. Seamen live there cheaper; thus their Maſters may ſell to Profit, and at cheaper Rates, and ſo get the greateſt Vent for their Merchandizes.

14. They have more Contrivance in Sailing: This makes them have need of fewer Men on board their Ships: This is another Cauſe why they may ſell to Profit, and at cheaper Rates than others. Now every body knows, that the way to get the greateſt Trade, is to be able to ſell, and in fact to ſell, cheaper than any body elſe.

Further,

Further; ſo long as they ſell at cheaper Rates, no body ought to be jealous of them; they receive the Reward of their Labour, their Induſtry, their Frugality, their Advances; what can be more equitable? Hitherto they do no wrong to others; but if, becauſe they are in Poſſeſſion of half of the Maritime Commerce, they ſhould take Advantage, and ceaſe to ſell cheaper than others, they would ſoon ceaſe to have the Superiority in Commerce; and 'tis this great Advantage of Cheapneſs, that the *European* Society will always produce in favour of all Nations, by procuring them a perpetual Commerce, free, certain, equal in the Conditions, and Univerſal. They will be ſure to have every thing cheaper than they can now; and ſo long as the *Dutch* Nation ſhall be the moſt laborious, the moſt induſtrious, the moſt equitable; ſo long as they ſhall have the moſt advantage as to their Laws and Eſtabliſhments; ſo long as, with the help of their Frugality, they ſhall carry and ſell cheaper; they will certainly continue to have the ſame Superiority in Commerce they have now, and they will have it without wronging any body, and without any body's having cauſe to complain of it, ſince they ſhall be Gainers, only in proportion as they ſhall be uſeful and commodious to the other Nations.

In a word, there are but two ſides in matter of Commerce; *frequent Interruption*, which is the Syſtem of War now followed, or *unalterable Continuance*, which is the Syſtem of Peace I propoſe to be followed. Now would any one dare to undertake by a vain Subtilty to perſuade the Republican States, and eſpecially the wiſe *Dutch*, to prefer *frequent Interruption* to *unalterable Continuance*?

We may therefore with ſome reaſon believe, that if this Project comes to the Knowledge of the *Engliſh*, the *Dutch*, the *Venetians*, the *Genoeſe*, the *Polanders*, and the other Republican States of *Europe*, it is as it were impoſſible for them not to make, ſome time or other, among themſelves, and afterwards with the leſs powerful Princes, and by little and little with all the Potentates of *Europe*, ſuch a Confederacy.

Theſe Advantages being ſo great, ſo evident, is there any need of being ſo very wiſe, ſo very cunning to reſolve to ſign a Treaty, which, take it which way we will, is ſo advantageous to all the Parties? Is it neceſſary to have a Spirit ſo ſublime, a Reaſon free from Paſſions? On the contrary, is not this Syſtem conformable to the moſt common Paſſions? Are not extraordinary Fear, extraordinary Hope, and thoſe the beſt grounded, on our ſide? I do not ſuppoſe

poſe a Sovereign perfect; but if he be perfect, ſo much the better; the Love of the Publick Good, the Zeal for Juſtice make him for us: If he is not perfect, nay even if he is unjuſt, provided he deſires to encreaſe his Revenues, provided he deſires to make his Family continue long upon the Throne, he is ſtill for us: Let him love true Glory, he will endeavour to be the Benefactor of his People, and of all Nations, and not the Scourge of Mankind: Let him love Magnificence in Furniture, in Building, in Equipage, he is equally for us; if he is devoted to Virtue, if he is given up to Pleaſures, he is ſtill for us: This Syſtem has wherewithal to content all Characters, and without Peace none of thoſe Characters can ever be half ſo contented.

Let not any Body then tell us that it is impoſſible to trace back the *Motives* which induced the *Germans* to form the *Germanick* Society: Let not any Body then tell us that it is impoſſible to trace back the *Motives* which induced *Henry* the Great, Queen *Elizabeth*, and ſixteen or ſeventeen other Potentates of the laſt Age, to deſire to form the *European* Society; we have ſeen them all fortunately recovered: But if they will tell us any thing, let them tell us now wherein thoſe Motives are inſufficient to induce the Sovereigns of our Age to prefer the Syſtem of Peace. I think I may now conclude, that *if the* European *Society which is propoſed can procure for all the Chriſtian Princes a* ſufficient Security *for the Perpetuity of the Peace, both without and within their Dominions, there is none of them that will not find it more advantageous to ſign the Treaty for the Eſtabliſhment of that Society than not to ſign it*: And this is what I propoſed to demonſtrate in this Diſcourſe.

Now the European *Society, which is propoſed, can procure for all the Chriſtian Princes a* ſufficient Security *for the Perpetuity of the Peace, both without and within their Dominions*: This is what I propoſe to demonſtrate in the following Diſcourſe.

FOURTH DISCOURSE.

PROPOSITION to be demonſtrated.

The European Society, *ſuch as it is propoſed, will procure to all the Chriſtian Princes a* ſufficient Security *for the Perpetuity of the Peace, both without and within their Dominions.*

WE have ſhewn that to eſtabliſh a Society, it is ſufficient that the Parties give their Conſent to the Articles of the Treaty. Thus the *European* Society will be begun the very Moment that two Sovereigns ſhall have ſigned the Treaty of it; and it will be quite formed, when all the other Chriſtian Sovereigns, at whatever diſtance of Time one from t'other, ſhall have ſigned it. We have alſo ſhewn that they have incomparably more Motives to ſign, than not to ſign. I have no more to do than to ſet down the twelve Fundamental Articles of this Treaty, and at the ſame time to make the Reader ſenſible that they are *ſufficient* to render the *European* Society unalterable; and that the Peace, and all the infinite Advantages it will neceſſarily produce to the Sovereigns, will endure as long as the Society it ſelf.

I hope the Reader will not be diſpleaſed that after having ſufficiently made him ſenſible of the Neceſſity and Importance of each particular Convention, to make the Union more durable, I afterwards reduce that Convention into a ſort of an Article; ſince thoſe who ſhall be employed to compoſe the Project of the Treaty would themſelves be obliged to reduce it into divers Articles. Thus I ſave them the Labour; I preſent them with a rough Draught, which will make it much more eaſie for them to compoſe theirs, by adding or retrenching what they ſhall think fit, or even ſometimes without adding any thing, or retrenching any thing, but only by changing the Expreſſions, and ranging each Article in a different Order. Thoſe who know what this ſort of Work is, know that even a Rough-Draught, tho' in no very good Form, always ſaves a great deal of Trouble, and gives a great Facility to the Mind of him who examines it, whether to find out what is wanting in it, or to obſerve what there may be in it of ſuperfluous.

PREAMBLE.

IT ſeems to me convenient and even neceſſary for the Tranquility and Security of the Society in general, and of each

each of the Members in particular, to ſuffer the *Czar* to enter into the Union. Therefore I reckon his Vote for one of the four and twenty. I well know that the Chriſtianity of his Dominions is very different from that of ours, but they hope for Salvation through *Jeſus Chriſt*; therefore they are *Chriſtians*. I well know that abſolutely ſpeaking, the other *Chriſtian* Sovereigns may do without his Suffrage, but the *European* Society cannot well omit to make with him a Treaty of Commerce and everlaſting Peace, a League offenſive and defenſive, and to take thereupon all poſſible Securities, in order to ſave the Expence of keeping upon their Guard againſt him: But to ſpeak the Truth, this Treaty would be more ſecure both for him and the whole Union, if he had a Voice in the Congreſs, and were look'd upon as a Member of the Union. I go further; if he would neither enter into the Society, nor make a Treaty of everlaſting Peace with it, nor pay his *Quota* for the Maintenance of the Peace, and of the Chambers of Commerce, nor give the ſame Securities as the other Members reciprocally give each other, he ſhould be uſed as an Enemy to the Peace of *Europe*, as a Diſturber of the Publick Repoſe, 'till he had ſigned; but when all the others ſhall be entered into the Union, he will not want much courting to enter into it after them.

As for the *Mahometans* who border upon *Europe*, the *Tartarians*, the *Turks*, the People of *Tunis*, of *Tripoly*, of *Algier*, of *Morocco*, I have been told that it would not be at all decent to give them a Voice in the Congreſs: Perhaps neither would they accept it. But the *Union*, to keep up Peace and Commerce with them, and to exempt itſelf from remaining in Arms againſt them, might make a Treaty with them, take all the ſame Securities, and grant each of them a Reſident in the City of Peace. If they refuſed ſuch a Treaty, the Union might then declare itſelf their Enemies, and oblige them by force to give a ſufficient Security for the Preſervation of the Peace. It would be alſo eaſie to obtain of them ſeveral Articles in favour of their *Chriſtian* Subjects.

Among the Articles which the Sovereigns may agree to, in order to form the *European* Society, I think there are two ſorts; the one *fundamental*, wherein every one may be ſure that no Alteration ſhall ever be made, unleſs he himſelf conſent to it; and the other *important* to arrive at that ſufficient Security for the Preſervation of the Peace. As for the latter, they may at any time make convenient Alterations in them by three fourths of the Voices.

FUNDAMENTAL ARTICLES.

ARTICLE I.

THE preſent Sovereigns, by their under-written Deputies, have agreed to the following Articles. There ſhall be from this Day following a Society, a *permanent* and perpetual Union, between the Sovereigns ſubſcribed, and if poſſible among all the Chriſtian Sovereigns, in the Deſign to make the Peace unalterable in *Europe*; and in that View the Union ſhall make, if poſſible, with its Neighbours, the *Mahometan* Sovereigns, Treaties of League offenſive and defenſive, to keep each of them in Peace within the Bounds of his Territory, by taking of them, and giving to them, all poſſible reciprocal Securities.

The Sovereigns ſhall be perpetually repreſented by their Deputies, in a perpetual Congreſs or Senate, in a free City.

EXPLICATION.

1. IT is permitted to the leſs powerful Princes, in order to encreaſe their Security, to deſire to augment the Number of thoſe who are to have a League offenſive and defenſive with them to preſerve the Peace, and it will be very glorious in the moſt powerful Prince, to offer to contribute to this Augmentation of their Security.

2. If the *Turks* and *Muſcovites* were united with one of the Members of the Society, they might be hurtful to the reſt of *Europe*, and diſturb its Repoſe; whereas being all either Members, or Allies of the Union, and conſequently enjoying the immenſe Advantages of an everlaſting Peace, they muſt all three be become quite mad, to quit ſuch real Advantages, to catch at a *Chimæra*. Now, abſolutely ſpeaking, three Sovereigns *may* all be infatuated at the ſame time, but it is not much to be fear'd that they *will* be ſo.

3. So long as thoſe Potentates remained in Arms, or in a Poſſibility of arming, they would put the Union to a very great Charge to be upon its Guard.

4. The Commerce of the *Mediterranean* is of very great Importance to Chriſtians; thus it very much concerns them to take *ſufficient Securities* about that, whether with the Grand Seignior, or againſt the Pyrates of *Africa*.

I have been told that I aim at too much, by endeavouring to unite ſo many Potentates at the ſame time. 'Tis true, I endeavour to unite them, but not to unite them all at the ſame time. Let two ſign the Union at firſt; is that aiming at too much? Let

thoſe

thoſe two offer the Treaty to a third, and then all three to a fourth; is this impoſſible? Thus all might ſign it gradually one after another. Now if I require that the Society ſhould be numerous, 'tis becauſe, as I have elſewhere proved, that unleſs it be very numerous it cannot be unalterable.

What is moſt important to a Sovereign, is to be able to govern his Kingdom with Facility, that is, with Authority; ſo that in encreaſing the Happineſs of his Subjects he may at the ſame time encreaſe his own: For this he ſhould be ſure that not only the Union would be no Obſtacle to him in purſuing that end, but alſo that by its help it will aſſiſt him to ſubdue rebellious Spirits, and to make what Eſtabliſhments he ſhall think will be for his own Convenience, and for that of his People; ſo that the Union never concerns itſelf about the Conduct of the Sovereign, but only to ſupport his Will. Now the Sovereigns will ſo much the more willingly agree reciprocally to this Article, as it is their mutual Intereſt to augment their Authority over their Subjects. Each Sovereign will have ſo much the more Security that the Body of the Union will always exactly obſerve this Article, as the Monarchick States will make up the two thirds of the Voices of the Union, and beſides it is not at all the Intereſt of the Republican States to oppoſe this Augmentation of Authority: For if on one ſide they may have reaſon to fear leſt ſeveral very wiſe Princes ſucceeding each other, ſhould make their Government ſo amiable, that even the Subjects of Republicks ſhould go and ſettle in that Monarchy; they have, on the other ſide, more Reaſon to hope that ſeveral unthinking Princes will ſo ſpoil the ſame State by their odious Government, that ſeveral Subjects of thoſe Monarchs will tranſplant themſelves, together with their Riches and their Talents, into the Republican States.

The Monarchick State has one Advantage, namely, that in thirty Years it may reach to a Degree of Perfection in its Eſtabliſhments, which a Republick cannot reach in leſs than a hundred and fifty Years, and this proceeds from two Sources; the firſt, becauſe the Monarch is to have almoſt all the Honour of a great Enterprize, of a noble Eſtabliſhment, of a good Government, and this is a great Spur to prick him on to act with Vigour and Conſtancy. The ſecond, becauſe the Opinions of the Monarch are never contradicted, neither in the Reſolution, nor in the Execution; whereas in Republicks the Honour of an Enterprize is divided among ſo many Members, that that Spur becomes very weak in each of them; and beſides, there, an Opinion, however good or uſeful it may be, is liable to be contradicted with Autho-

rity, either in the Reſolution or in the Execution, and that Contradiction ſtops all its good Effects: But then the Republican State has another Advantage; namely, that when a good Eſtabliſhment is once formed in it, it is much more durable than in Monarchies.

As for Republicks, we have already obſerved that, as they are much more ſubject to the Diſeaſe of Diviſion and Parties, ſo it is very much their Intereſt to have a Security that this Diſeaſe ſhall either never happen, or at leaſt that it ſhall never get a Head, that is, the Parties never come to Blows. Now againſt this there is one ſure Preſervative, *viz.* to make in each Republick a Law, of which the Union ſhall be Guarantee, that it ſhall be forbidden upon Pain of Death, both to the Magiſtrates to ſend Troops againſt other Magiſtrates, and to the Officers, to lead the Troops upon thoſe Occaſions; and for the Union on the other ſide, to be engaged to ſend its Troops and its Commiſſioners, as well to prevent Diſorder, as to quell it, if it be already raiſed.

ARTICLE II.

THE *European* Society ſhall not at all concern itſelf about the Government of any State, unleſs it be to preſerve the Fundamental Form of it, and give ſpeedy and ſufficient Aſſiſtance to the Princes in Monarchies, and to the Magiſtrates in Republicks, againſt any that are Seditious and Rebellious. Thus it will be a Guarantee that the Hereditary Sovereignties ſhall remain hereditary, according to the Manner and Cuſtom of each Nation; that thoſe that are elective ſhall remain elective in the Country where Election is uſual; that among the Nations where there are Capitulations, or Conventions which are called *Pacta conventa*, thoſe ſorts of Treaties ſhall be exactly obſerved, and that thoſe who in Monarchies ſhould have taken up Arms againſt the Prince, or in Republicks againſt ſome of the chief Magiſtrates, ſhall be puniſhed with Death, and Confiſcation of Goods.

EXPLICATION.

THE principal Effect of the Union is to preſerve all things in Repoſe in the Condition it finds them in, and as they are the Sovereigns themſelves, who, by their Deputies, decide all things in it, they cannot fear that Aſſembly, any more than each Sovereign can fear himſelf.

I know it is impoſſible, eſpecially in Republicks, but that there ſhould be Diſputes about Religion, and that as Men never diſpute but upon obſcure Matters, uncapable of Demonſtration, it is impoſſible to reconcile the two Diſputants: But it is poſſible,

poſſible, it is even eaſe for the Magiſtrates to hinder thoſe Diſputes from getting ſuch a Head, as to diſturb the Tranquility of the State. It is enough at firſt to impoſe Silence upon All, and either to baniſh or impriſon thoſe who ſhall either have ſpoken, or preached, or written, or printed ſince the Prohibition. Time diſcovers the Truth; therefore all that is to be done, 'till ſhe ſhews herſelf clearly to us, is to keep the Subjects from Diviſions and from the other Evils that Obſcurity may cauſe to them; and this is what the Prudence and Authority of the Union will always infallibly do in every State of *Europe*.

To keep up the Society, it is not abſolutely neceſſary that the Citizens be of the ſame Opinion in obſcure Matters; nay it is ſo far from being in their Power, that Uniformity of Opinion upon ſuch Occaſions is as it were impoſſible: But the only Foundation of the Society, is Peace among the Citizens. Thus 'tis requiſite that each Citizen, in order to preſerve the Society, uſes Charity and Indulgence even towards thoſe whom he thinks in an Error. This is what is always not only in the Power of the Citizen, but 'tis alſo the firſt and moſt indiſpenſable of his Duties.

PREAMB'LE.

A pretty conſiderable Advantage which Sovereign Families could never yet find, is to be certain of an active, all-powerful, and everlaſting Protection in Regencies, and in all other times of Weakneſs.

ARTICLE III.

THE Union ſhall employ its whole Strength and Care to hinder, during the Regencies, the Minorities, the weak Reigns of each State, any Prejudice from being done to the Sovereign, either in his Perſon, or in his Prerogatives, neither by his Subjects, nor by Strangers; and if any Sedition, Revolt, Conſpiracy, Suſpicion of Poyſon, or any other Violence ſhould happen to the Prince, or to the Royal Family, the Union, as its Guardian and Protectreſs born, ſhall ſend Commiſſioners into that State, to look into the Truth of the Facts, and ſhall at the ſame time ſend Troops to puniſh the Guilty according to the Rigour of the Laws.

EXPLICATION.

IT is certain this Article will be punctually executed, ſince the United Princes will want neither *Power* nor *Will* to do it. As to *Power*, the thing is evident; as to *Will*, it is no leſs evident, ſince they have no greater Intereſt than to ſearch as carefully as poſſible into the Crimes which have deſtroyed ſo many Princes, and ruined ſo many Sovereign

Houſes, Crimes which ſo nearly concern them, and to puniſh the Guilty with all the Severity imaginable, in order to ſave their own Families, by thoſe exemplary Puniſhments, from the like Misfortunes.

PREAMBLE.

TO preſerve the Peace, it is neceſſary, as much as poſſible to cut off Occaſions of War. Now Aggrandizement of Territory is one of the principal occaſions; becauſe that cannot be made but at the Expence of the Neighbours. Thus the firſt *Baſis* is for every one to be ſatisfied with his own, and for none to look upon any thing as *his*, but what he actually poſſeſſes. And as every thing which they do not actually poſſeſs may be called Hopes, Pretenſions; it is abſolutely neceſſary for them to be ſatisfied with what they actually poſſeſs, and mutually to renounce all the Pretenſions, all the Hopes, they might have of all or part of each others Territories.

One of the principal Points for the common Security of *Europe*, is that no Sovereign Family may poſſeſs more Sovereignties than it actually has, and that it ſhould renounce acquiring any thing by means of Succeſſion or Agreement made with other Sovereign Families, to ſucceed each other, in want of Males.

For if, on the one ſide, the Door were left open for the Sovereigns to aggrandize their Territory by Succeſſion, Agreements between different Houſes, Elections or otherwiſe, it is evident that the Houſe of *Auſtria*, for Example, might in time get into its Poſſeſſion all the Female Sovereignties of *Europe*, as *Spain*, *England*, *Sweden*, and others, and the Heads of that Family might alſo poſſeſs the elective Sovereignties, as *Poland*, &c. Now any one may perceive that Then that Family would be too powerful with reſpect to the reſt of *Europe* ; and on the other ſide, it would be very unjuſt to give to the leſs powerful Houſes a Right of Succeſſion denied to the moſt powerful.

ARTICLE IV.

EACH Sovereign ſhall be contented, he and his Succeſſors, with the Territory he actually poſſeſſes, or which he is to poſſeſs by the Treaty hereunto joyned.

All the Sovereignties of *Europe* ſhall always remain in the Condition they are in, and ſhall always have the ſame Limits that they have now. No Territory ſhall be diſmembred from any Sovereignty, nor ſhall any be added to it by Succeſſion, Agreement between different Houſes, Election, Donation, Ceſſion, Sale, Conqueſt, voluntary Submiſſion of the Subjects, or otherwiſe.

No

No Sovereign, nor Member of a Sovereign Family can be Sovereign of any State, beſides that, or thoſe, which are actually in the poſſeſſion of his Family.

The Sovereigns, who, by their Deputies, are now going to ſign this Treaty, and thoſe who, by their Deputies, ſhall afterwards ſign it, ſhall be reputed and underſtood by this ſigning, in Conſideration of the Advantages they are all to reap from it, mutually to have given up and renounced, both for themſelves and Succeſſors, all the Rights and Pretenſions they might have one upon the other, and particularly upon the Territories of each other, under what Title, or of what Nature ſoever they may be; ſo that they ſhall remain quit one with the other, and not only with the Sovereigns who now ſign the Treaty, but alſo with thoſe who ſhall afterwards ſign it; and theſe latter when they ſign it ſhall be reciprocally quit, both with thoſe who have already ſigned it, and with thoſe who are ſtill to ſign it.

The Rents which the Sovereigns owe to the private Perſons of another State, ſhall be paid as uſual.

No Sovereign ſhall aſſume the Title of Lord of any Country, of which he is not in actual Poſſeſſion, or the Poſſeſſion of which ſhall not be promiſed him by the Treaty hereunto joyned.

The Sovereigns ſhall not be ſuffered to make an Exchange of any Territory, nor to ſign any Treaty among themſelves, but with the Conſent and under the Guaranty of the Union by the three fourths of the four and twenty Voices, and the Union ſhall remain Guarantee for the Execution of reciprocal Promiſes.

EXPLICATION.

1. THERE muſt be a fixed Point to bound *Meum* and *Tuum*. Now in matter of Territory, *actual Poſſeſſion* is a very viſible Point; for all that is worth being poſſeſſed, has evident Marks of *actual Poſſeſſion*: A Borough, a Village, acknowledges ſome Judge, and that Judge is ſupported by the Power of ſome Sovereign. The Sovereignty, the Poſſeſſion of it, is therefore certain; thus in matter of Poſſeſſion it may be ſaid that what is not certain is of no Importance: There may perhaps be ſome Uncertainty as to the *actual Poſſeſſion* of ſome uncultivated Mountain, of ſome barren Deſart, of ſome uninhabited Iſland, of ſome Foreſt uſeleſs becauſe of its Remoteneſs, of ſome Cottages of wretched Savages diſperſed here and there in Marſhes, in Foreſts, or on the Sea-ſhore; but would this be a Subject of Diſpute between two Sovereigns? Now things of but little Importance,

tance, that are contended for, are look'd upon as already decided, ſo ſoon as ever the Pretenders have given full Power to Arbiters to decide about the whole, and to ſet Limits to the Diviſion. One of the following Articles eſtabliſhes the Body of this Union for an everlaſting Arbiter. When I add theſe Words in the Article, *or which he is to poſſeſs by the Treaty hereunto joyned*, 'twas becauſe I ſuppoſed that the Sovereigns who ſhould be at War, might perhaps conclude the Peace, in the View of the Eſtabliſhment of the *European* Society, to have for the future a ſufficient Security of a perpetual Peace; and that ſome Potentates might promiſe to give up ſome Places, ſome Territory after that Eſtabliſhment is formed. Now in this caſe it was neceſſary to diſtinguiſh *actual Poſſeſſion* from *promiſed Poſſeſſion*, and to give them both equal Force, equal Authority.

But if the Treaty of the whole *European* Society is not made 'till in the midſt of Peace, and when all the *promiſed Poſſeſſions* are become *actual Poſſeſſions*, it will not be proper to ſay the *Treaty hereunto joyned*, it will be enough to uſe the Term *actual Poſſeſſion*.

It is impracticable to make a Law between Sovereigns, unleſs it be equal for each of them: And as it is They only that by their unanimous Conſent can make a Law, to which they muſt be ſubjected; they would not conſent to it, if in that Law, which they impoſe upon themſelves for the common Good and Security, the one were worſe uſed than the other, that is, if the Law were not equal for all of them.

Now we have ſeen that for the Security of *Europe*, it is abſolutely neceſſary to hinder Families already very powerful, from making themſelves ſtill more ſo, and from aggrandizing their Dominions by means of Succeſſion. It is therefore viſible, that if the leſs powerful Sovereigns find that it will be for their own Security to hinder the Aggrandizements of the moſt powerful by Succeſſion, they ſhould ſet the Example, and firſt renounce that Way of Aggrandizement: When the Law is equal, no Body has cauſe to complain of it; and when every one reaps a great Advantage from it, every one ſhould rejoyce at it. And who does not ſee that to ſet immutable Bounds to Sovereignties, to hinder them from encreaſing in Territories, is the *Baſis* of the Security of all the Nations of *Europe*, and of the Duration of Sovereign Families themſelves? There is another Ground of Security for the Union, namely, that four and twenty Voices, of which the Senate will be formed, are not ſo great a Number, as to perplex the Deliberations, and if the Number were leſs than four and twenty, it would

would be more eaſie to make Cabals in it againſt the common Good: Now if in Courſe of Time ſeveral Sovereignties might unite under one Head, the Number of Voices might become too ſmall, and conſequently too liable to Cabals and Factions.

Beſides, I aver that neither the moſt powerful, nor the leaſt powerful, loſe much in making this Renunciation, and that they gain very much by getting themſelves an everlaſting Peace, an everlaſting Security. As for the moſt powerful, ſuch as is the King of *France*, if his Neighbours are now ſo alarmed at his great Power, in the Condition he is in, as to take up Arms on purpoſe to weaken him; if they are ſo much the more united, in Proportion as they fear him; is it not evident that they would unite themſelves ſtill more, and in a yet greater Number, to hinder him from aggrandizing himſelf in Territory, by any Succeſſion, Donation, or otherwiſe? And let no Body ſay that his Neighbours would have no right to oppoſe that Aggrandizement; the Rights between State and State are not the ſame as the Rights between private Men living in one and the ſame State, who are ſubject to Laws, and who being equally protected by the Power of their Country, are not at all concerned, for their own Security, to hinder a Neighbour from aggrandizing himſelf; whereas the principal Law of a State, its chief Right, is to be able to do, and actually to do, all that is neceſſary for its own Preſervation, eſpecially if it can do it without deſtroying its Neighbour. Now it is plain that there may be ſuch an Aggrandizement of a Sovereign already powerful, as may be very dangerous to the Safety of the Neighbouring States. Thus when the King of *France* ſhall renounce for ever the Right of ſucceeding to all or part of a Sovereignty, he will give up nothing real, ſince he would find in all Ages an invincible Oppoſition from his Neighbours, to hinder him either from taking Poſſeſſion of that which was fallen to him, or from keeping it; the ſame may be ſaid of the manner of aggrandizing himſelf by Agreements between different Families; the Neighbours would never ſuffer him to put thoſe Agreements in Execution.

As for the leſs powerful, beſides the Conſideration of the great Advantages they will reap from the Unalterableneſs of the Union, there is yet another Conſideration which may help to take them off from the Deſire of preſerving the Right of ſucceeding to the Female Sovereignties, and to other Sovereignties by Agreements between different Families; and that is, that Sovereigns much more willingly give their Daughters in Marriage to the moſt powerful, than they do

to the leaſt powerful; thus the leaſt powerful loſe leſs than others by this Renunciation. It is the ſame as to Agreements about Succeſſion between Family and Family: It is certain the Sovereign who ſhall be willing to make ſuch a one, will rather chuſe to contract with a Sovereign more powerful than himſelf, than with one leſs powerful.

Again; there is nothing cauſes ſo many Diſputes as Succeſſions; now the hope of an Aggrandizement, which cannot be acquired but by undertaking a War (the end of which it is impoſſible to divine with certainty) and which it coſts immenſe Sums to procure the Poſſeſſion of, becomes a hope of very little Value; the unmarried Sovereigns, being no longer in Expectation of inheriting, will chuſe their Wives by their Merit, the Union between them will be the greater, their Poſterity more numerous, and the Marriage more happy.

In a Word, it is in vain to think of forming a Society ſo advantageous as the *European Society* will be, unleſs the Foundations of it be durable. And if the moſt powerful Family may ſtill double its Power, what will become of the Liberty of that Society? On another ſide, if the Sovereigns, for their own Happineſs, have need to agree about Laws, thoſe Laws ſhould be equitable; and can they be equitable if they are not equal, as well to the moſt powerful as to the leaſt powerful?

The Deſign of the Union is to preſerve each Sovereign in the Condition it finds him in, and conſequently in the ſame Degrees of Diſtinction as they are in as to Territory one with reſpect to the other. Now if the leſs powerful might aggrandize himſelf by Succeſſion, and the moſt powerful could not, could the Union preſerve between the Sovereigns and Sovereignties the ſame Diſtinction it now finds between them as to Territory?

There is alſo one Conſideration in favour of Republicks, and that is that they cannot aggrandize their Territories, neither by Succeſſion, nor by any Agreement between Families; and as they renounce all other ways of Aggrandizement, in Conſideration of the Advantages of the Perpetuity of the Peace, is it not equitable that the Monarchick States, in Conſideration of the ſame Advantages, ſhould be upon the ſame Terms, and in the ſame Condition as Republicks? *Holland* is deſirous to preſerve the Diſtinction of Power it at preſent has, with reſpect to the leſs powerful Princes of *Italy* and of *Germany*; it does them no wrong; they remain as they are, and by the Eſtabliſhment of the *European Society* they have the further Advantage of having a perfect Security for the

the Duration of their Family upon the Throne, and all the other great Advantages we have mentioned.

Perhaps ſome Sovereigns will at firſt diſpute this Article out of Jealouſie to the King of *Spain*, who is in Poſſeſſion of the vaſteſt Territory in the World: now by the everlaſting Duration of the Union, that ſort of Preheminence will be everlaſting to all the Kings of *Spain*; but as it is abſolutely neceſſary that in the World ſome Sovereign muſt have the moſt Land of any, what matters it to the Union whether it be the King of *China*, or the King of *Spain*, that has this Preheminence; and in my Opinion it is better for *Europe* that it is a *European* Family, than to have it an *Aſiatick* Family, and that it is the moſt ancient of all thoſe which now reign on Earth.

Without the mutual Ceſſion and the Dereliction of reciprocal Pretenſions upon each others Dominions, it is evident that there would never be any thing fixed. 1. The one would ſet up a Right of fifty Years, while the other would ſet up one of two hundred Years. 2. One Man, againſt a certain Demand would pretend to ſet up a more important Right, but alſo more uncertain, which he would revive after five or ſix hundred Years Interruption. Preſcription is a very good and very reaſonable Law to keep Repoſe in Families. Private Perſons have happily ſubmitted to it, but Sovereigns have not hitherto conſented to ſubmit to it, and which is more important, they have as yet given no Security for the Duration of their Conſent to any thing whatever. Thus the Law has no Force among them. 3. If Treaties are alledged, they will equivocate upon the Terms, and produce others which have different Clauſes in them. 4. If the Terms are too clear to admit of any Equivocation, if they have no Treaties to oppoſe to them, they will ſay that it was Fear that extorted 'em from them, that the ſtrongeſt conſtrained them to ſign it, with Arms in Hand; that thus not having been made willingly, they are not binding. 5. If they can't alledge Force, they will alledge Deceit, Fraud, Ignorance of the eſſential Facts, all ſpecious Pretences. 6. If Oaths are alledged againſt them, they will ſay that they were extorted from them by Force, and then the Validity of the Oath almoſt always dies with him that made it. 7. Let any one look into Hiſtory and trace back every Poſſeſſor one by one, let him examine the Source of the Right of the laſt by the Right of their different Predeceſſors; is it not certain that moſt of the States of *Europe* and *Aſia* are nothing elſe but Diſmembrings of the *Roman* Empire, that is, very ancient Uſurpations made upon ancient Uſurpers? For I eſteem

ſteem as ſuch not only the Emperors who uſurped or who ſucceeded in the Uſurpation of that Republick, but alſo the Republick it ſelf, which had uſurped part of its Dominions from the Succeſſors of *Alexander*, who were likewiſe more ancient Uſurpers.

I wou'd not be underſtood to confound all ſorts of Conqueſts with Uſurpations. There may be ſome juſt ones, even tho' they were only to reimburſe the Charges of a War undertaken with Juſtice: But 'tis ſufficiently known that neither *Cyrus*, nor *Alexander*, nor the *Romans*, nor the other Conquerors did always ſearch over-narrowly into the Juſtice of their Cauſe.

However, nothing is more eaſie to Men of Wit, than, (by tracing back Age by Age,) to eſtabliſh a kind of *Pyrrhoniſm* in point of the Rights between Sovereign and Sovereign, State and State, and to render ſuch Rights doubtful, when it is their Intereſt that they ſhould be doubted. So that if the Sovereigns reſerved the leaſt Pretenſions one upon the other, we muſt expect nothing but a Chaos of new Rights differing from each other, differing from more ancient Rights, and thoſe too differing from Rights ſtill more ancient, ſo that it would be ſo much the leſs Poſſible to diſintangle and decide them, as there would be ſcarcely any certain Principle of Deciſion at all.

If each of them, in ſigning the Treaty of Union, reſerved all, or part of his Pretenſions, they muſt all agree to refer it to the Arbitration of the Union, whether by Plurality, or by three Fourths of the Voices. Now if any Sovereign ſhould pretend to have a Right to all the Dominions of his Neighbour, as it would certainly happen, is it to be believed that that Neighbour would expoſe all his Dominions to ſuch Arbitration. Yet either all the Sovereigns muſt thus expoſe their Dominions to Arbitration, or mutually renounce all their Rights and Pretenſions, contenting themſelves with actual Poſſeſſion; or they muſt for ever remain, with their Chimerical Expectations, in the wretched Syſtem of everlaſting War.

In ſhort, are not thoſe who are Creditors often Debtors too? Have not thoſe who have Pretenſions upon ſome Neighbour, ſome other Neighbour that has the like or greater Pretenſions upon them? What can be done better, in this Confuſion of Debts and Pretenſions, than for all of them to acquit each other, *to the intent that each of them may once for all with his own Hands ſatisfie himſelf for all his Hopes and Pretenſions, and even obtain infinitely more, by drawing from the Treaſure of everlaſting Peace, Riches incomparably greater and more real than all thoſe Hopes? An inexhauſtible*

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Treaſure, from whence all the Sovereigns may inceſſantly draw freely, but from whence the one will never draw without the Conſent of the other, that is, without having formed a durable Society among them.

But there can be no durable Society without a Reciprocal Security, and 'tis an eſſential and fundamental Point of it, that every one for ever renounce all the Hopes, all the Pretenſions he might have in time to poſſeſs ſome part of a Territory poſſeſſed by another, and that every one ſtand to the fixed Point of *actual Poſſeſſion*. Now in ſuppoſing this reciprocal Renunciation, this mutual Ceſſion of Pretenſions, they will find in the Syſtem of Peace infinitely more than what they hunt after, and what too they in vain hunt after in the Syſtem of War.

I only ſpeak here of the Pretenſions and Debts between Sovereign and Sovereign, and not of thoſe of one Sovereign to the Subjects of another State, as thoſe of ſome *Genoeſe* from the State of *Milan*, and others.

It was reaſonable on one ſide, that Neighbouring Sovereigns might for their mutual Conveniency make ſome Exchanges of Territory; but on the other ſide it was reaſonable, for the Security of the Union, to hinder the one from enlarging his Territory, under this Pretence, to the Expence of the Neighbouring State, which ought to be a Fundamental Law of the *European* Society. Now to reconcile the Liberty and Convenience of the one with the Safety of the others, it is ſufficient for theſe Treaties of Exchange to be made with the Conſent of the reſt of the united Sovereigns.

If I propoſe it to be a Fundamental Law, that there ſhall be no more Treaties made between Sovereigns, but with the Advice and Conſent of the reſt of the Union, 'tis 1. Becauſe for the Safety of the Society, it very much concerns it that the Sovereigns may not, without being declared Enemies, make any ſecret Treaties among themſelves; Secrecy is never neceſſary but when any one has a mind to do ſomething that might diſpleaſe, or prejudice another. 2. Is it not juſt for thoſe who might have ſome Intereſt in a Treaty, to be heard, that they might be ſecured againſt the Wrong they might receive from it? Now thus a great many Cauſes of Complaint might be prevented. 3. 'Tis to the intent that none of the Contractants may ever either hope to deceive, or fear being deceived: Now Deceit is one of the Sources of Rupture, or at leaſt one of the moſt ordinary Cauſes of the In-obſervation of Treaties, and there is no body but what, as well for himſelf as his Deſcendants, is a

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Gainer by renouncing to deceive, provided he be ſure that neither he nor his Deſcendants ſhall ever be deceived; and is it not evident, that a Treaty which ſhall be propoſed and negotiated publickly between two Sovereigns, in the Preſence of all the reſt, will be ſo well expreſt, ſo well digeſted in all the Articles by Perſons very attentive, and very much concerned to examine it in all its Forms, that it will be almoſt impoſſible that there ſhould be any of the Parties, but what would really find his Advantage in that Treaty? And this reciprocal Advantage will ſecure the Obſervation of the Treaty. 4. Becauſe if unfortunately there ſhould be any Obſcurity, any Equivocation in the Terms, if any Caſe ſhould happen in it that was not foreſeen, and if in conſequence of that any Diſpute ſhould ariſe about the Execution of any of the Articles, thoſe who in the Union had any hand in the making the Treaty, might much more eaſily, by remembring the Spirit and Intentions of the Parties, find ways to reſolve the Doubts, to reconcile the Diſputes, or elſe judge them with more Knowledge of the Cauſe. 5. Becauſe for the Intereſt even of the Contractants, it is always abſolutely neceſſary for the Union to be Guarantee for the Execution of all future Treaties, and Arbiter of all the Differences that may ariſe about them. Now what can be more reaſonable, than for the Parties to have for Witneſſes of the Laws they impoſe upon themſelves, thoſe who are to be the Interpreters and Protectors of thoſe ſame Laws?

PREAMBLE.

THE Buſineſs is to render unmoveable the Foundations of a Society which is to procure ſo many Advantages for the Sovereigns and their Subjects: Upon that Foot it is no wonder that the *Engliſh*, the *Dutch*, and the other Allies of the Houſe of *Auſtria*, ſo earneſtly demand a ſufficient Security, that the Monarchy of *France* and the Monarchy of *Spain* ſhall never be united under one and the ſame Monarch.

The Houſe of *France* will willingly conſent to this Article, provided the Union, of its ſide, will warrant the Execution of the Agreement which ſhall be made in that Family, that no Daughter, nor Deſcendant of a Daughter, ſhall inherit the Kingdom of *Spain*, ſo long as there ſhall be two Males in the Houſe of *France*, be they of what Branch they will, ſo that the Elder be preferred to the Younger, and the Elder Branch to the Younger Branch.

On another hand, it is no leſs neceſſary to the Solidity of the Union, to agree that the Emperor ſhall never be elected

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King of *Poland*, nor the King of *Poland* Emperor; and that neither the King of *France*, nor the King of *Spain*, nor the King of *England*, nor the *Czar*, *&c.* ſhall ever be elected Emperors, nor Kings of *Poland*; but what ſufficient Securities can there be for the Execution of theſe Conventions, unleſs it be by the Guaranty of a Society, made perfectly unalterable both within and without?

ARTICLE V.

NO Sovereign ſhall henceforth poſſeſs two Sovereignties, either Hereditary, or Elective; however, the Electors of the Empire may be elected Emperors, ſo long as there ſhall be Emperors.

If by Right of Succeſſion there ſhould fall to a Sovereign a State more conſiderable than that which he poſſeſſes, he may leave that he poſſeſſes, and ſettle himſelf in that which is fallen to him.

ARTICLE VI.

THE Kingdom of *Spain* ſhall not go out of the Houſe of *Bourbon*, or the now Houſe of *France*, ſo long as there ſhall be two Males of that Family, of the Eldeſt Branches, or of the Youngeſt Branches, on condition that the Elder ſhall be always preferred to the Younger, and the Elder Branch to the Younger Branch.

EXPLICATION.

WE have ſhewn that ſuch an Article, ſuch a Guaranty, would be a ſtrong Motive to engage the Houſe of *France* to aſſiſt in eſtabliſhing the *European* Society, and to make it entirely ſolid and durable.

PREAMBLE.

ONE of the moſt important Articles for the Preſervation of the Peace, is to make good Laws for the Commerce of the Nations of *Europe*, and to find means to cauſe them to be well executed. But as that Body of Laws, which the Members may ſettle by the three fourths of the Voices, will perhaps be ſeveral Years before it is formed; it is abſolutely neceſſary to agree upon ſome proviſional Laws, ſuch as the Articles the Treaty of Commerce already made, with ſome Reſtrictions or proviſional Exceptions, which might alſo be agreed upon; and particular care muſt be taken to make thoſe Articles be executed, by way of proviſion, between the Traders of different States,

by Eſtabliſhing Chambers of Commerce upon the Frontiers of each State.

It is evident that without this the Nations would ſoon fall out, that they would ſoon come to Repriſals and then to Hoſtilities: There muſt be Laws, there muſt be Judges not ſuſpected, and eſpecially very well authorized, and whoſe Judgments may be always infallibly executed.

ARTICLE VII.

THE Deputies ſhall inceſſantly labour to digeſt all the Articles of Commerce in general, and of the different Commerces between particular Nations; but in ſuch a manner as that the Laws may be equal and reciprocal towards all the Nations, and founded upon Equity. The Articles which ſhall have paſſed by Plurality of the Voices of the preſent Deputies ſhall be executed proviſionally according to their Form and Tenor, 'till they be amended and improved by three fourths of the Voices, when a greater Number of Members ſhall have ſigned the Union.

The Union ſhall eſtabliſh in different Towns Chambers for maintaining of Commerce, conſiſting of Deputies authorized to reconcile, and to judge ſtrictly and without Appeal, the Diſputes that ſhall ariſe either upon Commerce, or other Matters between the Subjects of different Sovereigns, in value above ten thouſand Livres; the other Suits of leſs Conſequence ſhall be decided as uſual by the Judges of the Place where the Defendant lives: Each Sovereign ſhall lend his Hand to the Execution of the Judgments of the Chambers of Commerce, as if they were his own Judgments.

Each Sovereign ſhall at his own Charge exterminate his Inland Robbers and Banditti, and the Pyrates on his Coaſts, upon Pain of making Reparation, and if he has need of Help, the Union ſhall aſſiſt him.

EXPLICATION.

'TIS the chief Point in Commerce, that no one Nation be preferred to another, and that all be equally free to come to ſell and buy Merchandizes: Another very important Point is, that in order to avoid Diſputes about the Duties of Import and Export, to ſave Merchants the Trouble of Viſitation, as alſo the Vexations and Oppreſſions that the Cuſtom-Houſe Officers put upon them under thoſe different Pretences, they agree, by the three fourths of the Voices, that no Sovereign ſhall exact of any Body, whether Subject

or

or Foreigner, any Duty of Import or Export, unleſs perhaps for the Victuals that are conſumed, and that each Sovereign ſhall make it up to himſelf by other ſorts of Subſidies upon his Subjects. It is inconceivable how much this ſole Article would facilitate and encreaſe Commerce; how much the Subjects of each Sovereign would be enriched by it, and conſequently how much his own Revenue would encreaſe by the Augmentation of theirs: But as there are a great many Arguments *pro* and *con* about this Matter it deſerves a ſpecial Memorial.

But what is of the utmoſt Importance is, for all the Sovereigns to agree that the Articles of Foreign Commerce ſhall be regulated proviſionally by the Deputies by Plurality of Voices; for every thing is looked upon as regulated, every thing is in Peace and Commerce, ſo ſoon as ever a Method ſo eaſie and certain is agreed upon; for it does not ſignifie whether thoſe Articles are all brought to Perfection, ſince the Sovereigns that ſhould find themſelves aggrieved by them, have it always in their Power to have them mended by three fourths of the Voices, upon the Foot of Equality, which is the fundamental Rule.

Every Body knows that one of the moſt common Cauſes of War between Neighbouring Nations, is the Wrongs which the Subjects of one Nation ſuffer, or think they ſuffer, from the Subjects of a Neighbouring Nation: They are often then obliged to permit Repriſals, and when they are permitted in one Place, the War is kindled throughout.

In the Seventh Diſcourſe will be ſeen more particularly what regards theſe Chambers of Commerce.

PREAMBLE.

NOTHING can keep one Man in his Duty towards another: Nothing can actuate him but either the Hope of Advantages or Fear of Misfortunes to come; and, after all, Princes are no more than Men. We have in the third Diſcourſe fully ſhewn the Advantages they may expect from the Formation and Maintenance of the *European* Society. This would be ſufficient, if we were ſure that all the Sovereigns would always be ever ſo little reaſonable: But as it may happen that from time to time there may be born ſome young Prince, hot, raſh, ill-adviſed; the Union ſhould be in a condition to uſe him as they uſe Children that can no longer be governed by the Hope of Reward; he muſt then be governed by the Fear of great Evils. It is therefore abſolutely neceſſary for wiſe Princes, in order to keep their unwiſe Succeſ-

ſors in a Society ſo advantageous for them and their Family, to impoſe upon them a dreadful and inevitable Puniſhment.

ARTICLE VIII.

NO Sovereign ſhall take up Arms or commit any Hoſtility, but againſt him who ſhall be declared an Enemy to the *European* Society: But if he has any Cauſe to complain of any of the Members, or any Demand to make upon them; he ſhall order his Deputy to give a Memorial to the Senate in the City of Peace, and the Senate ſhall take care to reconcile the Differences by its mediating Commiſſioners; or if they cannot be reconciled, the Senate ſhall judge them by Arbitral Judgment by Plurality of Voices proviſionally, and by the three fourths of the Voices definitively. This Judgment ſhall not be given 'till each Senator ſhall have received the Inſtructions and Orders of his Maſter upon that Fact, and 'till he ſhall have communicated them to the Senate.

The Sovereign who ſhall take up Arms before the Union has declared War, or who ſhall refuſe to execute a Regulation of the Society, or a Judgment of the Senate, ſhall be declared an Enemy to the Society, and It ſhall make War upon him, 'till he be diſarmed, and 'till the Judgment and Regulations be executed; and he ſhall even pay the Charges of the War, and the Country that ſhall be conquered from him at the time of the Suſpenſion of Arms, ſhall be for ever ſeparated from his Dominions.

If after the Society is formed to the number of fourteen Voices, a Sovereign ſhould refuſe to enter into it, it ſhall declare him an Enemy to the Repoſe of *Europe*, and ſhall make War upon him 'till he enter into it, or 'till he be entirely diſpoſſeſſed.

EXPLICATION.

THIS Article is of very great Importance for the Security of each Sovereign. On the one ſide he will be ſure never to be attacked unawares by any of his Neighbours whom he might innocently have offended, or who might have been enraged againſt him by Calumnies. On the other, he is ſure that when he ſhall take up Arms it will be always with Succeſs, ſince he will do it with the all-powerful Aſſiſtance of the Union. In a word, he will be ſure that the Wrong, the Offence, the Injury he ſhall have received, will be repaired either by Accommodation, or by the Judgment of Arbiters, with the ſame Equity and in the ſame manner as he himſelf would have every thing repaired, if,

inſtead

inſtead of being the Offended, he were the Offender : *Do not uſe others worſe, than you yourſelf would be uſed by them, if you were in their Place, and they in yours.* This is the Rule which true Self-Love dictates to every Perſon offended; becauſe the Offended or his Children may in their turn become Offenders. Now in this Caſe, is it not his Intereſt that the Puniſhments ſhould not be too ſevere, nor the Reparations exorbitant ?

Fortune often gives very unjuſt Deciſions in War; thus whoever is deſirous of obtaining a juſt Reparation, is not ſure of obtaining it by Arms; whereas he is ſure of obtaining it by Equity and by the Power of the Society, and of obtaining it too without any Charge, and without doing himſelf, by the unfortunate Events of the War, a new Wrong, a new Damage greater than that he complains of.

Beſides, it would be in vain to pretend to maintain the Union, unleſs there were a very great and abſolutely inevitable Puniſhment inherent to the Refuſal of the Sovereign that would not execute the Regulations of it. This is what made the Members of the *Germanick* Body agree to put every refractory Member in the Ban of the Empire. Now when all the Sovereigns ſhall have agreed to put him who ſhould endeavour to break the Union in the Ban of *Europe*, it will never come into the Head of any of them, however paſſionate we ſuppoſe him, that it is his Intereſt to take up Arms. Thus tho' the Conſideration of the great Advantages that accrue to him from the Society ſhould not bind him to it ; yet the ſole Fear of the Puniſhment would do it, and force him, if I may uſe the Expreſſion, to follow his true Intereſts whether he will or no. There can be no durable Union expected among Men, unleſs each Member is retained in it, not only by Conſiderations of Pleaſure and Profit, which are ſufficient for thoſe that are wiſe and ſenſible ; but alſo by ſome great Fear, which is neceſſary to retain thoſe in it that are not ſo.

If a Sovereign of *Europe* went to make a ſeparate Armament, it would be very much the Intereſt of the Union to oblige him to take the ſame Engagements, and to give the ſame Securities as all the reſt ; becauſe without that, he might ſurprize one of his Neighbours by ſuch ſudden Armament. Now this would oblige them neceſſarily to remain in Arms for their own Security ; thus by his Conduct he would put them to a ruinous Expence, without any good Reaſon. I ſay he would have no good Reaſon for it ; for either he does it to aggrandize his Territory, or only to preſerve it. If he does it only to preſerve it, that is the chief

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Deſign, the principal Effect of the *European* Society. If he does it to aggrandize it, that he cannot do but to the Damage of his Neighbours; thus they have a Right to look upon and uſe him as their Enemy.

PREAMBLE.

AS I ſuppoſe that at the ſigning theſe fundamental Articles, it will be agreed that all the other Articles ſhall be regulated by the three fourths of the Suffrages of the Senate, and that ſuch Agreement, which is of the utmoſt Importance, cannot be well underſtood, 'till the Parties have agreed how many Suffrages the Senate ſhall be compoſed of, what Sovereign ſhall have Suffrage in it, and whether one Sovereign, however powerful he may be, ſhall have more than one Suffrage: I think it is proper to examine the thing thorowly.

How many petty Princes are there, how many Sovereign Cities in *Germany*? There are above two hundred. How many are there in *Italy*? Now, in my Opinion, it would be utterly impracticable to compoſe a Senate of ſo great a Number of Suffrages. It is therefore neceſſary to reduce them: But upon what Foot? Right of Suffrage might be given to the Sovereigns that have about twelve hundred thouſand Subjects, and upwards, ſuch as the *Pope*, *Savoy*, *Lorrain*, *Portugal*, *Denmark*, *Venice*, *Switzerland*, the *United Provinces*, *Sweden*, *England*, *Poland*, *Spain*, *France*, *Muſcovy*; and as to the other leſſer ones, as *Parma*, *Modena*, *Florence*, *Monaco*, *Malta*, *Genoa*, *Lucca*, *Raguſa*, *Baden*, *Salm*, *Naſſau*, &c. divers Aſſociations might be made of them, each of which might have a Vote.

There is another Queſtion, namely, Whether the Princes and States of *Germany* ſhall have but one Suffrage and one Deputy, named by the Emperor, as I ſaid in the beginning of this Work; or if ſince, becauſe of the *European* Society, they would not have any longer ſo much need of electing Emperors, the Sovereigns of that Nation ſhould have ſeveral Deputies, and ſeveral Suffrages, giving Aſſociates to the weakeſt. Thus there might be given to the Head of the Houſe of *Auſtria* one Deputy, not as Emperor, but as Sovereign of *Auſtria*, *Sileſia*, *Bohemia*, *Hungary*, &c. one to the King of *Pruſſia*, one to King *Auguſtus*, one to the Duke of *Bavaria* with ſome Aſſociates, Princes and Cities, one to the Count *Palatine* and Aſſociates, one to the Duke of *Hanover* and Aſſociates, one to the Archbiſhops of *Cologn*, *Mayence*, *Treves*, and Aſſociates. In this Caſe, there would be four and twenty Deputies or Senators. I ſhall now name them,

them, much according to the Order in which they may ſign the Treaty of Union.

1. *France.*
2. *Spain.*
3. *England.*
4. *Holland.*
5. *Savoy.*
6. *Portugal.*
7. *Bavaria* and Aſſociates.
8. *Venice.*
9. *Genoa* and Aſſociates.
10. *Florence* and Aſſociates.
11. *Switzerland* and Aſſociates.
12. *Lorrain* and Aſſociates.
13. *Sweden.*
14. *Denmark.*
15. *Poland.*
16. *Pope.*
17. *Muſcovy.*
18. *Auſtria.*
19. *Courland* and Aſſociates, as *Dantzick*, *Hamborough*, *Lubeck*, *Roſtock.*
20. *Pruſſia.*
21. *Saxony.*
22. *Palatine* and Aſſociates.
23. *Hanover* and Aſſociates.
24. Eccleſiaſtical-Electors and Aſſociates.

Now 'tis my Opinion, that it would be more agreeable to the Security of the Union, for the *German* Nation to have ſeven Deputies at the General Diet of *Europe*, without any Dependance upon an Emperor, than to have but one Deputy and one Vote, and be ſubject to an Emperor. I likewiſe think that this Regulation would be much more to the Intereſt of the Princes and Cities of *Germany*. 'Tis true, the Head of the Houſe of *Auſtria* would thereby loſe the Prerogative of Emperor; but beſides that it is not Hereditary in his Family, the Publick Good in ſuch a Caſe, eſpecially when it is very conſiderable and very durable, ſhould prevail above a private Advantage, which is but ſmall and of little Duration; and we have ſhewn in the preceding Diſcourſe how many conſiderable Advantages the Houſe of *Auſtria* (as well as all the other powerful Families) would reap from the Eſtabliſhment of the Union, which would recompence it, with an immenſe Profit, for the Title of Emperor. I leave this Article undecided; but in whatſoever manner it be decided, this Project is ne'er the leſs practicable, and all the Difference is, that the Union, inſtead of conſiſting of four and twenty Deputies, will conſiſt but of eighteen.

Another Queſtion to be decided by the Sovereigns is, whether the Deputy of a Prince eight times more powerful in Subjects than the Duke of *Savoy*, for example, ſhall have eight Voices, while the Duke of *Savoy* ſhall have but one, *England* four, *Holland* three, and ſo of the reſt.

To reſolve this Queſtion we muſt have regard to two things. 1ſt, To make the Formation of the Society eaſie. 2dly, To make it durable after it ſhall be formed. The moſt

powerful Sovereigns muſt not, when they have ſeen what Advantages will accrue to them from this Union, obſtinately demand a number of Voices proportionable to their Power; a thing of very little Conſequence, and which would nevertheleſs make the Formation of the Society either very tedious, or impoſſible, or but of ſhort Duration. Neither muſt the very little Republicks, nor the petty Sovereigns, obſtinately inſiſt upon having each of them a Vote, a thing of very little Importance, and which would make the Formation of the Society impracticable: A Society from which even *they* will have all their Security, and all the greateſt Advantages that they can reaſonably expect for their State and Family.

How wou'd it look, to give one Vote to the Prince of *Monaco*, for example, and no more to the King of *France*? But then, on the other hand, if you give one Vote to the Prince of *Monaco*, and three hundred to the King of *France*, who has at leaſt three hundred times as many Subjects, how will that do? What Confuſion would there be in the Deliberations, if there were three hundred States in *Europe* to ſend Deputies to the Senate; and if of the Deputies of thoſe States one had one Vote, the other two, the other thirty, the other fifty, the other fourſcore, the other a hundred and fifty, the other three hundred, and ſo as many Diverſities as there were Deputies. Every body muſt perceive, that this would be abſolutely impracticable. This Aſſembly, far from being able to deliberate conveniently, ſpeedily, orderly, would be nothing but a Confuſion, which would never yield any Advantage.

Suppoſing that it was reſolved not to admit of any Deputies but thoſe from Princes who ſhall have at leaſt twelve hundred thouſand Subjects: If they deferred forming the Union 'till that was made appear, it would be too long about, and the Articles could not in the mean time be ſettled either by Plurality, nor by three Fourths of the Voices. Thus for the Good of the Thing, and of *Europe*, it would be proper for the principal Potentates to fix the Number of Deputies. I propoſe to fix it at four and twenty, becauſe in giving to the moſt powerful ones but one Deputy, there will be found almoſt fourteen States that can make up twelve hundred thouſand Subjects and upwards without Aſſociates, and ten others that want them. But it is not improper to ſee what Reaſons can induce the Sovereigns of twelve or fifteen Millions of Subjects to conſent to have but one Vote, no more than thoſe who have a ten times leſs number of Subjects.

1. Should

1. Should all the Sovereigns agree that each ſhould have as many Votes as he has twelve hundred thouſands of Inhabitants, this Enumeration muſt be made in the Preſence of Commiſſioners; and when would that be done?

2. What would that moſt powerful Sovereign do with ſo many Votes? Would he do any thing elſe but preſerve the Union, and render it ſtill more and more ſolid; ſince 'tis from its Duration only that he can expect everlaſting Peace, and 'tis from everlaſting Peace that he expects, and will infallibly receive, the immenſe Advantages he has ſeen in the third Diſcourſe: Now with being ſatisfied with one Vote, he obtains what he ought moſt to deſire, namely, the ſpeedy Formation of the Union, and the Solidity of that ſame Union.

3. If there is ever any need to fear the Deſtruction of the Union, it will not be at all to be apprehended from the leaſt powerful, ſince it is even more Their Intereſt to have it continue, than it is that of the moſt powerful: Therefore 'tis ſo much the better for its Duration, to give the more Votes to the leaſt powerful. Now in confining each Sovereign to one Vote, and all the Votes in the Diet of *Europe* to the Number of four and twenty, the leſs powerful will have the greateſt number of Votes, and it is in that will conſiſt the greateſt Solidity of the *European* Society. We have proved that a very powerful Sovereign muſt almoſt have loſt his Senſes, either to refuſe to enter into it, or to wiſh to deſtroy it if he were entered. But the leſs powerful Prince muſt be yet more ſenſeleſs, if he ſhould harbour ſuch a Deſire. Now this Degree of Folly, which will be ſeldom found even in one, will be abſolutely impoſſible, when, to ruin the Union, eighteen, that is, three Quarters of the voting Sovereigns muſt be all ſiez'd with it at the ſame inſtant.

4. The Votes of the leſs powerful can never deprive the moſt powerful of any part of his Territory, nor of the Rights whereof he is poſſeſſed, ſince thoſe things are fixed; and to do it there muſt be an unanimous Conſent, and conſequently the Conſent of that moſt Powerful himſelf, who will never give it, if he thinks he ſhall thereby loſe any thing he is poſſeſſed of. This is what regards the interior of his Dominions; and as for the Foreign Commerce, the eighteen Votes of the leſs powerful cannot alſo make any Decree, unleſs their Regulations be equal and reciprocal for all the Nations; if they would have them otherwiſe, they muſt have not only eighteen, or the three Fourths of the Voices, but even all the Voices. Now if the Regulations be equal for all the Nations,

Nations, what Damage can there be to the Commerce of the Subjects of that very powerful Sovereign; and then would not the leſs powerful do as much harm to themſelves? The moſt powerful therefore has never any need to be at all apprehenſive of any thing they can do, either to him, or to his Subjects.

5. It is certain, that if the four and twenty Sovereigns of the Union were all equal, or almoſt equal, in Power, as *Henry* the Great propoſed to have them, the Society would be the more ſolid. Now what do we do by equalling the leſs powerful to the moſt powerful as to Suffrages, and the number of the Troops they are to maintain during the Peace; what do we do, I ſay, but bring them as near as poſſible to that Equality of Power to hurt, or to do ill, yet without changing any thing of their Inequality of Power to do good, and without diminiſhing any thing of the Extent of the Sovereignty of the moſt powerful, nor of the Greatneſs of his Riches, nor of the Diſtinction all thoſe Advantages give him above the other Sovereigns. In a word, in giving up the Power of doing ill, he will give up nothing real, nothing valuable, nothing but what Idolaters revere in the Devil; and in Exchange he gets the Eſtabliſhment of a permanent Society, which procures to him and His, invaluable Advantages. Theſe Conſiderations perſuade me that no Sovereign will ſcruple to agree to the following Article.

ARTICLE IX.

THERE ſhall be in the Senate of *Europe* four and twenty Senators, or Deputies of the united Sovereigns, neither more nor leſs; namely, *France*, *Spain*, *England*, *Holland*, *Savoy*, *Portugal*, *Bavaria* and Aſſociates, *Venice*, *Genoa* and Aſſociates, *Florence* and Aſſociates, *Switzerland* and Aſſociates, *Lorrain* and Aſſociates, *Sweden*, *Denmark*, *Poland*, the Pope, *Moſcovy*, *Auſtria*, *Courland* and Aſſociates, *Pruſſia*, *Saxony*, *Palatine* and Aſſociates, *Hanover* and Aſſociates, Eccleſiaſtical-Electors and Aſſociates. Each Deputy ſhall have but one Vote.

EXPLICATION.

THOUGH they turned and winded this Matter all manner of ways, I doubt whether they could ever do without agreeing to this Article, or to ſomething equivalent to it, if they were deſirous to obtain the Eſtabliſhment of the *European* Society. No body loſes by it; every one gains by

by it; or if ſome one may ſeem to loſe a little matter on one ſide, he does on the other gain really a hundred times, a thouſand times more.

Four and twenty is a Number ſufficiently great to make all Cabals againſt the Intereſt of the Union very difficult; and on another ſide, it is not ſo great as to cauſe Confuſion in the Deliberations and Reſolutions of the Senate.

I found that ſeveral Readers were ſhocked in the third rough Draught, becauſe I propoſed to allow Deputies, or Senators, to the *Mahometan* Sovereigns; therefore I now propoſe that They ſhall have only Reſidents at the City of Peace, for the maintaining the Articles of the Treaty of Commerce and Aſſociation which will be made with them for the Continuation of the Peace; and as the Articles will be much the ſame as thoſe which the Chriſtian Sovereigns will agree to among themſelves, the thing, tho' under a different Name, will have the ſame Effect as I propoſed it ſhould. They will not be Members of the Union with the Perogative of Arbitrers. They will be only the Aſſociates of it, with the Advantage of having its full Protection. Both We and They ſhall enjoy all the ſolid part of it, which is a ſufficient and perfect Security; and it is very likely they will deſire nothing ſo much as to be diſpenſed with from cauſing their Reſidents to enter into the Aſſemblies of our Deputies, and will be very far from inſiſting upon this Article.

ARTICLE X.

THE Members and Aſſociates of the Union ſhall contribute to the Expences of the Society, and to the Subſidies for its Security, each in Proportion to his Revenues, and to the Riches of his People, and every one's Quota ſhall at firſt be regulated proviſionally by Plurality, and afterwards by the three fourths of the Voices, when the Commiſſioners of the Union ſhall have taken, in each State, what Inſtructions and Informations ſhall be neceſſary thereupon; and if any one is found to have paid too much proviſionally, it ſhall afterwards be made up to him both in Principal and Intereſt, by thoſe who ſhall have paid too little. The leſs powerful Sovereigns and Aſſociates in forming one Voice, ſhall alternately nominate their Deputy in Proportion to their Quotas.

EXPLICATION.

NOTHING can be more equitable than for every one to contribute in Proportion to his Power, and conſequently in

in Proportion to his Revenues, and for the richeſt to pay moſt, ſince he is the greateſt Gainer by the Perpetuity of the Peace, whether by the Retrenchment of the charge of War, whether by the Augmentation of Commerce, whether by any of the other Advantages of this Perpetuity.

I have made no Difference as to Contribution between the Members and the Aſſociates, that is, between the Chriſtians and *Mahometans*; becauſe the one reaps in Proportion as many Advantages from the Perpetuity of the Peace as the others do.

I ſay, that it is proper for the moſt powerful to pay more Mony than the leaſt powerful, in caſe the Union be obliged to undertake a War. But in another Place I ſhall take Notice, that as to the Number of Soldiers, it is not fit that one Nation ſhould have more than another; ſo that if the King of *France* is obliged to find four and twenty Thouſand *French*, the King of *Portugal* ſhall be obliged to find four and twenty Thouſand *Portugueſe*, the Duke of *Lorrain* four and twenty Thouſand *Lorrainers*, thoſe *Lorrainers* and thoſe *Portugueſe* ſhall not be maintained at the Coſt of *Portugal* only, of *Lorrain* only; they ſhall be maintained at the Coſt of the whole Union, that is to ſay, with the Mony which the moſt powerful Sovereigns ſhall pay in to the Treaſurer of the Union; thus, perhaps, there will be but the eighth part of them maintained at the Charge of *Portugal* or *Lorrain*.

As the Commiſſioners of the Union will not be able, in leſs than five or ſix Years, exactly to inform themſelves of the Revenue and Charges of each Sovereign and his State; and as in the mean time it is neceſſary to regulate ſomething concerning thoſe Quotas immediately; this Regulation muſt indiſpenſably be made now by Plurality of Voices, after each Sovereign ſhall have given in to the Aſſembly a Memorial of his own Revenue, of the Revenue of the State and of its Charges. But this proviſional Regulation ought not in Juſtice to hurt any one; and after the Verification of the Revenues and Charges, it will be juſt to reſtore to him, who ſhall have paid too much, the Advances he may have made for thoſe who ſhall not have paid enough, and that he ſhould not loſe ſo much as the Intereſt of his Mony.

ARTICLE XI.

WHEN the Senate ſhall deliberate upon any thing preſſing and proviſionable for the Security of the Society, either to prevent or quell Sedition, the Queſtion may be decided by plurality of Voices proviſionally, and before it is deliberated they ſhall begin by deciding, by plurality, whether the Matter is proviſionable. EXPLI-

EXPLICATION.

WHAT I call a proviſionable Matter, is any thing that regards the Safety or Advantage of the Society in general, and about which it is neceſſary to take Meaſures ſpeedily, in order to avoid the Damage that might happen by a long Delay. Such are the Meaſures to be taken to prevent or to extinguiſh a Rebellion, a Sedition; to regulate any Article of Commerce, of Contribution; to name Commiſſioners to aſſiſt at the Council of the Regency of a Minor Sovereign, to maintain Order there, and to preſerve the Union of the Members in it, and for other yet more important Caſes.

ARTICLE XII.

NONE of the eleven fundamental Articles above-named ſhall be in any Point altered, without the *unanimous* Conſent of All the Members; but as for the other Articles, the Society may always, by the three fourths of the Voices, add or diminiſh, for the common Good, whatever it ſhall think fit.

EXPLICATION.

THIS twelfth Article is no leſs Fundamental than the other eleven, ſince It alone gives them all their Stability. And theſe twelve Articles being once conſented to and paſſed among all the Sovereigns, it may be ſaid that they are agreed as to all the others, ſince they have ſettled an eaſie and infallible Method to regulate the reſt, either by Plurality proviſionally, or by the three fourths of the Suffrages definitively.

I THINK I have proved that theſe twelve Articles will be Means ſufficient to form the Society, to make it ſufficiently powerful and ſufficiently intereſted to execute the Treaties that the Sovereigns ſhall make and the Regulations they ſhall eſtabliſh by their Deputies, in ſpite of the Reſiſtance, the Tricks, the Force, and the mad Ambition of one or ſeveral Princes, who, to diſturb the Peace, would break the Bonds of the Society.

1. It cannot be feared, that the Society will not be powerful enough to deprive every Sovereign of all Hopes of reſiſting it, ſince by the firſt Article it is to take in all the States of *Europe*.

2. It cannot be feared, either that the Republican States, or Monarchick, will ever be weakned by Diviſions and inteſtine Wars, ſince by the ſecond and third Articles the Union

on has always ſufficient Succours in a readineſs to quell Seditions, and puniſh the Seditious.

3. It cannot be feared that the deſire of enlarging Territories will henceforth cauſe Wars, or that there will be any Sovereign who, coming to inherit new Monarchies, might enſlave the reſt of *Europe*; ſince by the fourth and fifth Articles they all renounce all ſorts of Aggrandizement of Territory, be it under what Name it will, either by Conqueſt, Sale, Donation, Election, Succeſſion, voluntary Submiſſion, or any other Pretence.

4. It cannot be feared, that any Sovereign can ever revive any Pretenſions of what Nature ſoever, ſince by the fourth Article they all renounce them, mutually give them up to each other, and entirely quit Claim thereto reciprocally.

5. It cannot be feared that Affairs of Commerce will ever be Cauſes of War, ſince by the ſeventh Article the Sovereigns agree to regulate all the Articles by Plurality proviſionally, and by the three fourths of the Voices definitively; and as to Diſputes between Traders or other Subjects of different Nations, to have them decided according to thoſe Regulations, by the Judges of the Chambers of Commerce.

6. It cannot be feared, that the Articles of future Treaties will not be executed, ſince on the one ſide, by the fourth Article, the Union will be Guarantee for all thoſe Treaties; and on the other, if any Conteſts ariſe about the Conſtruction of the Terms of thoſe Treaties, the Society, by the eighth Article, remains Arbitrer of them, as well as of all Perſonal Differences; ſo that if it cannot reconcile them by its Mediators, it will certainly conclude them, *without War*, by its Judgments.

7. It cannot be feared that the Obſtinacy of one ſingle Sovereign will be ſufficient to hinder the Formation of the Society, ſince by the ſame eighth Article he would be declared an Enemy to all the reſt, and his State put in the Ban of *Europe*.

8. It cannot be feared that the fundamental Articles will not be always punctually executed, ſince the ſame Advantages and the ſame Motives ſet down in the preceding Diſcourſe, which ſhall have been ſufficient to induce the Sovereigns to agree to them, will always ſubſiſt, and always be ſufficient to induce the future Sovereigns to execute them. But tho' it ſhould happen in time that ſome young, unthinking, ambitious Prince ſhould endeavour to break the Bonds of this Society; yet the Fear of being ſoon infallibly dethroned, would be enough to determine him to execute all theſe Arti-

Articles, and in the eighth Article the Sovereigns agree to make Dethronement the Puniſhment.

9. It cannot be feared, that five of the moſt powerful Sovereigns will ever combine together to break the Society, and to invade the Dominions of the other nineteen; they muſt needs all become mad at the ſame Inſtant, ſhould they renounce for ever the immenſe Advantages of Everlaſting Peace, truſt to each others Promiſe, and deſire no other Security beſides that Promiſe, in an Affair wherein their All is at Stake, and at the time too when none of them makes any Scruple of breaking not only his Promiſe and his Oaths, but alſo the moſt ſolemn Engagements. Now every body muſt ſee that ſuch a Degree of Folly is not to be feared, when it muſt either neceſſarily be fruſtrate, or at the ſame time ſieze five Sovereigns of Manners very different, of Intereſts very oppoſite, and naturally diſtruſtful and jealous of each other.

10. It cannot be feared that the Sovereigns will find any Difficulty in regulating the other Articles important for the Security of the Society, ſince on the one ſide the number of Suffrages will be regulated by the Ninth Article; and on the other, by the Eleventh Article they have agreed to regulate all thoſe Articles proviſionally by the Plurality, and definitively by the three Fourths of the Voices.

11. It cannot be feared, that there will be any inſurmountable Difficulties in regulating the Quotas, ſince they will be all preſently removed, by agreeing to the Tenth Article.

12. Finally, no Sovereign has any Cauſe to fear that he ſhall ever be deprived of any thing he poſſeſſes, ſince by the Twelfth Article all the other Sovereigns renounce the Power of doing it, unleſs he himſelf conſent. Thus he fully enjoys the hope and certainty of enriching himſelf by the Continuation of the Peace without any Mixture of Fear.

Let any body tell me now, after ſuch a Treaty is ſigned, how War can ever henceforth be rekindled in *Europe*. Therefore I may conclude, *that the* European *Society, ſuch a one as I have propoſed the Fundamental Articles of, will procure to all the Chriſtian Sovereigns a* ſufficient Security *for the Perpetuity of the Peace, both without and within their Dominions*; and this is what I propoſed to demonſtrate in this Diſcourſe.

PREAMBLE.

IN an Affair of this importance it is not enough to have pointed out the *Fundamental* Articles; I ought to omit nothing that may render this Eſtabliſhment ſolid, and

and eaſie in the Execution; this is what has obliged me, in the ſecond part of this Diſcourſe, to collect ſeveral *important* Things which I have diſpoſed after the manner of Articles, for the Convenience of thoſe who ſhall be deſirous to examine the Work, and eſpecially to leſſen the Trouble of Miniſters of State who ſhall think fit to make uſe of it as of a Scaffolding for building the Edifice of Everlaſting Peace, that is for forming the real Articles which the Sovereigns may agree upon, in order to accompliſh ſo uſeful and glorious a Deſign.

IMPORTANT ARTICLES.

THE principal Difference between the *Fundamental Articles* and the *Important Articles*, is that in the former nothing can ever be altered but with the *unanimous* Conſent of all the Members, whereas in the Important Articles, there may be at any time an Alteration made by the three Fourths of the Suffrages. I am even perſuaded, that by little and little the Number of the Fundamental Articles may be encreaſed, when they can agree upon any new ones with an unanimous Voice. But at preſent the twelve preceding ones ſeemed to me ſufficient for the Eſtabliſhment of the *European* Society. It only remains to agree, at leaſt proviſionally by plurality of Voices, upon the moſt neceſſary things, and that is the Subject of the following Articles.

ARTICLE I.

THE Senate ſhall remain compoſed of one of the Deputies of each of the voting Sovereigns who ſhall have ſigned the Treaty of the twelve Articles abovementioned, and afterwards their Number ſhall be augmented by one Deputy from each of the other Sovereigns, in order as they ſhall ſign it, and the Aſſembly of the Senate ſhall proviſionally be held at *Utrecht*.

EXPLICATION.

I propoſe *Utrecht* for the City of the Aſſembly; yet I only propoſe it proviſionally, becauſe I am not ſure but that ſome other may be found, which, all things conſidered, may be more convenient to the Union: Tho' indeed I at preſent know of none that has ſo many joint Advantages.

1. A Town of *Holland* ſeems to me preferable, becauſe the *Dutch* are, of all the Nations in the World, thoſe who carry on the greateſt and moſt extenſive Commerce; and beſides, can the City of Peace ever be better placed than in the midſt of the moſt peaceable Nation in the World, and the moſt concerned of all in the Preſervation of the Peace?

2. If

2. If it were in the midſt of a Monarchy, or on the Frontiers of two Monarchies, it would be leſs free, and the Congreſs would have more Reaſon to apprehend being diſſipated in a Moment, thro' the Fear of a turbulent and hot-brain'd Monarch.

3. The Senators ſhould have a laborious Climate; I mean one that will admit of great Labour: For in ſhort, upon Their Application and Aſſiduity to Labour depends the Tranquility of *Europe*, and of the reſt of the World. Now in hot Countries the Mind, as well as the Body, is weakened and exhauſted for great part of the Year, and eſpecially in Day-time.

4. In cold Climates they are ſeldom afflicted with the Plague, which, not without reaſon, makes the principal Inhabitants deſert the Cities; and the Senators ſhould, if poſſible, have no Cauſe given 'em to leave a City from whence thro' them comes the Happineſs of all the other Cities in the World.

5. Of all the Towns of *Holland*, *Utrecht* ſeems the moſt preferable. It is one of thoſe where the Water is beſt, and where the Air is moſt wholſom.

6. *Utrecht* may be conveniently fortified; even new Suburbs might be made to it, wherein might be the Palaces of the Senators, the Magazines and the Citadels.

7. The other Towns of *Holland* which ſurround it, ſerve it as a firſt Rampart, to put the City in all Security againſt Violence and Surprize. It muſt be ſo order'd that Wiſdom, which produces ſo much Good, may be defended againſt the Inſults of Folly, which cauſes ſo much Evil.

8. *Utrecht* is diſtant from *Amſterdam* but ten Leagues, which may be conveniently travelled by divers Canals. Now *Amſterdam* is the greateſt Mart in the Univerſe, and furniſhes in abundance all the Conveniencies of Life, and continual News from all Parts of the World; things very deſirable both to the Senators, and to the Princes whoſe Commerce is extenſive.

9. The Territory of the City of Peace ſhould have ſome Extent, both for the Country Houſes of the Senators, and in order to have a ſufficiently numerous People, out of which to chuſe Subjects fit for the Employments of the Republick of Peace: Now the little Territory of the Republick of *Utreebt* is ſufficient for that, and may thus remain united to its Capital City, to form the Territory of the *European* Republick.

10. The Sovereigns having already choſen that City for the Conferences of Peace, gives a Prepoſſeſſion in favour of my Reaſons; but there is a new and conſiderable Reaſon,

namely, that almoſt all the Sovereigns of *Europe* actually have their Deputies already aſſembled there.

11. There is no Chriſtian Nation wherein is found, either among the Learned, or among the Vulgar, a greater Diſpoſition to tolerate different Religions, than the *Dutch* Nation; and 'tis no ſmall Advantage to the City of Peace, that the People and Magiſtrates are diſpoſed, with Goodneſs and Humanity, to tolerate even thoſe by whom they are look'd upon as Hereticks.

Now it is difficult, nay, perhaps impoſſible, to find ſo many Advantages befitting a petty State, where the General States of *Europe* are to aſſemble; to meet with ſo many things neceſſary to a City which is to be the Center of all Cities, the City of all Nations, and of all Sovereigns.

The other ſix Provinces of *Holland* will not be at all weakened by the Diſunion they will ſuffer of the little Province of *Utrecht*, ſince that Diſunion procures them a Union incomparably more powerful and ſolid; and as to the Subjects of that Province, whether thoſe who exerciſe Employments in it, or thoſe who do not, they will be infinite Gainers in all reſpects (as will afterwards appear) by receiving for the Sovereigns of their Territory the Members of the *European* Senate. Thus it would be the greateſt Advantage that the Inhabitants of that Sovereignty ever can receive, to become Neceſſary to all the other Sovereignties of the Earth, and to be, if I may ſo ſay, the Everlaſting Miniſters of the univerſal Peace.

ARTICLE II.

THE Senate, in order to keep a continual Correſpondence with all the Members of the Society, and to free them from all Cauſe of Fear and Diſtruſt one of the other, ſhall always maintain not only an Ambaſſador with each of them, but alſo a Reſident in each great Province of two Millions of Subjects.

The Reſident ſhall dwell in the Capital Cities of thoſe Provinces, that they may be perpetual and irreproachable Witneſſes to the other Sovereigns, that the Prince in whoſe Dominions they reſide, has no Thoughts of diſturbing the Peace and Tranquility.

Theſe Ambaſſadors and Reſidents ſhall all be choſen from among the natural Inhabitants of the Territory of the City of Peace, or naturalized in that Territory.

Each Sovereign ſhall, as much as lies in his Power, facilitate the Informations of all the things that ſhall be in the In-

Inſtructions of the Reſidents, and ſhall order his Miniſters, and his other Officers, to give them all the Inſight they ſhall deſire for the Publick Security and Tranquility, to the Intent they may every Month give an Account of things to the Senate, and to the Ambaſſador of the Senate.

The Reſidents ſhall be of the number of thoſe Commiſſioners whom the Senate ſhall ſend to verifie the Memorial of the Revenues and Charges of the Sovereign and of his State, in order to give the definitive Regulation of his *Quota*.

EXPLICATION.

1. THE Purpoſe of the preceding Diſcourſe, was to make the Sovereigns wiſh for a *ſufficient Security* to render War impoſſible; the Purpoſe of this, is to point out the Means proper to obtain this Security. Now I think one of the moſt important of theſe Means, is to ſettle Matters ſo, that no Sovereign may ſurprize his Neighbour by a great and ſudden Armament; and what can be imagined more conducing to this Effect, than to place Reſidents upon the Frontiers, and in the very heart of the Dominions of the moſt powerful and moſt formidable Sovereigns, to watch and to give Notice of every thing that has the leaſt Appearance of Liſtings, of providing of Arms and Ammunition? And to be more ſure of having ſuch Notice, nothing can be more convenient, than to commit theſe Employments to Perſons independant of the Sovereign, who have their Relations and Fortunes in the Territory of the Peace, and who are ſo much the more incorruptible, as their Honour and Intereſt conſpire to make them do their Duty with the greateſt Exactneſs; for in ſhort, what would become of all the Subjects of the Territory of the City of Peace, if the Union ſhould come to be broken? What an Alteration would it make in their Condition?

2. Princes, as well as private Men, have long ſince been accuſtomed not to take offence at the Securities required of them, or the Precautions taken to make them keep their Promiſes. And indeed when they promiſe to disband their Troops, to evacuate ſome Places, to demoliſh others, do they not take care to ſend Commiſſioners as well on one ſide as t'other, to ſee the things executed in the Manner promiſed? They long ſince have been uſed not to be affronted at any one's taking Securities; becauſe it is alſo permitted Them to take theirs, as Hoſtages, Stipulations, and that ſuch and ſuch Sovereigns ſhall be Guarantees for the Execution of reciprocal Promiſes, and many ſuch like Precautions, which they

generally take againſt each other in their Treaties: What are theſe but Authentick Teſtimonies that, as well for his own private Intereſt, as for the Intereſt of his People, neither of them thinks himſelf obliged to truſt to a ſimple Promiſe, or to a ſimple Engagement in Writing, when he may add to it yet greater Securities? Beſides, a Prince always has to ſay for himſelf, *I do not diſtruſt your Probity, your Faith, your Exactneſs, in keeping your Word, in executing your Promiſe; but you are not immortal, and you who are alive now, may be dead to Morrow; or at leaſt, before you can have executed what you have promiſed: how do I know what Temper your Succeſſor may be of, and what Counſellors he may have?*

3. What do the Reſidents perform in the Provinces of a Sovereign? Three things very advantageous to him. Firſt, they are perpetual and irreproachable Witneſſes to the united Princes, of his Faith, Good-will, good Conduct for the Preſervation of the Peace. Secondly, they make him ſure that nothing is practiſing againſt him in the Neighbouring States. Thirdly, they encreaſe his Authority over his Subjects, by continually putting them in Mind of the great Strength of the Union always ready to puniſh thoſe who ſhould dare to riſe againſt their Sovereign. Thus theſe Officers ſecure his Sovereignty to him againſt Foreign Invaſions, by taking all ſorts of Precautions againſt War between Sovereigns, and at the ſame time increaſe his Authority over his People, by depriving them of all Hopes of Impunity in caſe of Diſobedience.

4. The Union is uſeleſs, if it be not look'd upon as an unalterable and eternal Eſtabliſhment, and if each in ſigning it does not ſee therein a perfect Security. Now what Security can there be, if a Prince may privately make Levies, and create Officers under other Pretences; and Who ſhall hinder him from ſo doing, if the Union has not Reſidents with him? If he has no ſuch Deſign, Who ſhall give Teſtimony that he remains in Repoſe, and Who ſhall aſſure Him himſelf that none of His Neighbours are contriving to diſturb him and invade his Dominions?

5. If others have Reſidents with You, You have Reſidents with Them: If You look upon theſe Witneſſes of Peace to be neceſſary to reſide with the others to inform you of what paſſes, ought not You, in order to engage them to receive thoſe Witneſſes of Peace for your Security, firſt to receive them your ſelf, to procure to your Neighbours the like Tranquility? Would you have it put out of the Power of others to deceive you, to ſurprize you, to hurt you? They conſent to it, provided you at the ſame time put it out of your own Power to deceive

ceive Them, to ſurprize Them, to hurt Them. As the ſole End, the ſole Intereſt of the Union is to keep every Body in Peace, it cannot be made too durable, nor can too many Precautions be taken againſt the Diſturbers of the Publick Repoſe.

6. If all the Reſidents carefully do their Duty, if each Sovereign freely and willingly puts it in their Power ſo to do; it is evident that this Precaution does, as it were, put a new Fortification, and a very conſiderable one too, round each State, to hinder all manner of Invaſion: And what can be more equitable than for a Sovereign to deſire, or demand of the other Sovereigns, all ſorts of Informations, that he may not at all fear them, and to give them the like Satisfaction in the Perſons of the Officers of the Union, to the Intent that they on their ſide may have no Cauſe to fear Him? Is it not one of the principal Rules of Equity, not to refuſe Others for Their Security, what we ſhould be unwilling that they ſhould refuſe Us for Ours?

7. One of theſe two things muſt be: Either the Prince who refuſes to conſent to the Eſtabliſhment of the Reſidents of the Union *will* put it out of his own Power to overthrow and invade the Neighbouring States, or *will not* deprive himſelf of that Power: If he will not, what can be more odious than a Neighbour that is deſirous to invade all the others? But if he is ſincerely willing to give up that Power, why will he not give an inconteſtible Proof of his good Faith and Sincerity?

8. What do the Princes who make a Peace of *a few Years* do, in diſarming at the ſame time? They for *a few Years*, by that reciprocal Diſarming, give up the Power of making War upon each other. Now here the Point is, to make an *unalterable* Peace; it is therefore abſolutely neceſſary, ſince they deſire to have it *unalterable*, that they all *for ever* give up, each of them, in particular, the Power of ever making War upon each other, unleſs it be when one of them ſhall be declared an Enemy to the *European* Union.

ARTICLE III.

WHEN the Union ſhall employ Troops againſt its Enemy, there ſhall be no greater number of Soldiers of one Nation than of another; but to make the Levying and Maintaining a great number of Troops eaſie to the leſs powerful, the Union ſhall furniſh them with what Money is neceſſary, and that Money ſhall be furniſhed to the Treaſurer of the Union by the moſt powerful Sovereigns, who ſhall pay, in Money, the *Surplus* of their extraordinary *Quota*.

If any Member of the Union ſhould omit to pay timely his extraordinary *Quota* in Troops or Money, the Union ſhall borrow, make Advances, and ſhall cauſe it ſelf to be reimburſed, with the Intereſt of the Loan, by the Sovereign that ſhould be in Default.

In time of Peace, when all the Sovereigns have ſigned, the moſt powerful ſhall keep up no more Troops of his own Nation, than the leſs powerful, which ſhall be limited for the leſs powerful, who has a full Vote, to ſix thouſand Men: But a very powerful Sovereign may, with the Conſent of the Union, borrow and maintain at his own Charge in his Dominions, other Troops for his Garriſons, as likewiſe to prevent Seditions, provided they be all Foreign Soldiers and Officers; and neither thoſe Officers, nor thoſe Soldiers, ſhall, upon pain of being disbanded, purchaſe any Eſtate, or marry any where but in the Country of their Nativity.

EXPLICATION.

TO take away all Fear from the leſs powerful Sovereigns, and all Temptation from the moſt powerful, nothing can be more honeſt than to agree that in the Wars of the Union, the Number of Troops of one Sovereign ſhall be equal to the Number of Troops of every other Sovereign; for Example, when *France* ſhall ſend four and twenty thouſand Men, the Duke of *Savoy* ſhall ſend as many, aſſiſted by the Union's Money, which *France* ſhall have paid; in this manner, the Equality between the Troops of the moſt powerful and the Troops of the leſs powerful will be the Security and produce the reciprocal Confidence of the United Nations.

If the Duke of *Lorrain* maintain ſix thouſand Men in the moſt profound Peace, the King of *France* may maintain thirty thouſand: But among thoſe thirty thouſand, there ſhall be but ſix thouſand *French*, and there may be ſix thouſand *Lorrainers*, ſix thouſand *Piedmontois*, ſix thouſand *Switz*, &c.

ARTICLE IV.

AFTER the united Princes ſhall have declared War againſt any Sovereign, if one of his Provinces revolt in Favour of the Union, that Province ſhall remain divided from its Kingdom, and be governed like a Republick, or given as a Sovereignty to him of the Princes of the Blood whom that Province ſhall have choſen for its Head, or to the General of the Union.

Any Miniſter, General, or other Officer of the Enemy who ſhall retire either to a Member of the Union, or into

into the Territory of the Union, ſhall be there protected by the Senate, which during the War ſhall give him a Revenue equal to that which he poſſeſſed in his own Country, and the Union ſhall not make Peace 'till it be repaid what it has given him, and 'till the Enemy, when reconciled, has given the Union the Value of what the Refugee has in his own Country, that he may chuſe his Habitation elſewhere.

Two hundred of the principal Miniſters or Officers of the Enemy, who ſhall have omitted to retire into Foreign Countries at the beginning of ſuch War, ſhall be delivered to the Union, and puniſhed with Death, or Impriſonment for Life, as Diſturbers of the Peace of the Common Country.

EXPLICATION.

THE great Fear an ambitious Sovereign will be in of being declared an Enemy to the Union, if he ſhould endeavour to ſeparate from it, is a great Security for the Duration of the Union and of the Peace. Thus it is impoſſible to make his Danger too great, that his Fear may be the greater. It muſt therefore be ſo ordered by the Regulations, that on the one ſide his cauſe of Fear may be very conſiderable, and that on the other, he may not flatter himſelf with any Hopes of avoiding the Danger he is afraid of. But then it is not fit to dethrone him entirely; it would be much better to deprive him of part of his Dominions, and to give it to the other Sovereigns, as a living and perpetual Example of what Thoſe are to expect who ſhould do as he did. It is likewiſe very uſeful (if he be declared an Enemy) to make him fear leſt ſome of his Provinces revolt, and leſt ſome Prince, or Grandee of his Kingdom, diſcontented with his Government, aſſiſt in the Inſurrection, and head the Rebells, in hopes of ſo great a Recompence, as that of being made a Sovereign: A Hope ſo much the better grounded, as the Sovereignty will be promiſed by the Union, which will certainly be the Conqueror.

It is a Point of Wiſdom to open a Way to the Men of Worth that are in an Enemies Dominions, to leave them, without risking any part of their Eſtates. It is juſt to puniſh with Death, or perpetual Impriſonment, ſuch Miniſters and Officers who have it in their Power to forbear ſerving againſt their Common Country, that is to ſay, againſt the *European* Society, and who being able to retire, without hazarding their Fortunes, do nevertheleſs joyn in a criminal War againſt the Union, to diſturb the univerſal Peace: They ought therefore to be treated as Enemies and Diſturbers of the Publick Repoſe; thus it is apparent that the Prince who ſhould

conſult whether he ſhould give Cauſe to be declared an Enemy to the Union, would be either diſſuaded from it by his Council, or will fear being abſolutely deſerted by the wiſeſt part of his Miniſters and Officers, and this Fear will be very wholſome for him, and keep him to his true Intereſt againſt his Will.

ARTICLE V.

THE Union ſhall give great and honourable Rewards to him who ſhall diſcover any thing of a Conſpiracy againſt its Intereſts, and that Reward ſhall be ten times greater than any the Diſcoverer could have expected had he remained in the Conſpiracy.

EXPLICATION.

NOTHING is of more Importance than to make Conſpiracies againſt the Union impracticable: And to make them impoſſible to be kept ſecret, is making them impracticable; and is it not making them impoſſible to be kept ſecret, to make it the Intereſt of the Conſpirators not to remain in the Conſpiracy, and to give them great Encouragement to diſcover it?

ARTICLE VI.

IN order to encreaſe the Security of the Union, the Sovereigns, the Princes of the Blood, and fifty of the principal Officers and Miniſters of their State ſhall every Year, on the ſame Day, renew in their Capital City, in the Preſence of the Ambaſſadors and Reſidents of the Union and of all the People, their Oaths, in the Form agreed on, and ſhall ſwear to contribute as much as they are able to maintain the general Union, and punctually to cauſe its Regulations to be executed, in order to make the Peace unalterable.

EXPLICATION.

ANCIENTLY the Sovereigns, in their Treaties of Peace, declared that they renounced doing any thing contrary to the Treaty, and that if they did, they conſented that their Subjects ſhould be abſolved of their Obedience and Fidelity to them.

ARTICLE VII.

AS there are ſeveral Lands in *America* and elſewhere which are inhabited only by Savages, and as the Sovereigns of *Europe* who have Settlements there ought to have

have certain, viſible, and immutable Bounds to their Territory, for avoiding occaſions of War; the Union ſhall appoint Commiſſioners who ſhall go upon the Spot to get Information about thoſe Limits, and on their Report It ſhall give Deciſion by three fourths of their Voices.

EXPLICATION.

THOSE Lands, ſo Remote, Uncultivated, Uninhabited, are but of little Importance; but, if poſſible, nothing ſhould be left to be divided between Sovereigns; all Cauſe of Diviſion ſhould be removed, and it will be ſo much the more eaſie now to ſucceed in that Dividing, as thoſe Countries have hitherto been of but very little Uſe to the Sovereigns, who expend more upon them than they get by them. Nay we may ſay, that tho' there may be ſome little Profit to a few poor Families, who may go and ſettle there; yet it is opening a Door for the common People to Deſert the State by; and 'tis a conſiderable loſs to Trade, when thoſe who ſhould Traffick together are diſperſed and at a diſtance from each other; and Commerce is never greater, more frequent, more rich in a State, than when the People are all gathered together in a ſmall Compaſs. Witneſs the Provinces of *Holland* and *Zeland*. The late Sir *William Petty* has plainly demonſtrated this Opinion, and concludes from it, that the Settlements of *England* in *America*, nay even in *Ireland* and *Scotland* ſhould by rights be quitted, that the People might be in a narrower Compaſs in *England*, and that ſuch a Tranſmigration would very much enrich the Subjects and the Kingdom in general.

PREAMBLE.

THERE is one thing which happens in every Age, and which, unleſs the Union take ſome care about it, may occaſion Diſturbances in ſome States; namely, when Sovereign Families come to be extinct, and when there are no Heirs, either Male or Female, capable to ſucceed. Now by the Treaty of Union this Incapacity of Succeeding might become ſtill more frequent, not only becauſe of the Article which makes two Sovereignties incompatible in the Perſon of one Sovereign, but alſo becauſe of an Article which declares that no Prince of a Sovereign Family, tho' he himſelf be not a Sovereign, ſhall poſſeſs any other Sovereignty beſides That, or one of Thoſe, which are actually in his Family.

ARTICLE VIII.

WHEN in any one of the States of the Union, there ſhall remain no Perſon capable to Succeed the Reigning Sovereign, the

the Union, to prevent Diſturbances in that State, ſhall regulate, and that too, if it can, in concert with the then Sovereign, the Perſon who ſhall Succeed him; but always on Condition he leave no Children: and as he may die ſuddenly, the Union ſhall immediately upon his Death either Nominate the Succeſſor, or turn the Government into a Republick, in caſe the Sovereign is againſt having a Succeſſor.

EXPLICATION.

ANY body may perceive the Importance of this Article for preventing the Miſchiefs of Civil-Wars: perhaps that Sovereign will rather chuſe to ſettle his State into a Republican Government, than to ſee one appointed to Succeed him: and then the Union, by its Commiſſioners, ſhall diſpoſe all things, to the intent that at the Death of the Sovereign, every thing may be executed after the manner the Union ſhall have ordained.

SUCH are the moſt Important Articles with the Sovereigns, that ſhall firſt Sign the Fundamental Articles, may agree to Proviſionally, and till all the others have Signed the Fundamental ones. I hope that neither in the one, nor in the other, there will be found any thing but what is Equitable, and very Conformable to the common Intereſt of the Society: and after all, What is required of the Sovereign to whom this Treaty of Union is propoſed? That he ſuffer the others peaceably to enjoy all the Territory they actually poſſeſs; that he renounce all Pretenſions to that Territory, and that he give *ſufficient Securities* for that Renunciation; on Condition, that the other Sovereigns ſuffer Him and His for ever peaceably to enjoy all the Territory he is actual Poſſeſſor of, that they all for ever renounce all their Pretenſions to his Territory, and give him *ſufficient Securities* for their Renunciation.

What is required of him? That for the Safety of his Neighbours he disband all his Troops, except the Quota he is to maintain; that he renounce the fatal Power of taking up Arms againſt any one, unleſs againſt one who is declared an Enemy of the Union; and that once for all, he frees his Neighbours from the fear of being Invaded, either by Him or his Succeſſors, in permitting the Reſidents of the Union to render to the others, Teſtimony of his good Conduct for the Maintenance of the Peace: on Condition, that for His Security, his Neighbours at the ſame time Diſband

band Their Troops, except the Quota they are to maintain; that they renounce the Power of ever taking up Arms againſt him, unleſs ceaſing to maintain the Union, he is declared the Enemy of it; and that they for ever free Him and his Poſterity from the like Fears, and the like Uneaſineſſes, they on their ſide permitting thoſe Reſidents to render him a ſure Teſtimony of their good Conduct for the Preſervation of the Publick Repoſe.

What is required of him? That, in the Impoſſibility all Sovereigns are in, as well as other Men that have any Diſpute or any thing to divide, ever to do themſelves a piece of Juſtice that may equally content them all, He agree to make his Equals the Arbiters of the Diſputes he may chance to have with his Neighbours; on Condition he at the ſame time ſhall be Arbiter of their Differences.

What is required of him? That his Subjects in their demands upon the Subjects of other Sovereigns, be judged by knowing and equitable Judges, choſen by the Union; on condition the Subjects of other Sovereigns in their Demands upon His, be judged by the ſame Judges.

What is required of him? A Quota of Mony proportionable to his Riches, to maintain the Union, and thus to ſecure all the other Sovereigns againſt His Inconſtancy, and that of his Succeſſors; on Condition that they pay a Quota proportionably, to ſecure Him and his Poſterity, againſt the Inconſtancy of the other Sovereigns, as well preſent as future.

Finally; What is required of him? That, for the Tranquility of the others and their Succeſſors, he impoſe upon himſelf the ſame Laws, the ſame Conditions that he deſires they ſhould Impoſe upon themſelves, to procure to himſelf and his Deſcendants a perfect Tranquility.

Are not all theſe Demands founded upon this firſt Law of Natural Equity, from which all other juſt Laws take their Riſe; namely, *Do not unto others that which you would not that they ſhould do unto you, if you were in their place, and they in yours.* Are all theſe Articles, properly ſpeaking, any thing more than Explications than evident Conſequences of that firſt Law? Who is there that does not know that only thoſe Treaties which are equitable, are durable? Who is there that does not know that thoſe who govern States, whether Republicks or Monarchies, are very much concerned, for their own Security, for their own Happineſs, always to follow Equity?

To end this Diſcourſe, therefore, I think I have no more to do than to ſum up the Propoſitions I flatter my ſelf to have demonſtrated in the preceding Diſcourſe and in this.

IF the European Society *can procure, for all the Chriſtian Princes, a* ſufficient Security *for the Perpetuity of the Peace, both without and within their Dominions, there is none of them that will not find it more Advantageous to ſign the Articles propoſed for the Eſtabliſhment of that Society, than not to ſign them.*

Now the European Society, *ſuch as it may be formed by the twelve fundamental Articles juſt now propoſed, can procure, for all the Chriſtian Princes, a* ſufficient Security *for the Perpetuity of the Peace both without and within their Dominions.*

Therefore there is none of them but what will find it much more advantageous to ſign thoſe twelve Articles for the Eſtabliſhment of that Society, than not to ſign them. And this is what I propoſed to ſhew in this Work.

Beſides, it ſeems to me, that if it is ſo advantageous to all the Chriſtian Princes to ſign theſe twelve fundamental Articles, or others equivalent, for the Eſtabliſhment of the *European Society*, it is almoſt impoſſible but that if this Project comes to the Knowledge of the four and twenty principal Sovereigns of *Europe*, there will be at leaſt two who will ſign it; that it is almoſt impoſſible but in time thoſe two will perſuade a third; that it is almoſt impoſſible but in time thoſe three will perſuade a fourth; that thus it is almoſt impoſſible but this Society muſt in time encreaſe, and at laſt, in leſs than half an Age, arrive at its whole Accretion, and its entire Settlement.

But it is time to ſhew, that whatever Poſture the Affairs of *Europe* be in, the Propoſal of this Project muſt pleaſe all the Sovereigns; and this is what I ſhall in a few Pages prove in the following Diſcourſe.

FIFTH

FIFTH DISCOURSE.

PROPOSITION to be demonſtrated.

If this Project is propoſed to Sovereigns during a War, it will facilitate a Peace.

If it is propoſed to them in the Conferences of Peace, it will facilitate the Concluſion of it.

If it is propoſed to them after the Peace is concluded, it will procure the Duration of it.

I Think I take in all the Times that this Project can be propoſed to them in, and if at all times it would be very advantageous to them, it is impoſſible to preſent it to them out of time.

As for the Proof of the firſt part of the Propoſition, it may be eaſily fetched from what has been demonſtrated in the third Diſcourſe. It is certain, that at the beginning of moſt Wars, there is a Sovereign or a League which demands and attacks, and a Sovereign or a League that is contented with ſtanding upon the Defenſive, and demands nothing; but ſo ſoon as ever the War is begun, that very Perſon, who at firſt demanded nothing, begins to become a Demandant himſelf, becauſe of the Charges he has been at, and the Damages he has ſuſtained. Thus each demands either his whole Pretenſion, or part of his Pretenſion, when it is impoſſible for him to have the whole, or finally an *Equivalent* to his Pretenſions.

The Pretenſion, however conſiderable it may be in it ſelf, diminiſhes in its Value in Proportion to what it muſt coſt to obtain it, and in Proportion to the Uncertainty of the Succeſs of the War; and there is one ſort of Pretenſion, which, becauſe of theſe two Inconveniencies, however great it may be, can be reckoned at little or nothing.

Thus it may be ſaid, that *Equivalents*, with thoſe who are at War, change their Value according to the preſent Succeſs and Conjunctures that are not far off, and which, in all Appearance, muſt ſoon happen. And I know that the beſt Genius's, with very equitable Intentions, however well informed they may be of the State of Affairs of each of the Pretenders, have much ado to make a juſt Judgment of the Value of thoſe Pretenſions, and conſequently of the Value of

of an *Equivalent* which the one is to offer, and the other to accept.

The Chances of War are much the ſame as the Chances of Play. When a Match at Tick-tack is begun between two Gameſters of almoſt equal Skill, it is hard exactly to determine the Value or Chance of him who has, for Example, ſeven Holes againſt five, eleven againſt two; but yet we may come pretty near it; and however the Game ſtands, he who has the Advantage may be offered an Equivalent to that Advantage, and if he is offered ever ſo little more, he ſhould accept it, if he underſtands his true Intereſt.

But happily for the Succeſs of this Project, there is no need that thoſe to whom I offer *Equivalents* for their Pretenſions, ſhould ſo perciſely know the Value of thoſe Pretenſions; it is enough if they ſee that the Advantages they would reap from Peace, provided a way was found to make it everlaſting, and things always remained in their preſent Condition; I ſay, it is enough they ſee that thoſe Advantages are much greater than their very Pretenſions, that ſo, in ſigning a Treaty of Everlaſting Peace, 'tis the ſame as if their Enemy promiſed them to pay them a conſiderable Sum every Year, not only for the firſt ten Years of the Peace, but for all the Years that the Peace ſhall endure; and this Payment is ſo much the more ſecure, as each ſhall pay himſelf, as well out of the Diminution of Expence, and the Continuation of Commerce, as from the other inexhauſtible Sources which I mentioned in the third Diſcourſe; and what matters it to you, whether that Payment comes out of a Sum that your Enemy ſhall ſend you, or if it comes out of a Treaſure that he diſcovers in your Dominions, and which you can get no good from without his Permiſſion and Conſent, that is, unleſs he conſent to the Perpetuity of the Peace and to the Means to form an Eſtabliſhment, for that purpoſe, which may endure for ever.

If there be ſome of the Allies who entered into the War only to get Securities for the Duration of their Government and Commerce, thoſe will find in this Project Securities which they do in vain ſeek for in War: Thus they will not only be induced to make Peace themſelves, provided it be upon condition that it ſhall be *unalterable*; but they will alſo very much contribute to induce their Ally to make it too, by declaring to him that they will have no more War, and by giving him to underſtand that he ought not to diſpute as to more or leſs Conditions, provided he may be let into the inexhauſtible Treaſure of everlaſting Peace.

As

As for the ſecond part of the Propoſition, the Proof of it is ſtill more evident, ſince the Parties ſeldom enter into a Conference of Peace, but when they on both ſides begin to be weary of War, and to be more near agreeing as to the Conditions of Peace. Now is it not certain that when the Pretenſions on each ſide are diminiſhed, the *Equivalents* that may be propoſed to them, and which they ſhould accept, may be of leſs Value than in the Middle, or at the Beginning of the War? And yet thoſe *Equivalents*, which the Project propoſes to them, will be equally conſiderable: They will be the fifteen Advantages which form the whole third Diſcourſe. Now if there ever were any Equivalents infinitely more advantageous than the Pretenſions themſelves, theſe are certainly ſo; thus we may ſay, that ſo ſoon as ever they ſhall be propoſed in the Conferences, they will no longer diſpute on any ſide about more or leſs, or at leaſt they will diſpute with much leſs Warmth, and each on his ſide will do all he can to contribute to a ſpeedy and uſeful Concluſion.

As for the third part of the Propoſition; it may at firſt ſeem that the fitteſt time to get the Project approved of, would be in a profound Peace; but I am of a quite different Opinion: The Miſchiefs of War are never ſo well perceived, as when it has already laſted ſeveral Years; and the Advantages of Peace are never ſo well perceived, as when it has been long abſent. Beſides, moſt Sovereigns have had time to form Deſires of nouriſhing Pretenſions upon each other; ſome of them remember to have given up againſt their Will at the laſt Peace, or rather at the laſt Truce, Places which they think of right belong to them. Thus it may be ſaid that this Appearance of Peace is indeed nothing but a Preparation for War, and it is not the leſs real, nay it is the more to be fear'd, for being private and conceal'd.

However, I believe that notwithſtanding this Diſpoſition of the Sovereigns to take up Arms, if this Project comes to their Knowledge, they will begin to look upon the Peace as more important, the Charges of War as a certain Evil, the Succeſs as more doubtful; they will begin to compute what they may really get by the Unalterableneſs of the Peace, and if they once come to a Computation, the Advantages are ſo evident, they are in ſo great Number, they are ſo conſiderable, they are ſo viſible to the Eyes, that it is not poſſible but that they ſhould, either of themſelves, or at the Solicitation of their Miniſters, of their Allies, of their Subjects, reſolve to embrace the Syſtem of Everlaſting Peace as an *advantageous Equivalent* for all their Pretenſions.

Thus

Thus I think the Reader is able to ſee that *if this Project is propoſed to Sovereigns during a War, it will facilitate a Peace.*

That *if it is propoſed to them in the Conferences of Peace, it will facilitate the Concluſion of it.*

And that *if it is propoſed to them after the Peace is concluded, it will procure the Duration of it* ; and this is what I undertook to demonſtrate.

SIXTH DISCOURSE.

CONTAINING,

USEFUL ARTICLES,

AND

PARTICULAR MOTIVES.

SEVERAL Perſons, upon reading this Work, have taken a diſtruſt that what ſeemed poſſible and practicable ſo long as the Project remain'd in the Speculative, would be nevertheleſs impoſſible when it ſhould be tried to be put in practice. I own it is not eaſie to anſwer this Scruple but by the Practice it ſelf: But with ſuch a Diffidence, Men would never begin to endeavour at any Eſtabliſhment ; and yet the moſt ſcrupulous Wiſdom adviſes and orders to endeavour at them, eſpecially at thoſe which ſeem very important, and in which no inſurmountable Obſtacle is apparent : It was therefore neceſſary to ſhew that this Project will, in the Circumſtances of the Execution, meet with no Difficulty, but what may be eaſily ſurmounted ; ſince the Regulations I am going to propoſe, are ſufficient for the entire Eſtabliſhment of the Society, and ſince it is eaſie to agree to Them, or to ſome others equivalent to Them ; and ſince not one of thoſe Regulations are impracticable : Now this is the Subject of the *uſeful Articles* which you are going to read.

I well know that thoſe who are wiſer than I am, will be able to find out more convenient ones, and more to the purpoſe ; but in the mean time, the Reader, who is impatient to ſee, at leaſt in general, the Form that may be given to ſo noble an Eſtabliſhment, will not be diſpleaſed with this Sketch : I had collected a much greater number of *Ideas* and Articles, but at preſent I thought it would be more proper

proper to propoſe only theſe: neither would I here give the Reaſons that induced me to propoſe each of theſe Regulations in particular, becauſe I would have them look'd upon only as an Eſſay, which I intend to put into a better Condition when I have more leiſure, and then each ſhall be accompanied with its Motives.

ARTICLES propoſed, as uſeful for the Formation and Preſervation of the Union.

ARTICLE I.

Security and Privileges of the City of Peace.

THE City of Peace ſhall be fortified with a new Incloſure, and Citadels ſhall be placed round that new Incloſure; there ſhall be in it Magazines of Proviſions, of Ammunitions, and of all things neceſſary for the ſuſtaining a long Siege or Blockade.

The Ambaſſadors of the Union, the Reſidents, the five Deputies of each Frontier Chamber, and eſpecially the Officers of the Garriſons of the City, ſhall be all as near as poſſible Natives, or Inhabitants, and married in the City and Territory of the Union; the Soldiers of the Garriſon ſhall be raiſed in the ſame Territory if poſſible, and the reſt ſhall not be raiſed any where but among the Subjects of the Common-wealths of *Europe*.

The Union ſhall make up to the United Provinces what Subſidies they are us'd to raiſe upon the Lordſhip of *Utrecht*, by leſſening their *Quota*: Thus inſtead of a greater Sum, they ſhall pay but nine hundred thouſand Livres for their *Quota*; and to recompence the private Perſons of the ſame Lordſhip for the Prejudice it might be to them to have their Sovereignty incorporated with the Union, the Inhabitants ſhall not only be preſerved in their Laws, Eſtates, Religion and Employments; but the Union ſhall provide them with Poſts more profitable and more honourable, as Ambaſſadors, Reſidents, Judges of the Chambers, Conſuls, Treaſurers, and the like; and as to the ordinary Subſidies of the Subjects, they ſhall be leſſened by the one half.

ARTICLE II.

Generaliſſimo of the Union.

IF the Union enters upon a War againſt any Sovereign, it ſhall name a *Generaliſſimo* by Plurality of Voices; he ſhall not be of a Sovereign Family, he ſhall be revocable at pleaſure,

he ſhall have command over the Generals of the Troops of the united Sovereigns, he ſhall diſpoſe of no Employments among thoſe Troops; but if any of thoſe Generals or other General Officers ſhould diſobey or fail in their Duty, he may have them before a Council of War.

The Union, in caſe there be no Prince of the Sovereign Family which it ſhall have conquered, may reſolve to give all, or part of what it may Conquer from the Enemy, to be erected into a Principality for the General.

EXPLICATION.

IT has been objected to me, that I give but very little Authority to the Generaliſſimo: I know indeed, that the leſs Authority a General has, the leſs formidable is his Army; I well know that the more diverſity of Nations there is in it, the leſs Union there is, and conſequently the leſs Strength; but the United Princes may eaſily remedy this Inconvenience, by ſending each of them a third part more of Troops, and by making their Army three times ſtronger than that of the Enemy to the Union; they may do it, without ſtraining themſelves ſo much as the Enemy, and they have three conſiderable Motives to do it. Firſt, the greater Efforts they make to have a very numerous Army at the beginning, the ſhorter time the War will continue; thus the Expence will in effect be leſs: The ſecond, and which is the moſt important, is, that the ſtronger the Army of the Union is, the leſs doubtful will be the Succeſs of the War. The third is, that the Succeſs being certain, every one will be ſure of being repaid his Advances at the Expence of the Conquer'd Enemy: Thus then a little more Mony will remedy the Inconvenience ariſing from the limited Authority of the Generaliſſimo; whereas the wiſeſt Heads can find no way to remedy the great and pernicious Inconveniences, which might ariſe, to the Prejudice of the United Members from the too great Authority he would have, were he allowed the naming of Officers.

ARTICLE III.

Qualifications of the Deputies, Vice-Deputies and Agents.

EVERY Prince, every State, ſhall keep in the City of Peace, for the whole Year round, one Deputy, of at leaſt Forty Years old, and two Vice-Deputies of the ſame Age, to fill up his Place in caſe of Abſence, or Sickneſs; and two Agents to fill up the Place of the Vice-Deputies.

The

The Vice-Deputies ſhall in the Credentials of their Sovereign, be diſtinguiſh'd by firſt and ſecond, to the intent that the firſt, in caſe of Sickneſs or Abſence, may with full right ſucceed to the Rank and Office of the abſent Deputy; the Agents ſhall alſo be diſtinguiſhed by firſt and ſecond, to the intent that the firſt Agent may perform the Function of the abſent Vice-Deputy.

The Princes who ſhall name them, ſhall in their Choice have regard to Superiority of Parts, Capacity in Buſineſs, Knowledge of the Civil Law and of divers ſorts of Commerce; likewiſe to their Character, whether they be moderate, patient, zealous for the Preſervation of the Peace; as alſo to the Knowledge of the Language of the Senate, and eſpecially to Induſtrioufneſs and Application to Labour: Each Prince may revoke them, and ſubſtitute others, when he ſhall think fit, and ſhall not be allowed to employ the ſame Deputy for above four Years together, in that Function.

If a Senator is found to be of a Temper oppoſite to Peace and Tranquility, the Senate may by the two thirds of the Voices declare him incapable to exerciſe the Functions of it, and order that the Prince be deſired by the Union to nominate another, and from that very Day he ſhall be excluded the Aſſemblies.

None ſhall be afterwards appointed Deputy, but what has been two Years a Vice-Deputy; none ſhall be Vice-Deput that has not been two Years Agent in the City of Peace.

None ſhall be afterwards nominated Judge of a Frontier Chamber, that has not dwelt two Years together in the City of Peace.

ARTICLE IV.

Functions of the Deputies.

EACH of the Senators or Deputies ſhall, in his turn, Week by Week, be Prince of the Senate, Governor or Director of the City of Peace; he ſhall preſide in the general Aſſemblies, and in the Council of five.

There ſhall be a Council of five Senators appointed to govern the daily Affairs that are preſſing and important, and which regard the Safety of the Senators, and of the City of Peace; as the Watch-word, Orders to ſeize any one, *&c.* The Prince may not give the Word but in their Preſence, nor give any Order without their Conſent in Writing, by Plurality of Voices.

The Deputy of the Sovereign who ſhall firſt have ſigned the Treaty, ſhall firſt be Prince of the Senate, and each of

the other Senators ſhall place themſelves in the Chamber of the Senate, according to the Order they ſhall have ſubſcrib'd in; ſo that he who ſhall be found upon the Seat at the Right ſide of the Chair of the Prince, ſhall ſucceed him in that Dignity, the very Day the Adminiſtration of the firſt ſhall end; and he who has finiſhed his Adminiſtration ſhall place himſelf on the Left Hand of his Succeſſor, and ſhall not be Preſident again, till all the Members of the Aſſembly have preſided in their turn.

When any Sovereign ſhall enter into the Union after it is already formed, his Deputy ſhall not be capacitated to be Prince of the Senate, till two Months after he has taken his Place; to the intent that he may have time in the Aſſembly to learn the Cuſtoms of that Company, and the Duties of that Employment.

The Sitting of Senators in private Committees, and in publick Aſſemblies, ſhall be regulated every Week by their Sitting in the Senate; ſo that they who are neareſt the Princeſhip ſhall have the Precedence in the Weeks; but in private Viſits every one ſhall be *incognito*, and without any Diſtinction.

ARTICLE V.

Form of Deliberations, &c.

THE Aſſembly ſhall deliberate upon no Memorial, till it be ſigned by three Senators, who ſhall certifie that it is neceſſary to examine it; all Deliberations ſhall be made upon Printed Memorials; they ſhall be diſtributed by the Secretary, to all the Members: Eight Days after that Diſtribution the Aſſembly ſhall deliberate by Plurality of Voices, whether it is neceſſary to have that Memorial examined; if it be reſolved to have it examined, the Secretary ſhall give it to the Chairman of the Committee, whoſe buſineſs it is to take Cogniſance of the ſubject Matter of the Memorial.

When a Memorial is ſent to a Committee, it ſhall be examined by them according to the Forms that ſhall be agreed upon; the Chairman of the Committee ſhall give to the Secretary of the Senate the Opinion of the Committee, with the Motives; the Secretary ſhall get Copies of them Printed, which he ſhall diſtribute to all the Senators; the Day ſhall be appointed by the Prince of the Senate by Plurality of Voices, that every one may then give his Vote according to the Importance of the Affair; when the Day appointed is come, each Senator ſhall write down and ſign his Opinion at the bottom of the Memorial, and ſhall return it to the Secretary.

On

On the Day of the Aſſembly the Secretary ſhall read all the Opinions of one ſide one after the other in courſe, and then count them; and the Prince ſhall with an audible Voice declare which ſide carries it, and the Judgment ſhall be written at the bottom of the Memorial, which ſhall be carried into the Secretary's Office by the Chairman of that Committee which had examined the Affair; the Judgment or Deciſion of the Aſſembly ſhall be ſigned by the Prince, by the Members of the Council of five, and by the Secretary; all theſe Deciſions ſhall be recorded in divers Regiſters, whereof a Printed Copy ſhall be every Year given to each Senator: It ſhall be as much as poſſible avoided condemning a Sovereign by Name in any Sentence; but the Senate ſhall make a general Law upon that particular Fact, which is the ſame thing as deciding it, without naming any one, and the Sovereign after that Law ſhall of himſelf execute what is ordered in it.

In the firſt Committee ſhall be examined the Letters of the Ambaſſadors and Reſidents of the Union, and Anſwers given to them, after they ſhall have been approved by the general Aſſembly; that Committee ſhall alſo chuſe Perſons to fill up the Places of Ambaſſadors, Reſidents, Officers of the Frontier Chambers, Councils of the Senate, *&c.*

In the ſecond ſhall be choſen the Officers of the Garriſon, and the Affairs of War, if there be any, examined; the Choice of a General ſhall be there made, and whatever elſe concerns the Troops of the Frontiers of *Europe*.

In the third ſhall be examined the Affairs of the Revenue, the Accompts, the Choice of the Officers of the Revenue.

In the fourth ſhall be examined the Memorials about ſuch Regulations, as may concern either the Union in general, or the City of Peace and its Territory, or the Laws of the Frontier Chambers.

Beſides theſe four ſtanding Committees, there ſhall be other Temporary Committees, formed expreſly to reconcile Differences between Sovereign and Sovereign: Theſe Committees of Reconciliation ſhall conſiſt of Members nominated by Letters Patents of the Senate by Plurality of Voices; the Commiſſioners of this Committee ſhall be thanked, and ſhall have a Gratification, in caſe they reconcile the Parties, and get them to ſign an Agreement; and if they cannot ſucceed, the Chairman ſhall give the Opinion of the Committee to the General Society, who ſhall diſtribute Printed Copies thereof to all the Senators; that, being well informed, they may give their Opinion in Writing in full Aſſembly to the Secretary; and if after the Law is made by the Senate for all ſuch

Caſes, the Sovereign who is in the wrong ſhould not pay Obedience to the Law, then the Prince of the Senate ſhall pronounce a Judgment nominally againſt the Sovereign, whoſe Demand or Vindication did not ſeem juſt, to the other Sovereigns.

This arbitral Judgment ſhall be pronounced by Plurality of Voices proviſionally, and ſix Months afterwards by a ſecond Judgment by the three fourths of the Voices definitively; thus there ſhall be always two Judgments upon every Diſpute.

A time ſhall be appointed for the Votes to be given, and ſuch a time as that the Plenipotentiaries of the moſt diſtant States, may have leiſure to get the Inſtructions of their Sovereigns. If one or more have not received an Anſwer within the time appointed, the Senate may, by Plurality of Voices, give a further time; and when that is up it ſhall proceed to Judgment, whether the Plenipotentiary that refuſes to give his Vote be abſent or no.

All theſe Committees ſhall aſſemble within the Bounds of the Prince's Palace, unleſs the Health of the Chairman of a Committee requires to have it aſſembled at his Houſe.

The Senate, by the three fourths of the Voices, ſhall name the Chairmen and Members of the Commitees, which ſhall conſiſt of five Deputies and of five Vice-Deputies; the Clerk of the Committee ſhall be a Subject of the Union, either by Birth or by Naturalization.

The Deputies of the Republicks of *Holland*, *Venice*, the *Switz*, and *Genoeze*, ſhall be always of the Council of five; when a Deputy of one of thoſe Republicks ſhall be Prince of the Senate, the Place that ſhall be vacant in that Council ſhall be fill'd by turns, beginning with that Deputy who ſhall have laſt preſided in the general Aſſembly.

The Language of the Senate, in which the Deliberations ſhall be made, and the Memorials given in, ſhall be the Language the moſt in uſe, and the moſt common in *Europe*, of all the living Languages.

Every Deputy ſhall be allowed the free Exerciſe of his Religion, a Chappel in his Palace, with what Miniſters are neceſſary; thoſe who are of his Religion, whether they be of his Nation, or of any other, ſhall have the ſame Liberty there: The Senate ſhall make very expreſs Prohibition, upon pain of Impriſonment and greater Puniſhments according to the Faults, againſt any Diſturbance in them, or to go to turn any thing publickly into Ridicule, and to write or print any thing againſt any particular Religion in the Territory of the Republick; and it ſhall be eſteemed a publick Abuſe if any particular Perſon of a contrary Religion be reflected upon.

The Union ſhall endeavour to agree upon the Name and Weight of Coins, upon one and the ſame Weights and Meaſures, and upon one and the ſame Aſtronomical Calculation throughout all *Europe*; and eſpecially upon the Beginning of the Year.

EXPLICATION.

THIS Convention would be of very great uſe towards making Commerce more eaſie, and every thing that makes it more eaſie augments it, and every thing that augments it enriches the People and the Sovereign.

We might even hope to find a fixed and immutable Meaſure throughout the Univerſe by means of the Pendulum of Seconds, which contains a little above three Feet *French*; and if we had once found the Meaſure of the immutable Foot, it would be eaſie by the ſame means to ſettle an immutable Pound, by determining that a Pound is the even part of a Cube Foot of Water diſtilled.

ARTICLE VI.

Security of the Frontiers of Europe.

FOR the Security of the Union, the *Czar* ſhall ſtrongly fortifie all his Frontiers that look towards Princes who ſhall not be Members of the Union; he ſhall there keep conſiderable Garriſons, conſiſting of the Troops of the united Sovereigns.

If one of his Neighbours arm more than ordinary, the Union ſhall arm on that ſide in Proportion, and ſhall have a third more Troops than that Neighbour; and leſt the Troops of neighbouring Sovereigns might be better inured to War than the Troops of the Union, ſhould thoſe Princes make War with each other, the Union ſhall offer them its Mediation, its Arbitration and Guaranty, as well for preſent Conteſts as for future ones, and ſhall declare for him who accepts of their Offer.

It ſhall be agreed, that, in order to have Notice of all new Armaments, there ſhall be Ambaſſadors and Reſidents reciprocally with each other.

The Emperor of the *Turks* ſhall obſerve the ſame Conduct as to his Frontiers joining to thoſe Princes that ſhall not be Members of the Union.

ARTICLE VII.

Quotas or ordinary Revenues of the Union.

THE Revenue of the Union ſhall conſiſt in the ordinary Quota each Sovereign ſhall pay; the Quota ſhall be re

gulated provisionally, equivalent to three hundred thousand Livres yearly, (present Mony of *France*, or the Value in other Mony,) which shall be paid by the less powerful Sovereign, who shall have but one Vote; the others shall pay in Proportion to their Revenues; that Quota shall afterwards be lessened according to the Diminution of the Exigencies of the Union, which would then have finished its Buildings, Fortifications, Magazines, *&c.* The Quota for the Frontiers of *Europe*, and the Quota in case of War, shall be regulated, in Proportion, by the Senate.

The Quota shall be paid by the General Treasurer of that State, in equal Parts, the first of each Month, upon the Procuration of the General Treasurer of the Union, and upon the Acquittance of his Clerk, who shall reside in the Capital City of that State; that Clerk shall every Month pay the Salaries of the Ambassador, of the Residents and of the Judges of the Frontier Chambers, in that State.

The Union shall every Month reckon up the Interest of the Sum, which shall not have been paid regularly to the Clerk of the Treasurer, in order to repay those who shall have advanced them.

EXPLICATION.

I here, for the Reader's Convenience, set down an imaginary Computation, to give him a sort of an Idea of that Repartition. *Viz.*

Members of the Union.

1. *France*, three Millions of Livres.
2. *Spain*, three Millions.
3. *England*, fifteen hundred thousand Livres.
4. *Holland*, exclusive of the Lordship of *Utrecht*, nine hundred thousand Livres.
5. *Bavaria* and Associates, three hundred thousand *Livres*.
6. *Portugal*, five hundred thousand Livres.
7. *Switzerland* and Associates, three hundred thousand Livres.
8. *Florence* and Associates, three hundred thousand Livres.
9. *Genoa* and Associates, three hundred thousand Livres.
10. The Ecclesiastick State, three hundred thousand Livres.
11. *Venice*, five hundred thousand Livres.
12. *Savoy*, five hundred thousand Livres.
13. *Lorrain*, three hundred thousand Livres.
14. *Denmark*, five hundred thousand Livres.
15. The Ecclesiastical Electors and Associates, three hundred thousand Livres.
16. The Elector *Palatine* and Associates, three hundred thousand Livres,

17. *Ha*

17. *Hanover* and Aſſociates, three hundred thouſand Livres.
18. *Saxony* and Aſſociates, three hundred thouſand Livres.
19. *Brandenburg*, five hundred and fifty thouſand Livres.
20. *Courland*, three hundred thouſand Livres.
21. *Auſtria*, thirteen hundred and fifty thouſand Livres.
22. *Poland*, a Million.
23. *Muſcovy*, three Millions five hundred thouſand Livres.
24. *Sweden*, ſeven hundred thouſand Livres.

Aſſociates of the Union.

Turky, four Millions five hundred thouſand Livres.
Morocco, ſix hundred thouſand Livres.
Algier and Aſſociates, three hundred thouſand Livres.

The total of all the ſeven and twenty Quotas, amounts to twenty five Millions; now to make a near Conjecture of the Expence of the Union while it is but yet growing, it will be proper to compute it as if all the Sovereigns of *Europe* were already entered into it; it will afterwards be eaſie to deduct the Expences it will no longer need to be at, when it is entirely finiſhed.

I ſuppoſe twenty frontier Chambers, ten Little and ten Great, the little ones with ten Judges, the great ones with twenty, and with lower Officers who will coſt a third; now each Judge has ten thouſand Livres Salary; every little Chamber, with under-Officers, will coſt one hundred and fifty thouſand Livres, and all the ten little ones one Million five hundred thouſand Livres; each of the great ones will coſt three hundred thouſand Livres, and all the ten three Millions; ſo that in all they will coſt four Millions five hundred thouſand Livres.

Seven and twenty Deputies at ſeventy two thouſand Livres a Year each; one Million nine hundred and forty thouſand Livres.

Fifty four Vice-Deputies at ſix and thirty thouſand Livres a Year each; one Million nine hundred and forty four thouſand Livres.

Fifty four Agents at eighteen thouſand Livres a Year each; nine hundred and ſeventy two thouſand Livres.

Forty Reſidents at eighteen thouſand Livres a Year each; ſeven hundred and twenty thouſand Livres.

Salaries of the Magiſtrates of the City and Territory of the Union, three hundred thouſand Livres.

Seven and twenty Receivers in the Dominions of the Sovereigns, at ten thouſand Livres a Year each; two hundred and ſeventy thouſand Livres.

Officers of the Revenues in the Territory of the Union, three hundred thouſand Livres.

Charges of Exchange, five hundred thouſand Livres.

Garriſons of the Citadel, including Ammunitions for ten thouſand Men, the fifth part Dragoons, three Millions.

The Annual Loſs in the Magazines in a Year and a half, both for the City and Citadel, about a Million.

Reparations of the Fortifications and Buildings, *&c.* one Year with another, five hundred thouſand Livres.

Penſions to Men skill'd in the Arts and Sciences, Colleges, Hoſpitals; under-Officers, Gratifications, Loſſes by bad Money; eight hundred and ſeventy eight thouſand Livres.

Theſe Expences amount to eighteen Millions five hundred thouſand Livres; thus there would remain ſix Millions five hundred thouſand Livres, to make the Citadels, the Fortifications of the new Incloſure, the ſeven and twenty Palaces of the ſeven and twenty Deputies, the Palace of the Prince of the Senate, the Magazines, the ſeveral Hoſpitals of the Poor, for Children, for diſabled Soldiers, for the Sick, whether of common Diſeaſes, or contagious Diſeaſes, *&c.* But theſe things, and many others of the like Nature, may eaſily be regulated between the Sovereigns, when they ſhall have agreed upon the principal Articles. There is only one Augmentation of Expence to be conſidered; and that is the Troops that muſt be maintain'd upon the Frontiers of the *Czar* on the ſide of the *Tartarians* and of *China*; and on the Frontiers of the *Grand Signior* on the ſide of *Perſia*, *Arabia*, and *Abyſſinia*; but theſe are Articles which may be eaſily formed, when Matters are brought to that Point.

ARTICLE VIII.

ASIATIC UNION.

THE *European* Union ſhall endeavour to procure in *Aſia*, a *permanent* Society like that of *Europe*, that Peace may be maintain'd There alſo; and eſpecially that it may have no cauſe to fear any *Aſiatic* Sovereign, either as to its Tranquility, or its Commerce in *Aſia*.

EXPLICATION.

BESIDES the preceding *Quota's*, there ſhall be alſo a *Quota* to pay the Bodies of the Troops which ſhall be, one upon the Frontiers of the *Muſcovites* and the *Tartars*, the other upon the Frontiers of *Turky* and *Perſia*; the third in *Egypt*. Two Bodies may be placed upon the *Caſpian* Sea.

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1. The more eaſily to hold a Correſpondence by Sea between the two Camps, and that they may be able mutually and ſpeedily to ſuccour each other. 2. That the Recruits may be carried into the *Eaſt* by the *Black Sea*, and that they may have but little way to go by Land, which will ſave the Charges of Carriage, and prevent Deſertion. 3. That one and the ſame *Generaliſſimo* may govern all, and for that purpoſe, the Union ſhould alſo have Ships upon the *Caſpian* Sea, under the Command of the *Generaliſſimo*. 4. To the intent that Money, Arms, Ammunitions, Cloaths, and Victuals, may be eaſily carried to both Camps without much Charge.

Now if each of thoſe two Bodies were of ſeventy five thouſand Men, and thirty thouſand Men in *Egypt*, it would be ſufficient in time of Peace, to ſecure the Frontiers of *Europe*; and ſuppoſing *France* to be the ſixth Part of *Europe* for Power, it ſhould ſupply the Treaſurer of the Union with wherewithal to pay thirty thouſand Men, that is to ſay, the ſixth part of the Troops; of which thirty thouſand there ſhould be about ſix thouſand ſeven hundred *French*, and the reſt ſhould be of the Neighbouring Nations; this *Quota* of *France* would not amount to fifteen Millions of Livres *per Annum*, and the Kingdom would gladly give the King ſuch a *Quota*, to remove the War eight hundred Leagues off from its Frontiers, to purge the Kingdom of turbulent and uneaſie Spirits, and to be thereby ſure of the Continuation of Commerce: It would coſt *Europe* but ninety Millions a Year to keep upon its Guard againſt the Princes of *Aſia* and *Africa*; whereas it now coſts the Sovereigns of *Europe* above two hundred Millions a Year to ſtand upon their Guard againſt each other in time of Peace; and above four hundred Millions, one Year with another, to defend themſelves, one againſt the other, in time of War; and this Expence of ninety Millions would not continue any longer than 'till the *Aſiatic* Society ſhould be effected: And I may ſome time or other prove, in another Part, that it will be much more eaſily formed than the *European* Society.

ADDITIONS, or *PARTICULAR MOTIVES.*

I HAVE ſet forth the Intereſts that all the Sovereigns and States of *Europe* have, in general, to form the *European* Society: I thought that before I concluded it would not be

be amiſs to make ſome further Reflections upon the Intereſts ſome of thoſe States and Sovereigns may have, in particular, in this Eſtabliſhment.

Intereſt of Poland.

WE with Horror behold the terrible Misfortunes into which that great State is fallen by the Diviſion ariſen among the Nobility of the Kingdom upon occaſion of electing their King, and yet what we know of them is infinitely ſhort of the real Deſolation of all the Provinces, of all the Cities, and almoſt of all the Families of that potent Republick; there is no Body but knows that the Duration of thoſe Misfortunes has proceeded from the almoſt Equality of the Parties; becauſe each Party has been ſometimes uppermoſt and ſometimes lowermoſt; becauſe it was impoſſible ſpeedily and entirely to reduce either of thoſe Parties; and in a word, becauſe they have had no Arbiter either ſufficiently powerful to hinder them from taking up Arms, and ruining each other, or ſo well inclined as to be deſirous of terminating their Differences *without War*.

But let us ſuppoſe that at length one of thoſe two Kings is become the ſole Maſter, that he is in peaceable Poſſeſſion, and that the Republick, after ſuch dreadful Agitations, is at laſt become ſerene; who can give it a *ſufficient Security* that, at the Death of the King, it ſhall not again fall into the like Misfortunes? Can the Families of the Great be without Jealouſie? Will all the *Polanders* for the future be born without Ambition? Is it poſſible that in ſo great a Number there ſhould be none either preſumptuous, or turbulent? Is it to be expected that Men will always prefer the publick Intereſt to their private? There is no room to hope for this at the Death of a King in an Elective Kingdom; the Fire of Diviſion is ready to rekindle, and every thing will be ſo much the more diſpoſed for it againſt the next Election, as the Kingdom has had time to cheriſh Party-Hatreds, and to accuſtom itſelf to live in the Diſorders of Civil Wars.

Now let the moſt prudent Man alive think upon a Preſervative againſt ſo dangerous and ſo terrible a Diſeaſe; there is none, unleſs there be in *Europe* a ſuperior Power which might be intereſted, in caſe two almoſt equal Parties ſhall be formed in the State, to impoſe upon them the happy Neceſſity of abſtaining from the Means of Arms, and of appealing to its Arbitration, if it cannot reconcile them by its mediating Commiſſioners.

But

But where can a Power be found ſo much ſuperior, as that either of the Parties may not poſſibly hope to reſiſt it? Where can a Power be found ſufficiently intereſted to keep up Peace among its Neighbours, unleſs it be the *European* Society? So that if any State is Much concerned to procure ſuch an Eſtabliſhment, it muſt be *Poland*, as well to free it ſelf from its Miſery, if it ſtill continues when the *European* Union is forming; as to deliver itſelf from it for ever, if the preſent Conteſt is concluded before that Eſtabliſhment.

Tho' that Republick may have Reaſons to like one of the preſent Pretenders more than the other; yet can that Advantage, be it what it will, be ever compared to the thouſandth part of the Misfortuues it has ſuſtained, and which it ſtill ſuſtains? And is there need of any great Diſcernment to perceive, that neither of thoſe Pretenders can ever repair the hundredth part of the Damages the War has cauſed to the State, and that the ſhalloweſt Prince *without War*, would always be infinitely more deſirable to them for King, than the moſt excellent one *with War*? And this is the immenſe Advantage which the *Polanders* will find in contributing to eſtabliſh a Society, which is to make all manner of Wars entirely impoſſible among them, and which will infallibly preſerve them in an unalterable Peace.

The Advantage a wiſe King may reap from the Eſtabliſhment of the European *Society, for his Minor Succeſſor.*

A WISE King may be apprehenſive of dying, before his Succeſſor is of Age to govern by himſelf: Let us ſuppoſe that he make a Will, in which he ſhall endeavour to prevent the different Diſeaſes which States are liable to in Minorities; that, foreſeeing its Diſeaſe he endeavour to preſcribe the moſt convenient Preſervatives, and the moſt effectual Remedies; that he eſtabliſh a Regent, and give him a Piece of Advice, without which he cannot decide certain important things, that ſhall be ſpecified; let us ſuppoſe that he even has the Foreſight to ſubſtitute skilful Miniſters in the Places of thoſe who may die before the Prince comes of Age; let us ſuppoſe that every thing is regulated beforehand for all the time of the Minority, Places at Court, Employments in the Army, the Ordering of the Revenues, the Choice of Governors of Places and Provinces, the Diſtribution of Penſions, Gratifications, Biſhopricks, and all other Favours, to the intent that nothing may be diſpoſed of by canvaſſing, that nothing may go to the higheſt Bidder, and that Merit and Talents may be reckoned for

for ſomething: What uſe will the wiſeſt Will in the World be of either to the minor King, or to his Kingdom, if he has no Security that that Act will be executed even for three Months?

It requires but a moderate Acquaintance with the World, a ſmall Knowledge of what has paſſed in preceding Regencies, to ſee, *1ſt*, That it is abſolutely impoſſible but that the Members of the Council muſt be divided, and ſeek much more to hurt and deſtroy each other, than to ſerve the minor King, and the Kingdom. *2dly*, It is impoſſible but that the Regent muſt ſoon aſſume the whole Authority, by his Favours to ſome, and his Threats and Puniſhments upon others; he will ſoon make himſelf abſolute Maſter in the Council, and employ complaiſant Miniſters, to turn out, under ſpecious Pretences, thoſe who either out of Probity, or thro' Ambition under the Veil of the Publick Good, ſhould be apt to reſiſt him. Now one of theſe two things muſt happen; either there will be formed a very ſtrong Cabal of Ambitious, or of Honeſt Men in the Council, and then beware of Diviſion, and Civil War: For it is ſoon kindled there where the Parties are much upon an Equality, where the Authority ſeems to divide and range itſelf part under the Standard of a Chief of a high Birth, and who will be ſaid to be ill-adviſed, and part under the Standard of Miniſters, who ſhall ſeem zealous for the Service of the King, and for the Intereſts of the State; and 'tis the greateſt Misfortune that can poſſibly happen to a Kingdom, when two Parties are formed, whoſe Equality may ſubſiſt.

If the Perſon of the minor King, and the Laws are in Danger, to whom ſhall the true Patriots fly for Succour? Which of them can hope to be in Safety of his Life and Fortune, if he complains of the Government? And if none can with Juſtice complain, without being ruined; if none may defend the Intereſts and Life of the Minor King, without being puniſhed as a Criminal; who will dare to ſpeak? And yet if no Body ſpeaks, what Remedy can be hoped for to the extreme Miſchiefs they may be threatned with? But even tho' they might complain with Impunity, what good would Complaints do, if they are addreſſed to no Body that has both Power and Will to remedy the Evil, to reſtore Things to their firſt Order, and to cauſe the Regent himſelf to execute, upon very great and inevitable Puniſhments, the Eſſential Articles of the prudent Will.

Now 'tis impoſſible to find any other Power beſides the *European* Society that can give a ſufficient Security for the exact Execution of the Articles of ſuch a Will, and ſup-

ply

ply what may have been omitted in it, either for the Safety of the minor King, or for the Tranquility and Good of the State: It will certainly be *ſufficiently powerful*, ſince it will conſiſt of the Strength of all *Europe*; and it will certainly be willing to cauſe every thing to be executed, ſince there is none of the Sovereigns that is not perſonally intereſted to procure to himſelf a Protection which his Family may ſoon ſtand in need of, in the like Caſe.

I think a prudent King, for the Safety of his Succeſſor, for the Good of the Regent and of the Council of the Regency, and for the Proſperity of his Kingdom, can never do any thing wiſer, in order to be ſure that his Will ſhall be executed, and that the State ſhall be well governed after his Death, than to get the *European* Union to accept of the Executorſhip of his Will, and Tutorſhip of the King, and to get it to name two Commiſſioners expreſly to aſſiſt at the Council of the Regency, to give an Account to the *European* Senate of every thing of Importance that ſhall paſs in that Council contrary to the Direction of the Will: Thus it is evident That King can never do any thing wiſer or more glorious, than to labour, for the remaining part of his Life, to eſtabliſh that Union, if it be not then already eſtabliſhed.

Intereſt of the Sovereigns of Italy.

I do not know whether the Houſe of *Auſtria* will remain in peaceable Poſſeſſion of *Naples* and *Milan*; but if it ſhould, how could the Princes of *Italy* be ſure of ſupporting themſelves againſt the Pretenſions, the Ambition, and the great Power of the Emperor, eſpecially if he kept himſelf in a readineſs to enter it forcibly at the firſt Minority, or the firſt Diſorders that may happen in *France* upon occaſion of a Regency.

Now if ſuch a Misfortune ſhould happen to *Europe*, would not thoſe Sovereigns be extremely happy if the *European* Society were already form'd? And are they not greatly intereſted to ſet about forming it before that Misfortune happens? Can they have any Negotiation of more Concern or Importance to enter upon than this? What will the World ſay of the great Wiſdom of the Senate of *Venice*, if, foreſeeing the Storm, they take no Precautions, while it is in their Power to take them? The *Switz*, that Nation ſo very fond of Liberty, will they ſuffer themſelves to fall aſleep, and to awake Slaves? Does the Duke of *Savoy* think he has any ſufficient Security, that he ſhall peaceably enjoy what he has had ſo much trouble to wreſt from the Houſe of

of *Auſtria*, if *France*, being weakened by a Minority, cannot give him neceſſary Aſſiſtance? What has the Great Duke lately experienced? What is he not to expect from ſuch a Power? And if the Houſe of *Auſtria*, notwithſtanding the preſent Diſtractions, appears to be ſo weighty and formidable, what will it be when it ſhall be no longer weakened by Diſtractions, and when it ſhall have Time and Power to reunite all its Forces? And if that Family already talks ſo proudly to *Rome* and *Genoa*, what will it do at the time when the helpful Voice of *France* can no longer make it ſelf be heard, to reconfirm Minds eaſily alarmed? The more timorous will yield in a Moment, and they will ſoon make uſe of thoſe many that ſhall have ſubmitted, to finiſh ſubduing the reſt of thoſe who ſhall ſtill have entertained ſome hopes of preſerving their Liberty.

The Advantages that England *may reap from the Eſtabliſhment of the* European *Society.*

IF at any time the Sovereigns of *England* ſhould endeavour to gain an Abſolute Power over their Subjects, where can the Subjects find Aſſiſtance againſt ſuch Enterprizes, unleſs it be in the *European* Society? Therefore it will be extremely much their Intereſt to ſollicit its Eſtabliſhment.

Beſides, the *Engliſh* would have two very conſiderable Advantages in the Union; firſt, the delivering themſelves from the Danger of Civil Wars, which may in ten Years, nay, at any time, happen among them, upon occaſion of the Difference between the Epiſcopal and the Presbyterian Religion.

Secondly, They might then recal a great many *Engliſh* and *Iriſh* Catholicks, by giving them the ſame Liberty as in *Holland*; neither need the Nation fear their making any Diſturbance, any Diviſion, any Sedition. Now this would be no ſmall Comfort to thoſe poor Refugees, and their Proteſtant Relations.

Intereſt of the Mahometans.

EVERY body knows that the Chief Reaſon why the Mahometan Sovereigns do not build Colleges, nor encourage their Subjects to the Study of the Sciences, and of liberal Arts, is their Fear of Schiſms and Wars, which the Diſputes of Theologiſts often occaſion. Hitherto it has been their Opinion, that nothing but profound Ignorance could ſecure them againſt thoſe Misfortunes; but ſo ſoon as they ſhould find that being in *Aſſociation* with the *European* Society, they ſhould have a Security for the Preſervation of the

the Peace both without and within their Dominions; it is probable they would ſoon follow the Methods of Chriſtian Countries in the Education of Youth, and the Advancement of Arts and Sciences: Thus this would be to them a new Motive to induce them to contribute with all their Power to form and confirm this great Eſtabliſhment; the Church would be a Gainer by it, ſince the more knowing the Mahometans were, the leſs would they adhere to their Opinions, and the more would they be diſpoſed to perceive the Beauty and Perfection of the Chriſtian Religion.

Intereſt of the Czar.

THE *Czar* has ſufficiently teſtified his Deſire to promote Commerce in his Provinces: He has great Advantages for that purpoſe on the part of Nature; his Country is interſperſed with very large Rivers, he has Ports in the Ocean, in the *Baltick*, in the *Black Sea*, in the *Caſpian Sea*; his Soil is very fruitful in a great many Places; his People are numerous, they only want a frequent and perpetual Commerce with Polite Nations, to improve themſelves in Manufactures and Arts: Now he has lately found by Experience how much War hinders the Accompliſhment of the Noble Projects he had form'd in that Point; thus it is very likely that ſo ſoon as ever he ſhall have the leaſt Inkling of a Project to ſettle an Everlaſting Peace among Chriſtians, he will be very forward to uſe all Means that may make it ſucceed.

Intereſt of the Sovereigns as to the next World.

HITHERTO, to determine the Sovereigns of *Europe* to ſign the Treaty of Union and to ſettle an Eſtabliſhment which is to produce an Everlaſting Peace, I thought it would be enough to ſet before them the divers Intereſts they may find in it, with reſpect to this Life; but I find that for their own Good, and for the Good of the thing, it would not be entirely uſeleſs to recommend to them at leaſt a Moment's Conſideration about the next Life. As it does not become me to pretend to direct or to preach, eſpecially in a Work of this Nature, I ſhall in a few Words ſet down the Reflections which another might expreſs with more Energy and Extent.

I do not believe that of the Four and twenty Sovereigns, before whom this Work may appear, there is one that confines all the Hopes of his Felicity to this Life, which is ſo ſhort, and ſo much mixed with Evils, that moſt Men are

tempted to believe there are, taking it all together, more Evils to ſuffer than Happineſſes to enjoy. The Hope of a happy Life after Death enters ſo naturally into the Soul, that 'tis as it were the principal Foundation of even the falſeſt Religions: The Happineſs of the Bad in this Life, the Miſeries of the Good, both which happen only by the permiſſive Laws of Providence, equally prove that God cannot be juſt unleſs he puniſh the one, and recompence the other in a Life which is to ſucceed to this; it ſeems to be an Opinion which all Men have from Nature it ſelf, or rather from God, as Author of Nature: Thus the Mahometan Princes, as well as their Subjects, conduct themſelves in ſeveral Affairs, with regard to that Hope; and indeed if there are any Men, any Sovereigns that are deprived of this Comfort in their Diſgraces, and of this agreeable Idea in their old Age, they ſeem to me to be of all Men the moſt wretched.

Now I ask if a Sovereign that can ſave all who profeſs Faith in Chriſt, for the ſpace of but fifty Years, from very great Misfortunes, and may by ſigning a Treaty hinder an infinite number of Violences, Paſſions, Rage, Anger, an infinite number of Murthers, Sacrileges, Thefts, unjuſt Exactions, and other Crimes very enormous in the Eyes of God; I ask, I ſay, if that Sovereign is not obliged to come into it, eſpecially if by that Treaty he can loſe no part of his Temporal Intereſts? I ask if he can reaſonably expect a happy Life after Death, and if he can reaſonably forbear to fear a very unhappy one, in refuſing to procure ſuch great Bleſſings for ſo many Families, and neglecting to prevent ſo many great Evils?

Now the Meritoriouſneſs of ſigning it, and the Faultineſs of not ſigning it, will infinitely encreaſe, if inſtead of Fifty Years we conſider that by coming into this Treaty that Sovereign for Ever ſaves Chriſtians from all the Miſchiefs of War, and to the end of Ages prevents all the Crimes that are almoſt neceſſary Conſequences of it, without taking any thing from his Kingdom, or from his People, or from his Family. I take it for granted that there is not one Caſuiſt in *Europe* who will ſay that in ſuch a Conjuncture a Sovereign, who ſhould refuſe to endeavour to procure an everlaſting Peace, can in Conſcience, and with any Reaſon, expect a future Life; I take it for granted that there is not one that does not think it a very great Crime to have it in his Power to prevent an infinite Number of Crimes, and not to prevent them, and that ſuch a Crime is of the Number of thoſe which are puniſhed with everlaſting Damnation.

I will go further; I take it for granted there is not even among the *Mahometan* Prieſts one that is not of the ſame Opinion; becauſe it is enough not to have entirely loſt the Lights of Nature, and to have ſome little *Idea* of Good and Evil, juſt and unjuſt, to know that God, who is Juſtice itſelf, does not reward wicked Princes, but puniſhes them according to their Wickedneſs; and that is it being extremely wicked to be able to prevent a great many Misfortunes and Crimes, by ſigning a Treaty full of Equity, and obſtinately to reſiſt ſigning ſuch a Treaty.

This is enough, and the little I have ſaid will ſuffice to make the Sovereigns give ſerious Attention to it. This is enough to ſhew Miniſters that they are in Conſcience obliged to repreſent the Truth to them: Beſides, can this new Conſideration be looked upon as uſeleſs in the Eſtabliſhment of the Union among the Chriſtian Princes; and if it may be of uſe in it, can any Body blame me for having endeavour'd to make uſe of it, and ſhewn that the Hope of a preſent Felicity, and the Fear of Temporal Evils, are Motives ſo much the more powerful, as they are in this caſe ſtrictly allied to the Hope of future Felicity, and the wholſome Fear of Eternal Evils.

Intereſt of a Kingdom ready to fall into Minority.

AS much as a Kingdom is diſtant from Civil Wars under the Reign of a Monarch of a firm and conſtant Character, and of an abſolute Authority; ſo much is it near falling into the Precipice under a Regency, where the Authority is divided between the Regent, and the Council of the Regency.

It is impoſſible for Men, when they have any thing to divide, ſo exactly to confine their Pretenſions to Equity, to Juſtice, that the one ſhall not demand more than the other thinks he ought to grant: So that they muſt of Neceſſity be divided, and when they acknowledge no ſuperior Authority to regulate their Differences, they are on both ſides prepared to decide them by means of Force; and they on each ſide are carried to it with ſo much the more Precipitation, as each Party fears being prevented by the oppoſite Party, and the firſt that has Arms in hand has an almoſt deciſive Advantage.

I therefore think, that good Citizens, that is, thoſe who are apprehenſive of Civil War, ſhould wiſh either that in the Regency the whole Authority be placed in one Head, even tho' but of mean Parts, and not extraordinary well adviſed, leſt the ſharing of Authority ſhould raiſe War among the Citizens; or that if by a Will that Authority is

ſhared, there be in *Europe* ſome ſuperior Power, deſirous to cauſe that Will to be executed. Suppoſing then the Authority of the Regency to be divided, good Citizens have nothing ſo much to wiſh as the Eſtabliſhment of the *European Society*, that in caſe of any Diſpute about the Diviſion of the Authority, the Pretenders may either be reconciled or judged by the Senate; but, which is of more Importance to the Kingdom, neither of the Parties will have the leaſt Thought of making uſe of the Means of Force: Thus it will be no more than a Common Law-Suit, of which the Subjects will be Spectators; a Suit that will not diſturb Commerce, nor arm Kindred againſt Kindred, Family againſt Family in one and the ſame City; nor Cities againſt Cities in one and the ſame Province; nor the Capital City againſt the Court; nor the Provinces againſt one another.

The more Biſhopricks and Eccleſiaſtical Preferments there are to be diſpoſed of in a State, the more Civil Offices to be filled, the more Dignities to be conferred, the more Employments and Penſions to be given, whether at Court, or in the Magiſtracy, or in the Revenues, or in the Army, or in Trade, or in the Arts and Sciences; the more is every one of thoſe that ſhare in the Authority jealous of another's having more than himſelf. Now this prodigious Number of Nominations which belong to the Monarch, will be the Envy of all thoſe that ſhall have part in the Royal Authority: On the other hand, if People are not obliged to follow their Opinion in theſe Nominations, their Authority is no longer any thing, and their Vote will decide nothing of Importance; ſince what is moſt important in a State, and moſt the Concern of the Subject, is the Diſtribution of Favours, Penſions, publick Employments both great and ſmall. This then is a Source for Parties, Cabals, and Seditions.

We have alſo unhappily, in moſt States of *Europe*, another Diſpoſition to Civil War; and that is the Poverty of a great many of the Citizens, who have rather ruined themſelves by their Luxury, than been impoveriſhed by the Greatneſs of the Taxes; thoſe who ought to ſet an Example to their Inferiors, have placed all their Honour and Diſtinction in having great Equipages, rather than in maintaining poor Penſioners; in building Palaces, rather than in ſupporting poor Communities; in buying fine Furniture, and magnificent Garments, rather than in aſſiſting poor Workmen; in loſing great Sums at Play, rather than in giving any thing to the Maintenance of Hoſpitals; in keeping nice Tables, rather than giving any thing to the uſe of Beggars, or to the Magiſtrates whereby to put an end to Beggary;

they

they have given us very ill Inſtructions how to place our Taſte as to Diſtinction: We have by their Example not only turned our Expence on that ſide, but we have alſo turned our Minds to it too; every one ſtrives who ſhall have the Honour of inventing ſomething new in Luxury, inſtead of endeavouring at Glory by new Inventions for putting an end to the Miſery of the Poor, or at leaſt to diminiſh it.

After ſo great a Corruption, after ſo great Indigence cauſed by Luxury, all we want to fill up the Meaſure of our Evils is the Conflagration of a Civil War; and Mens Minds are never ſo much inclined to it, as when every one, being diſcontented with his preſent Condition, fooliſhly believes that it cannot be worſe than it is; every wiſe Man, and eſpecially the rich, ſhould tremble when they ſee that we *Europeans* are at every inſtant upon the point of falling into the Precipice, unleſs every one ſeriouſly ſets himſelf, as well by his Power as by his Credit, to make the Potentates approve of the only Eſtabliſhment that can preſerve us from all War as well at home as abroad, and which can ſecure to us the Continuation of Commerce, both interior and exterior, by ſecuring to us an Everlaſting Peace.

Intereſt of thoſe States which may fear Parties upon occaſion of Differences in Religion.

IT is certain there are in *Europe* ſeveral States which may fear Civil Wars upon Occaſion of the Diſputes among Theologiſts. Now it is evident that if the *European* Union were formed, tho' it would not indeed terminate the Diſputes of Theologiſts, nor hinder new ones from ariſing, becauſe they have enow in Bank to laſt to the End of Ages; it would at leaſt hinder thoſe Diſputes from occaſioning any one to take up Arms, and Evidence might ſometimes ariſe from a Diſpute and terminate it, and that too without any Hazard of the Publick Repoſe; but if the *European* Union is not ſoon formed, there are ſeveral States have a great deal to fear from the Diſeaſe of Schiſm.

If we were to run over the particular Intereſts every State in *Europe* has to enter into the Union, I dare ſay we ſhould find very potent ones; becauſe Peace is the Foundation of all Intereſts: But at preſent I am not enough verſed in thoſe Particularities, to repreſent them to each Sovereign and to each Nation.

Intereſt

Intereſt of the Switz.

EVERY Body knows that a War has lately been kindled among the *Switz* Cantons : I am unacquainted with the Rights of the Pretenders ; but it is certain they have no *ſufficient* Preſervative againſt the Means of Arms, ſince they have taken up Arms againſt each other, and have already fought. Here are two Parties that have contrary Opinions and Pretenſions. Ought they not to have eſtabliſhed the Means of Arbitration among themſelves in ſuch a Manner, as that it ſhould have been impoſſible to have had recourſe to the Means of Arms to terminate ſuch Differences? Some Eſſential Article is therefore wanting in their Conventional Laws. And who does not know that a Law is very defective, when it does not provide againſt Accidents, whether in not eſtabliſhing perpetual Judges well enough, whether in not giving them Power enough, whether in not intereſting them enough in puniſhing thoſe who take a different Courſe than their Deciſion; laſtly, whether the Puniſhment of the Contravener is not either great enough, or not fear'd enough.

Here we ſee the *Swiſs* obliged to be at great Charges: Here we ſee Deaths, Wounds, Burnings, Families ruined and deſolated: Here we ſee their Commerce interrupted. Here we ſee the Weakeſt reduced to the Neceſſity of calling in Foreigners to their Aſſiſtance: Here we ſee their Society, and conſequently their Liberty, their Tranquility, their reciprocal Security very much ſhaken : Here we ſee the great Loſſes both the Subjects and the State in general muſt ſuſtain not only at preſent, but alſo the Miſeries they may fear for the future : They have one great Incitement to Diviſion, and that is, Difference in Religion.

Now is not this Event another manifeſt Proof that the greateſt Intereſt of the *Switz*, as alſo of all Republicks, is to avoid the Means of Arms to terminate their Differences, and that they can never obtain ſo great an Advantage, but by the Formation of the *European* Society?

THUS have I attain'd the ſole End of my Work, which was to prove that the *European* Society is abſolutely neceſſary to all the Sovereigns of *Europe*, and that it may eaſily be formed ; and this I dare be bold to affirm, That if once it is ſown, it is more probable it will take root and produce all the Fruit we can promiſe our ſelves from it, that is to ſay, it is more probable it will one Day be eſtabliſhed, than that it will never be eſtabliſhed.

Then

Then will be fulfilled the Prophecy, *Salutem ex Inimicis noſtris, & de manu omnium qui oderunt nos.* The Nations of *Europe* are Enemies, they hate each other; and yet in making a Treaty of a *permanent* Society, they will all contribute to the Preſervation and Felicity of each other.

The Progreſs of this Eſtabliſhment may, 'tis true, be very ſlow; but it may happen to be form'd in eighteen Months, eſpecially if ſuch Meaſures were taken which, if neceſſary, I ſhall point out in one Hour's reading.

I have demonſtrated all that could be demonſtrated, and all that was abſolutely neceſſary to demonſtrate; I have ſhewn all that was moſt probable; and this, I think, in ſuch a Caſe is all the Reader could expect from a private Man, who can prevail nothing upon thoſe who can do all things, any further than they themſelves ſhall have a Deſire to know and follow their trueſt Intereſts.

F I N I S.

Ad dirigendos pedes noſtros in viam Pacis.

ADVERTISEMENT.

THE Second Part of this Work, which is now in the Preſs, and will be publiſh'd in a Fortnight, conſiſts of all the Objections which the Author cou'd muſter up in relation to this *Project*, with compleat Anſwers to Each : Interſperſed with great Variety of Hiſtorical and Political Obſervations on the State and Condition of all the Countries in *Europe*. The Objections which he anſwers are as follows.

I. Obj. *The Houſe of* France *would be too powerful after the Reſtitution of the Conqueſts.*

II. *One Sovereign acknowledges Another ſuperior to him, whenever he makes that other his Judge.*

III. *How happens it that a Project ſo advantageous to all Princes was never hit upon before ?*

IV. *Sovereign Princes are not diſpaſſionate and cool enough for ſuch a Project.*

V. *If the Allies ſhou'd diſpenſe with themſelves from reſtoring the Conqueſts they ſhall make upon* France, *wou'd not that be an Addition to the Security they won'd find in the Treaty of the General Union ?*

VI. *What Equivalent will you give the* Engliſh *and* Dutch *for thoſe Places in* Flanders *which they keep in their Hands, to ſecure the Repayment of the Principal (with Intereſt) which they have lent to the Houſe of* Auſtria *this War ?*

VII. *Princes to give up all Pretenſions upon their Neighbours, and to be obliged never more to take up Arms, will be a great Obſtacle to the Union.*

VIII. *There will ever be in Sovereigns and other Men Principles of Diviſion, which Principles are oppoſite to ſuch an Union.*

IX. *Will a Prince ever conſent to enter into a Society, which, if he ſhou'd be minded to ſeparate himſelf from, may deprive of him of his Dominions ?*

X. *What Juſtice is there in the Union's ſupporting a Revolt in the Provinces of a Sovereign ?*

XI. *No Sovereign will like to have perpetual Arbiters to determine his future Differences.* XII. *As*

XII. *As the Deputies are not to give their Opinion in a Diſpute between two Sovereigns, 'till they ſhall have receiv'd Inſtructions from their Maſters, the Proceedings will be very tedious.*

XIII. *There will be Caballings in the Senate.*

XIV. *The Deſire of Aggrandizement will be a great Obſtacle in all ſorts of Men.*

XV. *War is a neceſſary Conſequence of Original Sin.*

XVI. *War is a Scourge of God, neceſſary to his Juſtice.*

XVII. Chriſtians *do not behave themſelves according to their trueſt Intereſts.*

XVIII. *This Project is too vaſt to be executed.*

XIX. *This Project will never be ſigned, even tho' it be practicable.*

XX. *Several Men of Wit, who have read the Work, foretell the* Engliſh *and* Dutch *will never ſign it.*

XXI. *Without War People would grow too numerous.*

XXII. *No Human Eſtabliſhment can be made unalterable.*

XXIII. Chriſtianity *and* Mahometiſm, *the* Muſcovites *and* Calviniſts, *can never be reconciled.*

XXIV. *The Glory which ſome Sovereigns expect from a ſucceſsful War will make them averſe to this Project.*

XXV. *Miniſters of State will oppoſe it. Conſiderations upon the Gentry imployed in the War.*

XXVI. *The Difficulty of making four and twenty Perſons concur.*

XXVII. *Too great Plenty will produce great Inconveniences.*

XXVIII. *War purges States of Seditious Spirits.*

XXIX. *It is impoſſible that even four or five ſhould begin to ſign.*

XXX. *It had been better if the Author had conceal'd his Country.*

XXXI. *The Difficulty in making Miniſters of State go out of their old way.*

XXXII. *Miniſters of State will not have leiſure to read it.*

XXXIII. *Would not the Author have done better to have given his Syſtem as if it had been a Platonic Idea?*

XXXIV. *Would it not be better firſt to drive the Turk out of* Europe?

XXXV. *The moſt powerful Princes will have cauſe to complain, in not having more Votes in the Debates, than the leaſt powerful.*

XXXVI. *Princes and Miniſters accuſtomed to a different way of thinking from what is contained in this Memorial, will be always a very great Obſtacle.*

XXXVII. *Miniſters of State will oppoſe this Project out of Pride, becauſe they were not the Contrivers of it themſelves.*

XXXVIII. *It is impoſſible to hinder the Riſe of Civil Wars.*

XXXIX. *The Houſe of* France *may league with the Houſe of* Auſtria.

XL. *The Charges of War are not ſo great, becauſe the Mony does not go out of the State, but paſſes from the Officers and Soldiers, to the Sutlers, Merchants,* &c.

XLI. *May not ſome Sovereign happen to run mad with Ambition?*

XLII. *A long continued Peace may efface all the Impreſſion which War has made upon the People's Minds.*

XLIII. *Princes will never read this Project, nor come to the Knowledge of it; 'tis their Unhappineſs ſeldom or never to hear the Truth.*

XLIV. *It requires a great deal of Penetration to ſee all the Advantages of the Project, and Princes are ſeldom attentive enough to ſuch Demonſtrations.*

XLV. *The Houſe of* France *will gain enough by it, without pretending to have any Reſtitution of her Conqueſts.*

XLVI. *A Sovereign Prince will never care to enter into the Treaty of Union, and run the Riſque of being puniſhed by the Ban of the* European *Republick.*

XLVII. *There are many more Paſſions, and thoſe more powerful, for the Syſtem of War, than for the Syſtem of Peace.*

XLVIII. *The Potentates that border upon* Europe *will be more ſeaſoned to War, and conſequently take the* European *Troops at an Advantage, by their having been diſuſed to War.*

XLIX. *The Opulence of a People diſpoſes them to revolt.*

L. *Tho' private Men ſee ever ſo clearly into the Intereſts of the Sovereigns under the Union, the Sovereigns themſelves will not ſee it.*

LI. *The Author ſhould have left the Objections unanſwered, in order to excite Opponents.*

LII. *The Work is too long, ſo that the Reader at the end forgets what he read at firſt.*

LIII. *The Author ought to have confined himſelf to have propoſed a* European *Chamber, like that of the Imperial.*

LIV. *Tyranny more to be feared in the Syſtem of Peace.*

LV. *The Allies will never be prevailed upon to make Reſtitution to the Houſe of* France.

LVI. *The Allies will look upon this Project as a Snare laid for them by the Houſe of* France.

LVII. *There*

LVII. *There are too many Repetitions in this Work, which makes it diſpleaſing.*

LVIII. Lorrain *will not be able to furniſh the Quota in* Soldiers.

LIX. *The* Germanick *Union ſolely formed againſt the Enterpriſes of the Emperor.*

LX. *May not the Merchants of* Edinburgh *appeal from the Queen to the* European *Senate?*

LXI. *The Intereſts of the Sovereigns appear throughout the Work ſomewhat oppoſite to the Intereſts of the Subjects.*

LXII. Henry IV. *did not really mean to ſet up the Eſtabliſhment of the* European *Society.*

While

While the laſt Sheet of this Volume was working off, the Publiſher receiv'd from the Author the following Letter.

A Paris au Palais Royal 14 *Avril* 1714.

J'Ai apris, Monſieur, que vous avez entrepris d'imprimer mon Ouvrage en Anglois. J'ai chargé un de mes Amis de vous remettre quelques Additions, que vous pourrez mettre à la fin du ſecond Tome: ce ſont des Eclairciſſemens, que vous pourrez mettre ſous le nom de *Suplément.*

J'en Envoyrai encore un cahier avant que vous ayez fini le ſecond Tome, mais le tout n'ira qu'a environ deux feuilles d'Impreſſion.

Cela rendra votre Edition encore plus ample que celle qui eſt deja faite.

Je ſuis, Monſieur, de tout mon cœur, votre trés humble & trés obeiſſant Serviteur,

L' Abbé de Saint Pierre.

Paris, Palais Royal, 14 Apr. 1714.

I Underſtand, Sir, that you have undertaken to Print my Book in Engliſh.

I have ordered a Friend of mine to give you ſome Additions, which you may put to the end of the Second Volume: They are Expoſitions (or Explications) which may go under the Name of a Suplement.

And I will ſend you another Additional Sheet before you have made an end of the Second Volume, but the whole will not amount to above two Sheets Print.

This will make your Edition much fuller than that you already have.

I am, Sir, with Sincerity, your very humble and very obedient Servant,

Abbot de Saint Pierre.